
RETROGRESSION OF THE TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONSHIP THE ISSUE OF CYPRUS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS (1950-1960)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Murat ay
Gaziantep University

Introduction

The political scene after WWII was an indicator that the struggle between the world's political blocks would not cease. This struggle was then referred to as "The Cold War". The two main opponents of this struggle were the Soviet Union and the Western block.

Turkey and Greece aligned with the latter, albeit due to differing reasons relating to their own particular circumstances. Turkey depended on external resources to develop its economy post-war, hence it needed to improve its relationship with the West. Internal and external reasons are open to discussion but an important external reason for Turkey's rapid alignment with the Western block was a looming Soviet threat. For Greece, the situation was considerably worse because there had been a three-year civil war in the country between 1946 and 1949. An interesting development at the time was that, in a period when there was a Soviet threat in the Middle East and a civil war in Greece instigated by supporters of communist Markos Vafeiadis, supporters of communism in Cyprus increased their activities aimed at making Cyprus a part of Greece. The fundamental reason for this was to take back Cyprus, which is very strategically located in the Eastern Mediterranean, from the hands of the United Kingdom, and to therefore weaken the Western position there and consequently to turn the island into a communist stronghold (Armaođlu, 1994: 529). The surging civil war in Greece could then be stopped with the help of the USA and the communist masses were able to be expelled from the country. This directly aligned Greece with the Western block.

The relationship between Turkey and Greece, who were in some way the ambassadors of the West in the Balkans and in the Middle East, continued with a rather unstable peace until 1950. The driving force behind this peace was, of course, the West. With the Truman Doctrine, the USA came to be a factor in bilateral relations. Turkey and Greece became allies through NATO in 1952 and the Balkan Pact in 1954. After 1954 relations between the two countries took a turn towards tension and conflict, which was mainly caused by the issues relating to Cyprus and the Mediterranean. Until that time the issues of Cyprus and the Mediterranean had been handled according to Turkish foreign policy, but after 1954, developments in Cyprus and the Mediterranean began directing these policies.

Until 1954 Greece was in turmoil with civil war, and political and economic instability while at the same time facing the Soviet threat, which forced it to delay the plans of

Megali Idea and Enosis. When the country acquired the Dodecanese following the Paris Peace Treaties in 1947, historical Greek ideals were fired up once more. In the face of the Greek public's orientation towards Cyprus, the Turkish press and public opinion put the Cyprus issue on the agenda. However, the Turkish government ignored these developments since it was unwilling to enter any conflict with Greece due to the countries' allied status through NATO and the Balkan Pact. Yet these developments were no longer able to be ignored. The environment of conflict on the island reshaped Turkish foreign policy. At the beginning, neither country attached much importance to the issue of Cyprus due to their friendly relations, but this did not last long. In 1955 Turkey became an official side in the issue which opened a new era in Turkish-Greek relations. The USA also intervened in order to prevent possible damage to NATO should tensions rise between the two countries. This drove both countries to arrive at a mutual solution in order to protect their future national interests and due to their standing as NATO allies. This solution was then embodied with the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960. However, this solution was not permanent and when the issue came up again in 1960, the issues that were attempted to be solved within the framework of Turkish-Greek friendship were again left in a tangle of conflicts. Therefore the Cyprus issue was handled in a manner that reflects the exact opposite of the diplomacy required by friendly relations that was carried out in the first phase, and even reached the point of bloody conflicts on the island.

As a result, relations between Turkey and the Greece did not direct the developments in Cyprus, but rather what went on in Cyprus defined Turkish-Greek relations (Firat, 2002). This section examines the first phase of the Cyprus issue.

Emergence of the Cyprus Issue and Developments Up to the Time of the Bilateral Agreements

Until the First World War, under the treaty signed in 1878, sovereignty rights to Cyprus were granted to the British administration on condition that Cyprus remained as part in the Ottoman Empire. However, the British took advantage of the Ottoman Empire joining the war on 29 October 1914, and on 5 November 1914 they declared the annexation of Cyprus. The Turkish Republic acceded to this in the Treaty of Lausanne, which meant that the British now officially held sovereignty of the island.

