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# DEVELOPMENT AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY IN TURKEY BETWEEN THE YEARS 1950-1980

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## **Introduction**

The main discourse of the young cadres of the Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923, was based on strengthening political independence with economic independence. Correspondingly, the Izmir Economic Congress, which convened between February 17 and March 23, 1923, determined the basic economic orientation of the Republic and laid the cornerstones for the desired liberal development model that would last for approximately six years. However, as private capital lagged and the desired breakthroughs in industry failed to be achieved in the process, in addition, due to the Great Depression experienced in the world, the First Five-Year Industrial Plan (FFYIP) was put into practice which paved the way for statist development. Thus, the unique statism model of the founding cadre was shaped. The basic economic understanding of this model was characterized by neither the Soviets' unique strict model, nor the implementation of the pure liberalist policies of the West. This understanding of the economy, which was nurtured through the concrete realities of the country, provided achievements in FFYIP, and although it was soon decided to implement SFYIP in 1936, that plan failed to be implemented due to war conditions.

The Republican People's Party (CHP) administration, during its 12-year rule since Atatürk's death from 1938 to 1950, had a hard time keeping up with the old pace of industrialization breakthroughs. Many factors had an impact on this situation. The war environment of the 1940s in particular put the country in political and economic difficulties. The failed implementation of SFYIP due to war conditions, widespread black market practices, and difficulties in accessing staple food products summarize the economy of the period. As a result of these adverse conditions, the Wealth Tax was introduced on November 11, 1942 in order to increase tax revenues. The introduction of the Wealth Tax meant the collection of tax from property owners, big ranchers, businessmen, and certain people and companies obliged to pay tax. The severity of the situation could be even understood from radical decisions, such as sending those who did not pay their taxes to work elsewhere (Lewis, 2018: 399-400).

The radical measures taken within the country manifested within foreign policy in the form of close relations with the West. The main reason for these close relations with the

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West arose from the need to overcome the country's economic difficulties. This process, which constituted the beginning of an outward-oriented policy (Tekeli, 1979-1980: 294), became concrete through the Truman Doctrine (Kazgan, 2005: 95-99) and the Marshall Plan. On the other hand, not only economic reasons but also diplomatic and political reasons had been effective in establishing close relations with the West. Turkey's membership in NATO in the face of the Soviet threat and its military deployment to the Korean War brought Turkey closer to the West especially in the 1950s, although the process had started long before. However, on the other hand, the country's development of regional relations in response to the communist threat within the region (Baghdad Pact) also directly affected Turkey's economic policies. Starting from the 1950s, these political developments helped Turkey grow in confidence and integrate with the world, especially the Western world (Göktepe & Seydi, 2015: 206). The country's reflections of these developments came to light with the Urgent Industrial Plan of 1946 and the Economic Development Plans of 1947<sup>1</sup>. While the 1946 plan reflected the statist development understanding from the 1930s, the 1947 plan could be considered somewhat as the beginning of the liberalization that would later be frequently expressed. This plan led to the adoption of an approach that pushed industrial development which began in 1923, on the back burner, and prioritized development in agriculture (Avcı, 2000: 41). The plan shows support for agriculture via all other sectors, the establishment of transportation and communication infrastructure, and the serious paradigm changes that ultimately took place in the country. To make an even greater determination, the 1947 Economic Development Plan (Vaner Plan), although it was not able to be implemented, gave the early signals that distance between the West had ceased (Eşiyok, 2009: 123). All these preparations for the changes to take place, first showed effect in the change of political power in 1950.

In the following years, the country's first radical political break was experienced in the general elections held on May 14, 1950. The Democrat Party, which ended the 27 years of CHP government with 52.7% of the votes in the elections, desired to make significant changes not only in political policies, but also in economic policies. In this sense, the beginning of a political and economic tradition whose effects would reach until the present day was established. Undoubtedly, the radical discourse of the process that would take place from 1950 to 1960 was based on the desired change in economic policies. However, the question of how many of these economic policies were realized is disputable. Finally, with the military intervention experienced in Turkey for the first time in 1960, the private capital incentive policies of the DP period would be replaced by planned development, and the First Five-Year Development Plans planned for 1963

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<sup>1</sup> According to Eroğul 2013, the liberalization tendencies of the country were possibly said to date back prior to these plans, to 1945. The author bases this opinion on the San Francisco Conference in April 1945 and, from a domestic view, on the speech given by İsmet İnönü to address the May 19 celebrations. The main political conjuncture that this view focuses on is based on the liberalizing perspective on the transition to a multi-party system. In addition, details such as university autonomy and emphasizing the impropriety of anti-democratic practices can be considered the beginning of liberalization tendencies (Eroğul, 2013: 7).

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would gain a place on the national agenda. It is clear that this period's effects would continue until the 1980 Turkish coup d'état of September 12, and produced its own unique economic policies which in turn influenced the industrialization processes. The industrialization of this period and the geographical distribution of the industry were shaped around these economic policies.

In this study, the distribution of industrial organizations as a result of changing economic policies between 1950-1980 is discussed according to certain periods. In particular, the unequal distribution of industry across the country, which was also determined by the founding cadres of the Republic, reflects the basic characteristics of the distribution. This study focuses on the period from 1950 - 1980 and the four industrial censuses during these time periods were considered as the main data source. The geographical correspondence of all the data confirm the unequal distribution of industry within these time periods. On a macro-scale, the western part of the country stands out in terms of industrialization, while the eastern and southeastern parts remain weak in terms of industrial investments. This is the first distinct characteristic of Turkish industry. Another characteristic of the Turkish industry in this period is that the established industrial organizations fall under the scope of small industrial organizations. In all four industrial censuses, small industrial organizations outnumber large industrial facilities. This situation is still valid today.