The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923 and the 20th Article of the treaty states that the Turkish government recognizes the acquisition of the island by the British government on 5 November 1914. Since it was a physical annexation and it also enured on legal grounds, the Turkish Government had no say in the fate of Cyprus. This made Cyprus a part of the British Commonwealth (Eroğlu, 2001: 106). That status changed when the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960, which also gave way to new developments.

Greece and the Greeks in Cyprus wanted Cyprus to be ruled by the Greeks (Enosis)¹, which resulted in the Cyprus crisis between Turkey and Greece. The Turkish Republic, however, never had any intention to acquire Cyprus. This way of thinking was a legacy of the real foreign policy implemented during the era of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In December 1923, a delegation of notables from Cyprus travelled to Ankara to press for the return of Cyprus to Turkey, but they were rejected by Ataturk saying:

Our nationalism means to love all Turks with the deepest feelings of fellowship and to desire that they grow together in the healthiest way. We also know that political activities must stay within the borders of the Turkish Republic (Çakmak, 2009: 160).

Enosis had been on the agenda in Greece since 1791 when the first Megali Idea map was drawn. On 18 October 1828 Greece sent diplomatic notes to England, Russia and France and demanded that Cyprus be affiliated to them, hence physically manifesting the idea of Enosis (İsmail, 1992: 12). Britain's takeover of the island in 1878 was welcomed by the Greeks. Striving to actualize their Enosis ideals, the Greeks were already making some attempts through uprisings around 1878. During the years of Great Britain's control of the island, the Turkish Cypriots have always been the victims. They faced pressure and attacks from the British but mostly from the Greeks on the island (Manisalı, 2004: 20).

After WWII, Greece became more boldly interested in Cyprus, especially when the country acquired the Dodecanese with the Paris Peace Treaties in 1947. To Turkey, Greece was an ally in the Western block so Turkey wanted to be on good terms with them but this did not stop Greece from expressing its intentions with Enosis. On 16 February 1951, the then Greek president S. Venizelos openly stated that Cyprus must come under the rule of Greece. Greece also made an application to Britain. In this application, the Greek government stated that there was increasing pressure from the Greek public for Enosis and that the British government should express its opinions regarding the future of the island. This yielded no results from the British. Greece had several similar attempts with the British with no results and this continued as an internal problem for Greece.

On 16 August 1954 for the first time Greece brought the matter to the United Nations General Assembly which turned the problem into an international issue. The addressees on this issue were England, Greece and Turkey. This however altered the attitudes of England and Turkey in regard to the issue and led to important outcomes. Turkey intervened in the process for the purpose of concluding it without allowing it to escalate to an unacceptable level, rather than pursuing their claims and defending their rights to Cyprus (Armaoğlu, 1994: 530). The official view of Ankara was stated by Selim Sarper during talks in the United Nations General Assembly on 24 November 1954. Sarper stated that Turkey would prefer that Cyprus be left as a British colony and that any

¹ "Enosis" literally means annexation in a narrow sense, but for Greeks it refers to the re-establishment of the Hellenic Empire in the broadest sense (Olgun, 1991: 10).

changes in Cyprus' status would be need to be subject to approval from Ankara. Sarper went on, expressing the view that Cyprus was geographically a part of Turkey, and that just as the Aaland Islands, where people predominantly speak Swedish, were left for Finland to rule since the islands were geographically very close to Finland, Cyprus must be likewise left to Turkey (Özcan, 2016: 117).

The agenda was carried over into the United Nations' Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on 14 December 1954. Greece demanded that the community in Cyprus decide their own future, which meant that they be entitled to exercise the "self-determination" principle. However, the commission rejected negotiation of this demand on 17 December 1954. This was subject to a vote and Turkey abstained from voting on any option as an indicator of its willingness to stay out of the issue (Gürün, 1983: 386). This attempt by Greece was nothing more than a demand that the Greek people in Cyprus be given the authority to affiliate Cyprus to Greece. Turkey then took action. The problem started to be handled as one of the most important issues in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey prioritized homeland security against any possible Greek threats to Western Anatolia as well as the security of the Turks on the island. The USA was sternly against internationalization of the Cyprus issue by placing it on the agenda of the United Nations because this would raise concerns that it would be a chance for the Soviet Union to damage the Western Alliance (Uslu, 2000: 35).