### **Political First Break: 1950 General Elections and Industrial Organizations of The Democrat Party Era**

The young cadres of the Republic of Turkey, which emerged in 1923 with a new formation in the aftermath of the greatest war in the history of the world, proclaimed the Republic in 1923, and later tried to survive with support from a weak legacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire. In this sense, it should be stated that there was no systematic industrial heritage left to the Republic of Turkey, from the Ottoman Empire (İlkin, 1981: 93). Until the elections that took place on May 14, 1950, the country was not really dominated by a multi-party democratic structure. Founded on January 7, 1946 under the leadership of Celal Bayar, the Democrat Party (DP) gained 408 seats in the parliament in the May 1950 elections, whereas the 27-year-old CHP held only 69 seats. This did not just mean the change of the political power governing the country. It also meant that, instead of a bureaucratic and military elite group identified with the CHP, a different group which was less educated and more closely connected with feudalism, and had a commercial and legal formation gained representation in the country's governance. Another development that would further strengthen the DP government in the following years was the elections of May 2, 1954. In this election, with 58.4% of the votes and 503 seats in the parliament, the DP achieved an overwhelming victory over its closest rival CHP (Zürcher, 2017: 257-259). The period between 1950-1954 especially corresponds to the period when the DP was relatively successful, both in political and economic

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terms. The liberalization trends that were the main promise for the following years were replaced by an oppressive and authoritarian approach, identified with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Together with the deteriorations in the economy, which began in 1954 - 55, this authoritarian structure led to Turkey's first early election in 1957 which also marked the beginning of a period of regression for the DP. Their votes decreased from 58.4% to 47.3% and the number of its seats decreased to 424. The CHP, on the other hand, managed to increase the number of its seats from 31 to 178 in the same election (Zürcher, 2017: 269). The inability to stop the economic downturn and the fact that the DP lost its already weak support from bureaucratic and military circles resulted in a military coup on May 27, 1960 (Acar , 2001: 87) when Turkey faced the reality of a military coup which marked another first for the country, just like the early elections. Although economic problems such as the increase in USD by 300% along with the devaluation in 1958, played an important role in the occurrence of the military coup, internal and external political developments such as the oppressive internal policy of the DP administration<sup>2</sup> and the approach to the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviets<sup>3</sup> were also influential (Çakır, 2004; Bulut, 2009). This situation ended the 10-year political power of the DP, but it could not prevent a tradition formed over those 10 years from surviving to this day.

When the 10-year DP government is evaluated in five year periods and this first four or five year period is considered to be a successful period in economic terms, it can be assumed that the main economic sector behind this success is related to agriculture and developments in this field<sup>4</sup> (Eroğul, 2013: 132). Some positive developments in agriculture during the DP period are as follows: Providing cheap loans to farmers, keeping the prices of agricultural products artificially high, and increasing the number of cultivation areas in parallel with the increase in the number of tractors (Zürcher, 2017: 260-261). Undoubtedly, these developments in the field of agriculture were the best driving force to ensure growth rates exceeding 10% in those years. However, the other characteristic of the period related to agriculture, as opposed to these developments in rural areas, was the realization of unprecedented amounts of migration from rural areas to cities in Turkey and the increase in the number of residents in the cities (Lewis, 2018: 415). In other words, this corresponds to the dissolution of the rural area. The increase in the number of tractors in rural areas could be considered as the most visible reason for

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<sup>2</sup> For example, the division of Malatya into two (Malatya and Adıyaman) where people voted for the CHP and not for the DP in the 1954 elections; the fact that Kırşehir, once a province, where the CMP (Republican National Party) won all of the available five seats, was lowered to a district status on June 30, 1954 with the votes of DP deputies; arrests of journalists; the press being largely under the control of the DP; the introduction of the "Law on Meeting and Demonstration March" and the establishment of an Investigation Commission in the Parliament on April 18, 1960 (Bulut, 2009: 126-128).

<sup>3</sup> For example, Menderes' planned visit to Moscow and the increase in trade volume with the Eastern Bloc countries (Çakır, 2004: 61-65).

<sup>4</sup> The expansion of agricultural areas during the DP period was mainly in the form of the distribution of public lands. This situation allowed for an increase in the lands cultivated for agricultural purposes, while causing a decrease in meadows and pastures. In 1938 meadows and pastures covered 41,068 hectares (53.9%) while this number was 37,806 hectares (48.7%) in 1950 and 31,054 hectares (40%) in 1955 (Yasa, 1980: 165)

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this period, during which those who migrated to cities built shanty houses as informal places to live in within the boundaries of the city. And in the face of this settlement, the existing industrial facilities fell short of providing employment to this rapidly increasing population and, as a result, rapid unemployment began in the cities. All these processes not only caused an increase in the number of cities, but also in the total population and in the number of those living in the cities (Avcı, 2005: 8).

One of the most important parameters in the development literature to determine the level of development in countries is the state of industry. Industrialization and development were generally evaluated in parallel to each other, and the industrialization stage of countries is considered as an indicator of their development. Although the Republic's push of industrial development since its foundation in 1923 lost momentum from time to time, continuity was maintained.

One of the theoretical reflections of the political change in the country after 1950 took place in industrialization policies. The DP's liberal attitude in the economic model at a theoretical level contradicts the statist attitude it embraced in practice particularly in the industrial sector, as well as in other economic sectors<sup>5</sup>. First of all, certain prominent features came to the forefront during the economic conditions of this period. Among the main features of this period's economic policies are the realization of the accumulation of private capital, the expansion of the domestic market and the realization of development depending upon external resources including the Marshall Plan, etc. These policies, which also had an impact on industrialization, can be called as the new statism policies on a macro-scale. The theoretical framework on which these policies are based is shaped by liberal alignment. The idea of transferring activities, other than governance, security, and basic public services, to the private sector is the concrete equivalent of this alignment. One of the contradictions to these liberalization and privatization desires in practice is the SEEs (State Economic Enterprises). The expansion of SEEs and their increase in capital after 1953 is one of the fundamental contradictions to the economic policies of the DP administration (Kepenek, 1983: 1768-1769). From this point of view, it is true that the DP administration in the period between 1950 - 1960 pursued a new statist policy required by concrete conditions, rather than a pure liberal attitude. The reason for this attitude preferred by necessity in some way can be related to the absence of private capital that can feed the domestic demand.

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<sup>5</sup> According to Akat 1938, the definitions regarding the DP confirm this contradiction. Although the DP government was identified by the abolition of import prohibitions and the favoring of private ownership, the fact that it abandoned the contemptuous attitude for public entrepreneurship in its second 5-year term can be considered evidence of its adoption of statist policies. According to Akat, the most radical economic orientation in which the DP differed from the preceding 27-year CHP government is its populist approach to economy under expansionary monetary and budgetary policies. In some way this signaled the end of the previous period's "balanced budget - balanced payment" system (Akat, 1983: 1103-1105). Ultimately, most of the investments during the DP period were made within the scope of governmental industry. However, one of the criticisms in terms of the choice of location in this period's industry is about the wrong choices of location for factories. The factories of this period were established in unpromising places and in wrong sectors. One of the most concrete examples of this can be seen in the sugar industry. Excessive production in the sugar industry caused products to be exported at cheap prices (Zürcher, 2017: 261-262).

When the general distribution of Turkey's industrial facilities in 1950 is looked at, it can be seen that about three important industrial zones stand out (Tümertekin , 1957, s. 39). The first zone is the Marmara Region, where almost half of Turkey's industrial facilities were located in 1950, consisting of Bursa, Sakarya, Kocaeli, Balıkesir and, in particular, Istanbul. The second industrial zone is the area where Izmir and Manisa are at the center, while Ankara and Konya constitute the third most important industrial zone. These central industrial areas in Turkey are followed by Zonguldak and its surroundings, as well as Adana and Gaziantep. The fact that the industrial facilities in Zonguldak consist of heavy iron and steel industries and that new units were added to these facilities since 1950 was influential in the transformation of the province into one of the most important industrial areas. Indeed, the factory which was founded in 1936 with 36 million Turkish liras reached a capital amounting to 42 million Turkish liras in 1948 and 126 million Turkish liras in 1952 (Yurtoğlu, 2017: 177). For this reason, the distribution of industrial facilities in 1950 was related to the geographical characteristics of Turkey, but was largely shaped according to the economic policies of the early years of the Republic. Indeed, the number of existing industrial facilities in the entire Central and Eastern Black Sea regions and Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (except Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa) regions of Turkey is less than 1000 (Figure 1). The limited number of industrial facilities in these areas, as well as the fact that people make their living by cultivating the soil, and that there is no adequate transportation network between the city and the countryside, have effectively contributed to the low urban population in these areas (Figure 2).




Figure 1. Turkey in 1950, Distribution of Large and Small-Scale Industrial Facilities by Province.

**Source:** Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, (1955). *İstatistik Bülteni*. Ankara: T.C Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü.




Figure 2. The Amount of the City's Population in 1950 in Turkey.

**Source:** T.C. Başbakanlık İstatistik Genel Müdürlüğü. (1961). *22 Ekim 1950 Genel Nüfus Sayımı*. İstanbul: T.C. Başbakanlık İstatistik Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları.

According to the 1950 industrial census, the number of provinces with less than five hundred industrial plants was only fifteen, ten of which were to the east of Sivas. At that date, the Turkish province with the smallest number of industrial plants was Hakkari with 28, followed by Bingöl with 66 plants, Muş hosting 113 industrial plants, Ağrı with 115, Tunceli with 136, Bitlis hosting 147 plants, and Van with a total of 196. All of these provinces are located in the Eastern Anatolia Region and none of them was recorded with a number of industrial plants above 200. On the other hand, the provinces in the western part of Turkey host a higher number of industrial plants compared to the eastern ones including even cases with plants less than five hundred (363 in Yozgat, 390 in Sinop, 420 in Burdur, 425 in Bilecik, and 468 in Çankırı), going above four hundred in most cases. In the context of industrial plants across Turkey, such an unbalanced distribution was remarkable during the first years of the Republic (Sönmez & Ayık, 2018), and it still bears similar features today.

When Figures 1 and 2 are compared, it is observed that there is a close relationship between the distribution of industrial facilities and the distribution of urban population in this period. Except for a few provinces such as Zonguldak and Kayseri, the number of industrial facilities and the density of urban population coincide almost exactly. In fact, the existence of heavy industrial facilities in Zonguldak increased the population of the city over time, and the urban population in Kayseri, on the other hand, contributed to the development of industry in Kayseri. Therefore, both parameters triggered each other and contributed to the development.

The inadequacy of the private sector during this period can be confirmed by a number of factors. Various parameters in the number of plants referred to as large industrial facilities in the relevant period confirm this situation. The share of large state-owned

industrial facilities, in both the number of employees per workplace and annual wages is greater between 1950-1960 (Table 1). However, the factor that particularly reflects the basic characteristic of the large state-owned industrial facilities during this period is in the size of the added value created. The added value created in state-owned industrial facilities in the relevant period is greater than that of the private sector, except for some exceptional years (DİE , 1973: 206-207). Undoubtedly, the main reason for this situation is that the technology input was better in the state-owned facilities compared to the privately owned facilities to the degree enabled in that time period.

Table 1. Structure of State-Owned and Privately Owned Large Industrial Facilities Between 1950-1960

| <b>S: State</b>   |   | <b>Employees</b>     | <b>Annual</b> | <b>Production</b> | <b>Added Value in</b> | <b>Investment with</b> |
|-------------------|---|----------------------|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| <b>P: Private</b> |   | <b>per Workplace</b> | <b>Wage</b>   | <b>Value per</b>  | <b>Thousand TRY</b>   | <b>Current Prices</b>  |
|                   |   |                      |               | <b>Employee</b>   |                       |                        |
| 1950              | S | 738.2                | 1.840         | 12.229            | 5.629                 | 0.561                  |
|                   | P | 35.6                 | 1070          | 12.013            | 3.419                 | 0.407                  |
| 1955              | S | 605.6                | 3.028         | 21.674            | 9.915                 | 2.351                  |
|                   | P | 34.9                 | 1.962         | 20.792            | 6.495                 | 1.054                  |
| 1960              | S | 584.4                | 6.507         | 54.368            | 27.388                | 2.810                  |
|                   | P | 32.8                 | 4.718         | 44.050            | 14.004                | 1.601                  |

Source: Main source of the relevant data: State Institute of Statistics (DİE) (1973). Türkiye’de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı. Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yayınları. The values used in this study have been taken from Kepenek, Y. (1983). Türkiye’nin Sanayileşme Süreçleri. Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 7, 1760-1796.

The geographical characteristics of industrialization and industry were common in a number of characterizations during the DP period. The most important point that should be noted in this regard is that the import-substituting industrialization policies which started in the 1930s and concentrated on the production of consumer goods, began to become increasingly visible, thus it created an elementary or easy start for the import-substituting policies that would become more evident in the 1960s (Sönmez M. , 2004: 71-72). In the most general sense, import-substituting industrialization policies are based on the production of a product in the country by taking measures such as raising the customs rates of an imported product. As a result, the market to develop depending on the product is shaped rather according to the domestic demand. Import-substituting industrialization has the potential to turn into something that prevents competition and technology-based production over time (Dülger, 1991: 17). The second main feature of the DP period in the field of industry is the distribution of production by sub-sectors. Production during the DP period was mainly oriented towards the sugar, mining, iron and copper ore production, cement and weaving industries. Another characteristic arising from these conditions of industrial production was that facilities which belonged to these sub-sectors were determined based on political concerns and grounds, rather than according to the industry’s place of establishment characteristics. The criticism was due



the fact that Zonguldak's industrial facilities, which is in the third group and has 60 industrial facilities in total, were so large in size caused the proportion of the population employed in the industry to be almost the same as Istanbul, where there were about 1300 large industrial facilities during the time. In the Southeastern Anatolia Region, Gaziantep continued its development with 43 large industrial facilities, while in the Eastern Anatolia Region, Erzurum stood out with 18 large facilities. Kayseri with 41 facilities in the Central Anatolia Region and Samsun with 38 facilities in the Central Black Sea Region attracted attention as the cities started to develop in terms of industrial facility density (Figure 4).

In the 1950s especially, as the road transportation between rural and urban areas gradually developed, relations between urban and rural areas began to change and this situation started to manifest itself with both economic developments and migration events. Thus, by the 1960s, cities in Turkey began to become more and more crowded and slum areas around the city cores could be seen to take shape. Indeed, in 1960, the populations of Izmir and Ankara exceeded 500,000 while the populations in Adana, Konya and Bursa were more than 250,000. All provinces on the Samsun-Trabzon corridor in the Black Sea Region, as well as Erzurum in the Eastern Anatolia and all provinces in the Aegean Region, except Muğla and Burdur, exceeded a population of 100,000 (Figure 5).




Figure 4. The spatial distribution of large industrial plants in the early 1960s in Turkey

**Source:** Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü. (1968). *Sanayi ve İşyerleri Sayımı: İmalat Sanayi 1964*. Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü.




Figure 5. The Amount of Population in the Cities in Turkey 1960

Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü. (1963). 1960 Genel nüfus sayımı. Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası.

Turkey's membership in NATO in the face of the Soviet threat and military deployment to the Korean War brought Turkey closer to the West in the 1950s. But, on the other hand, regional pacts were established in response to the communist threat within the region and thus Turkey's economic policies were affected by this. Starting from the 1950s, these political developments helped Turkey grow in confidence and integrate with the world, especially the Western world (Göktepe & Seydi, 2015: 206). Indeed, although the unplanned and unscheduled economic policy pursued by the DP in the 1950s during a time when a turbulent political situation was dominating the world (Yücel, 2015: 53) caused Turkey to face various problems, the new political, military and political ties established by Turkey helped both the acceleration and diversification of the Turkish economy and contributed to the globalization of Turkey's economic relations.

### **The Beginning of Military Intervention Processes in Turkey and the Transition to a Planned Development Period**

The relations established with the military by political circles in Turkey did not stand out for their characteristics of being continuous, but of being problematic. The military, especially during the late periods of the Ottoman Empire, made people feel its potential to gain authority in the civil government. Although the Republic of Turkey, which was established in 1923, did not see any direct or concrete military intervention until 1960, this did not mean that the military did not oversee civilian administrations. The formal equivalent of the role played by the military upon the administration was based on the continuity of Atatürk's revolutions. Therefore, the military's opinions played an important role in many issues including the post-1938 CHP administrations in particular, as well as the transition to multi-party system. On the other hand, the military seized control of the government when it thought that the continuity of the system was in danger. In the period after 1923, the first time the military gave its concerns regarding the system corresponds to the termination of the 10-year Menderes government with an intervention on May 27,

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1960 (Erder, Karaosmanođlu, ilingirođlu, & Sönmez, 2003: 7). This was also the first coup experienced by the young Republic in 37 years.

Many factors played a role in the 1960 coup. However, the most important political reason for this intervention was without any doubt, the DP government's understanding of governance which was represented by Adnan Menderes which became harsher with each passing day. This situation caused a serious disturbance within the DP, the bureaucracy and the military, and in particular within the CHP. In addition to this, the weakening of the military's financial situation, the weakening of soldiers' social status, and the efforts by the DP to take the army under its control were also very effective (Turhan, 1991: 172). The most radical change seen after the coup was the split of the Parliament into two structures: the National Assembly and the Senate of the Republic (T.C. Temsilciler Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 1961). The second radical amendment was the establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO) by Law No. 91. The last amendment was the 1961 constitution adopted via a referendum (Acar , 2001: 88; Erder, Karaosmanođlu, ilingirođlu, & Sönmez, 2003: 3). One of the innovations brought about by the 1961 constitution regarding the industry were the gains made by the working class from the upper ranks. The 1961 constitution granted many concessions to the working class, which could not assume an organized structure during the history of Turkey. The right to become unionized, as well as subsequent bargaining rights, can be regarded as gains made by the working class after the 1960 process (Keyder, 2014: 183).

The first impression regarding the military's failed involvement in political life through intervention was seen in the aftermath of the elections held on October 15, 1961. In the elections, the CHP gained 173 seats with 36.7% of the votes while the Justice party (AP), which was the successor to the DP, won 158 seats with 34.8% of the votes. This, together with the 65 seats won by the New Turkey Party (YTP), which was on the same political spectrum as the AP, can draw the conclusion that political developments resulted in a manner that the military did not expect at all (Zürcher, 2017: 284). In the 4-year period from 1961 to 1965, the political history of Turkey experienced many coalition governments. Although İnönü rose to prominence in the coalition governments with the support of the military, he could not succeed. As a result of many unsuccessful attempts, the country once again went to the polls on October 10, 1965. Consequently, important political figures, especially Süleyman Demirel, began to be visible in the political life of Turkey. The AP won the 1965 elections by 53% (240 deputies) while the CHP remained at 28.7% (134 deputies). This overwhelming victory also continued in the 1969 elections. According to the results of this election, the AP received 46.5% of the votes (256 deputies) and the CHP had 27% (143 deputies) (Zürcher, 2017: 288-290).

Despite Demirel's strong votes in the political arena, his crises experienced in practice led to the military memorandum of March 12, 1971. This memorandum was the second

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military coup experienced by Turkey. The basic expectation of the military was essentially the same as the previous coup, with the termination of the conflicts that endangered the Republic being presented as justification for the memorandum. The first election in the country after Nihat Erim as the prime minister and Fahri Korutürk as the president, was held on October 14, 1973. Under Ecevit's leadership, the CHP received 33.5% of the votes (185 deputies) while the AP remained at 29.5% (149 deputies) (Zürcher, 2017: 296-299). However, this process could not prevent coalition and minority governments or the social conflicts that had been endlessly seen on the political ground since 1973 and brought forth the coup of September 12, 1980 which mainly stood out with social and economic radical changes. This was also the third coup experienced by Turkey.

These changes in the political field created their counterparts in the economic field as well. The fact that one of the policies was implemented by the military into the economy, unlike the DP era, after the 1960 intervention, confirms this situation. After 1960, Turkey established the State Planning Organization (SPO), and with five-year development plans - the first of which was to be implemented in 1963 - the country switched to a planned approach in economy as opposed to the previous periods<sup>6</sup>. On a macro-scale, it is understood that the economy entered a positive development course especially in the period of the first three plans. Undoubtedly, developments in the industry and service sector had a share in this improved and positive development in the economy. The main process characterized in the post-1960 industry was about the import-substituting industrialization model becoming further evident. The import-substituting industrialization model is actually the equivalent of Keynesian policies, which became more and more prominent in the West after WWII, in the surrounding countries. Keynesian structuring in the West was characterized by elements such as statist economics, and the redistribution of income among the classes. In neighboring countries such as Turkey, this process was named as the import-substituting industrialization (ISI) and was characterized by its unique structural features. Within the framework of the general definition, ISI is based on producing goods, which are normally imported from abroad, within the country by means of various customs protection measures. The main elements of Turkey's ISI policies that became evident in the 1960s and were implemented until the 1980s, were not about competing with international capital, but about carrying out one part of the production in the surrounding countries in a manner supported by the international system. It is important to note that there was no detachment from the international system with ISI. The idea of producing industries requiring standard

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<sup>6</sup> It is necessary to evaluate the planned period that Turkey entered with the 1960s within the framework of capitalism's own structuring. Keynesian economic policies, represented by the capitalist system show parallelism with the planned development model implemented by Turkey in the 1960s. In addition, the fact that many Western institutions supported the planning process in Turkey, especially the OECD's statement regarding the need for discipline in public spending, confirms that Turkey was in agreement with the international capitalist system. This situation changed with the crisis of Keynesian policies towards the end of 1970s. Moreover, Turkey lost no time in integrating into the international capitalist system, first with the resolutions of January 24, 1980 and then with the coup of 1980. This transition can be considered the beginning of the full free market economy dominance that survived to this day.

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technology in neighboring countries was also supported by the central countries, which confirms this situation. Another reason why ISI policies were encouraged in Turkey was the need to protect the foreign exchange input that was limited in the 1960s. Thus, the production of particularly durable consumer goods in the country would ensure that the scarce source of foreign exchange remains in the country. According to ISI, the production of the required goods within the country necessitates a sufficient amount of maturing also within the domestic market. With ISI, the shift of production from sectors such as textiles to durable consumer goods, especially automotive, brought along a consumer demand that would support the domestic market. The success of this new accumulation model, which Turkey experienced in the 1960s, was based on its ability to keep consumer demand alive. In Turkey, measures were taken after the 1960s to support consumer demand, especially under the leadership of the state, in an attempt to ensure the continuity of production shaped according to the domestic market. After 1977 onwards especially, ISI went through a crisis, one reason was due to the state remained weak in implementing incentives to support consumer demands due to crisis trends seen within the country. The crisis regarding the new ISI-based accumulation model changed to a holistic structure in the 1980s, and the period to switch to an export-based model began (Keyder, 2014: 185-194). In addition to great similarities between the ISI policies in Turkey and other neighboring countries and the Keynesian policies, these two approaches also match due to the failure to support domestic demand in terms of crisis trends' starting points. The most concrete expression of Turkey's ISI policies read as follows in the FFYIP: *"In order to overcome the drawbacks of being underdeveloped in foreign trade relations with developed countries, an ad valorem general protection that is not too high is required. This general protection should tend to decrease over time. In addition, a very selective special protection is required to protect and develop newly emerged industries. However, it is essential that these industries comply with the planned objectives. On the other hand, the decrease in the production costs of these industries over time will be ensured by considering their technical and financial structures. It will be ensured that these industries are as few as possible and do not lead to a large increase in costs"* (DPT, 1963: 521).<sup>7</sup>

The economic policies realized during this period were relatively successful and ensured the continuous increase of Turkey's GNP. Indeed, the growth rate of GNP was 6.4% between 1963-67 while it reached 6.7% between 1968-72 and 7.2% between 1973-77. This period of time also corresponds to the period in which three five-year development plans were made. From this point of view, the driving power behind the growth during the period of the three development plans was due to the industrial and service sectors, while the plans could also be considered successful. In addition, a comparison of 55 countries

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<sup>7</sup> For a detailed analysis of the main components, structure, political and economic implications of the import-substituting industrialization model, see: Hirschman, A. (1968). The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82(1), 1-32.

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with the same income level as Turkey during that period revealed that the average growth rate of 6% in these countries was less than that of Turkey (Çeçen, Doğruel, & Doğruel, 1994: 38). However, the series of developments that began with the oil crises of 1974 would later bring the economy's positive developments to an end. Turkey managed to delay the crisis by three years with various measures, but eventually experienced it more severely. Exports decreased by 200 million USD compared to the previous period, imports increased by 13% and foreign trade deficit exceeded 4 billion USD (Boratov , 2005: 140). In addition to the oil crisis, the embargoes imposed on Turkey due to the Cyprus Peace Operation in this period also had an effect, causing inflation in Turkey to rise above 50% and thus the Turkish economy suffered serious losses.

A detailed review of the plans allows for a better understanding of sectoral trends. At the theoretical level, the outstanding share of the industry is also confirmed by the data. Among the main objectives of the first plan, which covered the period between 1963 - 1967, were to ensure that the annual growth rate is around 7%, solve the employment problem, and achieve a balance in foreign payments, etc. There were also industry-enhancing objectives such as taking special measures to develop industry and carrying out fund transfers for the private sector (DPT, 1963). A more significant emphasis on industry and development took place in the second plan. The basic principle of the second plan was to ensure a rapid and balanced development that would best evaluate the development power of various sectors. According to the plan, industrialization is essential to achieve a rapid development. Apart from the fact that the industry was characterized as an economy-driving sector, the basic strategic industries producing investment and intermediate goods in particular would be established and the industries producing luxury consumer goods would not be encouraged (DPT, 1967). The emphasis on industrialization continued in the third five-year development plan. However, the idea of industrialization in this period contains structural differences from the past. Industrial facilities producing consumer goods would be replaced by investment and intermediate good-producing facilities. The role of the heavy industry, on the other hand, would be increased (DPT, 1972).

After the 1960 coup, economic and industrialization policies changed and until January 1980, a mixed economy was implemented by applying import-substituting economic policies to the public and private sectors as a developmental strategy. The period between 1963-1977 was the period in which the import substitution grew the fastest, as did capital accumulation (Yücel, 2015: 53-54). Therefore in this period, Turkey's industry grew steadily, based on domestic contribution and spatially expanded into larger areas. Indeed, by 1970, the provinces where the number of small-scale industrial facilities

were under 500, were located in Eastern Anatolia with seven in total. The number of provinces, where there were 500 to 1000 small-scale industrial facilities, was only 12, mainly in the Eastern Anatolia Region. On the other hand, the number of small-scale industrial facilities exceeded 10,000 in Izmir, and exceeded 5,000 in Bursa, Ankara, Konya and Manisa. In all the remaining provinces, the number of small-scale industrial facilities was over 1,000. Other cities in Turkey entered an important industrialization phase during this period, and as the number of facilities increased, new industrial areas emerged in different parts of Anatolia (Figure 6).

The fact that the industry in Turkey also began to improve in various provinces in a planned way brought about a dispersed population in Turkey. Indeed, the industrial investments made in and around Ankara from 1950 to 1970 brought forth a rapid increase in the population of the province and in 1970, the population of Ankara city exceeded 1 million. Izmir reached a population of over 500,000 while the population of Konya, Gaziantep, Manisa and Balıkesir exceeded 250,000. In addition, the population of all provincial cities in the Southeastern Anatolia Region, excluding Adıyaman, exceeded 100,000. In Eastern Anatolia, the population of provinces other than Malatya, Elazığ, Kars and Erzurum had yet to exceed 100,000 and the industrial facilities in these provinces were also very few in number. On the other hand, most of the provincial cities in the west of Anatolia, the Black Sea, Mediterranean and Central Anatolia exceeded 100,000 (Figure 7). When Figure 5 and Figure 6 are compared, it clear that this general population growth in Turkish cities shows parallelism with industrial facilities.




Figure 6. Spatial Distribution of the Small-Scale Industrial Plants in Turkey in 1970.

**Source:** Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü. (1976). Genel Sanayi ve İşyerleri Sayımı Temel Anket Sonuçları 1970. Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü.




Figure 7. The amount of population in the cities in Turkey in 1970

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu. 1970 Genel Nüfus Sayımları.

New areas of industrial activity began to emerge in Turkey with new planning studies in the 1970s. Especially by the end of the 1960s, new incentive policies were developed along with Investment Incentives and the implementation of Priority Regions in Development attempted to be realized in order to prevent regional inequalities. Moreover, flour, sugar and textiles, which had an important place in the industry of Turkey since the first period of the Republic, began to be replaced by coal, fuel and iron in the 1960s. In the 1970s, it can be seen that the automotive industry, which started to gain an important place in Turkey in the 1960s, came to the fore. Major automotive brands such as Ford, Fiat and Renault made significant investments hand in hand with domestic capital in Turkey.

When these plans are evaluated in terms of the emphasis placed on industry, the targeted rate of fixed capital investment in the manufacturing industry in the first plan was 16.9% while the realization rate was 20.4% in the same period. Likewise, during the period of the second plan, the target rate of 22.4% was realized as 26.8% at the end of the plan. Finally, in the third plan period, manufacturing industry investments, which were targeted as 31.1%, were realized as 28.2%. The role of industry in development during the planned development period is undeniable especially when the manufacturing industry's development course in the three plans is taken into consideration (Table 1). In contrast to the manufacturing industry, there were downward trends in terms of targeted and realized investments in agriculture. Agricultural investments, which were targeted as 17.7% in the first plan period, were realized as 13.9% at the end of the period and the

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investment rate targeted as 15.2% in the second plan was 11.1% at the end of the period. The target share in the agricultural area, which was 11.7% in the last plan period, was realized as 11.8% (Table 1). In addition to agriculture, the fixed capital investments in the housing sector are understood to have exceeded the target decided during the three plan periods. In the first plan, the targeted rate of housing investments was 20.3% while the realized rate was 22.4%. In addition to this, while the investment targeted for the second plan fell to 17.9%, the realization rate of the investment remained above the target with 20.1%. In the last plan, the targeted investment rate for housing investments was 15.7% and the realized investment rate was 16.9%.

This period, in which Turkey turned especially towards petrochemical, iron and steel, automotive and mining industries instead of agriculture-based industry, slowed down due to the oil crisis and the Cyprus Peace Operation that arose towards the midst of the 1970s. The start of right-left conflicts in Turkey in the period following these events would later lead to the January 24, 1980 economic resolutions and the 1980 Turkish coup d'état on September 12 that would reshape the economic and political life in Turkey.

In the 1970s, the central industrial areas of today's Turkey roughly began to take shape. When the general distribution of small-scale industrial areas is looked at, it can be seen that Ankara also reached over 10,000 small industrial facilities, just like Istanbul and Izmir. Adana, on the other hand, entered a growth trend especially with the support of private capital and reached more than 5,000 small industrial facilities. In addition, in other provinces of Turkey, a picture that is similar to the situation in 1970 can be seen (Figure 8). When the distribution of the industrial facilities with more than 10 workers is looked at, there was a density based in Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa and Ankara in 1964, and in 1980 not only did the number of large-scale industrial facilities increase in these provinces but also these provinces were joined by cities including Balıkesir, Manisa, Aydın, Denizli, Konya, Eskişehir, Kayseri, Adana, Gaziantep, Zonguldak and Samsun which are also today's important industrial and commercial cities. Similarly, while the number of large-scale industrial facilities in the provinces of Malatya, Elazığ and Van in Eastern Anatolia exceeded 10, it is noteworthy that there was an increase in Diyarbakır in the Southeastern Anatolia Region. When Figure 3 and Figure 8 are compared against each other, it is clear that there was a significant increase in the number of industrial facilities employing more than 10 workers throughout Turkey, except for some of the provinces in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions, during a 16-year period in Turkey (Figure 4 and Figure 9).

By the year 1980, there was also a rapid increase in the population of cities in Turkey. During this period, the city populations of Adana, Gaziantep, Konya and Bursa increased to over 500,000. The population increase in these provinces was in parallel with the development of large-scale industry. Other cities that followed included Kayseri, Manisa, Zonguldak, Balıkesir, Eskişehir and Samsun as they exceeded the population threshold of 250,000. While these cities already had an industrial infrastructure, Mersin and Hatay which stood out with their port advantage, as well as Kocaeli located in the hinterland of Istanbul were newcomers to the ranks of rapidly growing cities thanks to industrialization. Apart from this, it is also possible to say that there was a rapid urbanization process in Turkey between the years 1970-80 without being dependent on industrialization. As a matter of fact, all the provincial centers in the Marmara region, except Bilecik, and all the provincial centers in the Aegean and Southeastern Anatolia regions exceeded the population threshold of 100,000. While only the city of Burdur could not reach a population of 100,000 in the Mediterranean region, Hakkari, Bitlis, Muş, Bingöl and Erzincan in the Eastern Anatolia region, Çankırı, Kırşehir and Nevşehir in the Central Anatolia region and Artvin, Rize, Gümüşhane, Bayburt, Sinop and Kastamonu in the Black Sea region also remained below a population of 100,000 (Figure 10). In this period, most of the provinces that could not exceed the population threshold of 100,000 could not increase in population due to the disadvantages created by their geographical location, especially given the transportation drawbacks, while another part could just not find development opportunities due to being located nearby big cities. Therefore, it is possible to say that industrialization in Turkey largely took its present form in 1980 and that the population moved accordingly.




Figure 8. Spatial Distribution of the Small-Scale Industrial Facilities According to the Provinces in Turkey in 1980.

Source: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü. (1982). *1980 Genel Sanayi ve İşyerleri Sayımı II Küçük İmalat Sanayi (Geçici Sonuçlar)*. Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası.




Figure 9. Spatial distribution of large industrial plant in Turkey in 1980

Source: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü. (1985). *1980 Genel Sanayi ve İşyerleri Sayımı İkinci Aşama Sonuçları I Büyük İmalat Sanayi*. Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü.




Figure 10. The amount of population in the cities in Turkey in 1980

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu. 1980 Genel Nüfus Sayımları.

When looking at the investment sources among the sectors, some details attract attention. For example, the fixed capital investments realized in the third plan covering the years between 1973-1977 amounted to 626 billion TL in total, in 1976 prices. While 319.6 billion TL of this amount was realized in the form of public investments, the remaining 306.4 billion TL was made by the private sector. In the same period, the total planned capital investment in the manufacturing industry was 215.8 billion TL while the actual investment was 176.8 billion TL. Although the planned and realized investments could not be met, it is understood that the realization in the manufacturing industry had a high ratio of 81.9% in total. Furthermore, the superiority of the manufacturing industry in

terms of the amount of investment realized among sectors is remarkable. In the same period, the closest investment to the manufacturing industry was realized in the housing area with 108.3 billion TL. The doubled difference is remarkable. It is understood that the private sector was slightly ahead of the public sector in fixed capital investments realized in the manufacturing industry during the third planned period. The public sector investment target of 105.9 billion TL was realized as 76.7 billion TL (72.4%) while the private sector investments targeted at 109.9 billion TL were realized as 100.1 billion TL (91.1%) (Table 2). From this point of view, it can be said that public investments in the manufacturing industry had a greater part in the non-achievement of the desired target.

Table 2. Sectoral Distribution of Fixed Capital Investments in 1976 Prices (%)

|                |              | First Five-Year Development Plan<br>1963-1967 |              | Second Five-Year Development Plan<br>1968-1972 |              | Third Five-Year Development Plan<br>1973-1977 |  |
|----------------|--------------|---|--------------|--|--------------|---|--|
| Sectors        | Planned Goal | Realization                                   | Planned Goal | Realization                                    | Planned Goal | Realization                                   |  |
| Agriculture    | 17.7         | 13.9  | 15.2         | 11.1   | 11.7         | 11.8  |  |
| Mining         | 5.4          | 5.6   | 3.7          | 3.3  | 5.8          | 3.7   |  |
| Manufacturing  | 16.9         | 20.4  | 22.4         | 26.8   | 31.1         | 28.2  |  |
| Energy         | 8.6          | 6.5   | 8.0          | 9.0  | 8.5          | 7.4   |  |
| Transportation | 13.7         | 15.6  | 16.1         | 16.0   | 14.5         | 20.6  |  |
| Tourism        | 1.4          | 1.3   | 2.3          | 2.1  | 1.6          | 1.0   |  |
| Housing        | 20.3         | 22.4  | 17.9         | 20.1   | 15.7         | 16.9  |  |
| Education      | 7.1          | 6.6   | 6.7          | 4.7  | 5.0          | 3.3   |  |
| Health         | 2.3          | 1.8   | 1.8          | 1.5  | 1.4          | 1.1   |  |
| Other Services | 6.6          | 5.9   | 5.9          | 5.4  | 4.7          | 6.0   |  |

Source: DPT. (1979). Dördüncü Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı 1979-1983. Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı.

Due to the complexity of its targeted social and political structure, the sharp deteriorations seen in the economy, the constant increase of foreign debt, the rapid increase in inflation, and the rapid decline of foreign exchange reserves (Yenal, 2003: 94), the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan should be evaluated separately from the first three plans. This is due to the plan being implemented with a one year delay. For this reason, the first three development plans were taken as basis in this study. The magnitude of social conflict, the start of separatist movements, the deteriorations in the economy before 1980 and the September 12 intervention in the country after 1980, provide evidence that the environment in which the plan was implemented was not healthy.

The social and economic conditions that created the September 12, 1980 intervention should be considered separately. Political conflicts, especially in cities, are considered

to be the most important cause of the September 12. However, the most important reason for the September 12, 1980 intervention was the deterioration experienced in the economy. Especially the disappearance of the sustainability of the import-substituting policies in the industrialization policy required the introduction of a new model. Under the influence of this economic structure, Turkey introduced the January 24 resolutions, which are a series of harsh and sharp measures to the extent that was never experienced before.

Table 3. Fixed Capital Investments Realized in the 3rd Development Plan (by 1976 Prices, in Billion TL).

|                | State |             |                      | Private |             |                      | Total |             |                      |
|----------------|-------|-------------|----------------------|---------|-------------|----------------------|-------|-------------|----------------------|
|                | Plan  | Realization | Realization Rate (%) | Plan    | Realization | Realization Rate (%) | Plan  | Realization | Realization Rate (%) |
| Agriculture    | 42.9  | 32.3        | 75.3                 | 38.3    | 41.7        | 41.7                 | 81.2  | 74.0        | 91.1                 |
| Mining         | 33.0  | 21.3        | 64.6                 | 7.1     | 1.7         | 1.7                  | 40.1  | 23.0        | 57.4                 |
| Manufacturing  | 105.9 | 76.7        | 72.4                 | 109.9   | 100.1       | 91.1                 | 215.8 | 176.8       | 81.9                 |
| Energy         | 54.4  | 44.9        | 82.5                 | 4.7     | 1.3         | 27.7                 | 59.1  | 46.2        | 78.2                 |
| Transportation | 78.6  | 79.4        | 101.0                | 21.3    | 49.4        | 231.9                | 99.9  | 128.8       | 128.9                |
| Tourism        | 4.2   | 2.8         | 66.7                 | 6.9     | 3.5         | 50.7                 | 11.1  | 6.3         | 56.8                 |
| Housing        | 5.4   | 6.8         | 125.9                | 102.9   | 99.3        | 96.5                 | 108.3 | 106.1       | 98.0                 |
| Education      | 32.8  | 19.9        | 60.7                 | 1.7     | 0.7         | 41.2                 | 34.5  | 20.6        | 59.7                 |
| Health         | 9.4   | 6.4         | 69.2                 | 0.4     | 0.4         | 100                  | 9.8   | 6.8         | 70.4                 |
| Other Services | 23.4  | 29.1        | 124.4                | 8.6     | 8.3         | 96.5                 | 32.0  | 37.4        | 116.9                |
| Total          | 390.0 | 319.6       | 82.0                 | 301.8   | 306.4       | 306.4                | 691.8 | 626.0       | 90.5                 |

Source: DPT. (1979). *Dördüncü Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı 1979-1983*. Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı.

Urbanization movements between 1950 and 1980 were also largely associated with the industry. Indeed, the migrations during this period were largely from rural parts of cities, and partly from east to west, and were largely different from the migration movements after 1980.

However, the intervention of September 12, 1980 not only changed the social atmosphere but also formed the beginning of a switch from import-substituting policies to export-oriented economic policies. This changing of economic understanding was realized as a result of the neoliberalist restructuring policies of the resolutions of January 24, 1980<sup>8</sup>. Undoubtedly, the January 24, 1980 resolutions contained such strict measures that had not been seen before in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Some of the main objectives of the resolutions were to take high inflation under control, and to ensure the equilibrium of domestic supply and demand and the balance of payments abroad. Some drastic changes were also stipulated within the scope of these objectives. The basis of the January 24 resolutions consist of the transition from an import-substituting

<sup>8</sup> For a detailed analysis of the structural features and the ending of the Keynesian period, and the effects of the subsequent neoliberal structuring process, see: Keyder, Ç. (2004). *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

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industrialization model to an export-oriented industrialization model; implementation of a realistic exchange rate policy; determination of price controls according to market conditions; transformation of SEEs through reforms; reducing public expenditures; and, opening of some state monopoly production areas to domestic and foreign private capital (Ulugay, 1983: 13-16).

Undoubtedly, the January 24 resolutions are Turkish versions of the neoliberal restructuring economic policies identified with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan throughout the world. The lack of a social and political structure to implement these resolutions which can be considered sharp, caused Turkey to face a military intervention for a third time. In retrospect, the political parties' voting concerns and the presence of a confrontational environment made the implementation of these resolutions difficult, and Turkey only found the chance to implement the resolutions in the appropriate environment provided by the military intervention of September 12, 1980 (Ulugay, 1983: 20-21). The economic and social effects created by the resolutions after 1980, as well as the effects created by the neoliberal economy model in the industry and economy are quite wide. These have therefore been left to be the subject of another study.

Looking at the spatial development and distribution of the industries in Turkey between 1950-1980, it can be said that it was developed largely on the frameworks from the 1923-1950 period (Sönmez & Ayik, 2018). Indeed, during the unplanned period of 1950-1960 and the planned period of 1960-1980, although new industrial centers emerged, investments were made mainly in the existing areas and the disparity in the regional distribution of the industry in Turkey could not be eliminated.

### **Conclusion**

It is observed that the industry in Turkey gained significant momentum in the period between 1950-1980; production diversity increased; and the spatial distribution changed, even if in part, with the emergence of new industrial areas. Especially with the development of road transport in the 1950s, rural and urban areas in Turkey became closer, and the areas where there was no railway network were integrated with other areas. This began to reduce industry dependence on the railway network in Turkey and affected spatial distribution, albeit partially. In addition, since the early years of the Republic, agriculture-based industries such as flour, sugar and textiles, which do not require much capital and energy and do not have raw material problems, were replaced first by coal and then by oil and iron and then, towards the end of the period, a transition was experienced towards the automotive industry which is also the leading important export product for Turkey today. Thus, while the importance of ports such as Mersin, Iskenderun and Zonguldak gradually increased during this period, provinces such as Ankara, Bursa, Izmir and Istanbul and their surrounding areas achieved a faster rate

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of industrialization thanks to the automotive industry. Besides, with the emergence of Organized Industrial Zones established by the SPO in a planned manner, provinces such as Manisa, Mersin, Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep and Kayseri began to emerge as new industrial centers. On the other hand, boosts of industrialization in most parts of Turkey, especially in the Southeastern, Eastern Anatolia and Black Sea regions, were insufficient. Not only the policies applied during these periods, but also the geographical conditions had a great impact on these areas falling behind in terms of industrialization and, therefore, economically. It can be seen that the areas where transportation could not be developed, or where the transportation network fell behind due to natural conditions, remained beyond the industrialization stage. On the other hand, industrialization made great progress in areas that have both an important port and a developed and co-existing road and rail transportation. In addition, proximity to raw materials or energy sources were influential in the Turkish industry in the period of 1950-1980 as in the early years of the Republic, also as in today. For example, Karabük became the preference for the iron and steel industry as it provided the similar conditions.

The spatial distribution of industry in Turkey affected the most the population's spatial distribution in the period between 1950-1980, as was the case in other periods. Indeed, some of today's mega cities heavily increased in population as a result of the policies pursued in the industrialization during this period. In particular, the employment created by industrialization accelerated migration from east to west, particularly from rural areas, and established the core of the slum areas that today cover about 50% of metropolitan cities. Moreover, while migrations occurred between 1950 and 1980 were mostly employment oriented and slower, some migrations that occurred after 1980 were compulsory, more dispersed and randomly selected. Particularly, in provincial centers where large investments were made, populations increased more rapidly, and these centers started to receive immigrants from their surrounding areas. This caused these emerging industrial centers to suppress other areas and prevent their own development and caused the industry to be clustered around certain centers in Turkey.

As a result, the period between 1950-1980 in Turkey was a time when industrialization tended to develop, although not in a very planned manner and showed relative shifts towards different areas, based on the development of road transportation and when the iron, coal, oil and automotive industries, in addition to the agriculture-based industry, were also developed and, consequently, the way was paved for new industrial centers.

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