It was known that Turkish governments did not have any active policies regarding Cyprus until 1955. At first, the activities of EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriakon Aĝoniston/ National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) did not draw any attention from Turkey or its government. Under the management of Sedat Simavi, the *Hürriyet*² newspaper overcame developments on the island.. Every day, news about the acts of terrorists affiliated with EOKA in Cyprus and how the Turks were being mistreated appeared in headlines on the front page of the newspaper. The Turkish public learned the names of Makarios and Grivas and the title of Enosis thanks to this newspaper (Çavdar, 2013: 49). Led by *Hürriyet* newspaper and Sedat Simavi, this movement also had Dr. Hüsamettin Cindoruk, Orhan Birgit, A. Emin Yalman, Dr. Ziya Somer, Nevzat Karagil and Hikmet Bil playing important roles (Manisalı, 2004: 24). In fact, after the Second World War the Greek Cypriot Enosis ideals were not affected by the actions of the Turkish government, but rather by Cypriot students studying in Turkey and Turkish Cypriots who had been resettled in their homeland. After 1948, Ankara and İstanbul saw the establishment of Cypriot cultural foundations which then helped spread the issue through the media. As with the *Hürriyet* newspaper, other newspapers such as *Tasvir* and *Vatan* published news about the Cyprus issue and began raising public awareness (Fırat, 2002: 597).

An interesting fact is that in order to drive Turkey to become more active regarding

² For a different view regarding the support of the *Hürriyet* newspaper by Israel and the existence of Israel's strategies regarding Cyprus see.: (Çeçen, 2005: 56-57).

Cypriot issues, the Cyprus Turkish Leadership started lobbying Turkey in the 1940s with support from England. In the words of Rauf Denktaş “*The Cyprus Turkish Leadership spared no efforts to make Turkey take the Greeks’ Enosis plots more seriously and to get the Turkish government out of the sluggishness brought about by the idea that the British would not ever give up control of the island*” (Kızılyürek, 2003: 20). In 1950, when Britain refused to discuss the question of sovereignty of the island and Turkey needed Britain’s support in order to enter NATO, the Turkish Government still remained indifferent to the Cyprus issue. The Cyprus issue could only enter the Grand National Assembly’s (GNDA) agenda on 18 January 1950, when the National Students Association organized a demonstration in Ankara. During the demonstration, the Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak stated:

“There is no such thing as a Cyprus problem. I have already explained this to the press a long time ago because Cyprus is under British sovereignty and rule. We are fully convinced that Britain has no intention or inclination of giving up control of Cyprus to another country. Whatever may go down in Cyprus, the British government will not give up Cyprus for another country to rule. Therefore our young citizens get excited and expend their efforts in vain” (Özcan, 2016: 115).

On 20 August 1951, Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü said “*We currently are aware of no reason which would require a change in the island’s legal status...*” (Uçarol, 2013: 1030). Turkey’s attitude was established by the fact that the country needed Britain’s support in order to join NATO, and wished to avoid any conflict with Greece, with whom it was receiving support from USA support as part of the Truman Doctrine. Therefore the DP Party persevered with the CHP Party’s policy of indifference to the matter (Özcan, 2016: 116). Despite this indifference, student associations and nationalist circles showed a more open attitude towards Cyprus. Shortly after Köprülü’s statement, “*Turkey does not have a Cyprus problem*”, the Turkish National Students Federations rejected this official discourse with the line “*Cyprus is an indivisible part of the mother country [Turkey]*”. Despite Köprülü’s discourse, there indeed was a Cyprus problem, of which everybody, save the Turkish Government, its foreign deputies and UN representatives, were aware (Eroğlu, 2001: 108).

On 1 April 1954, Foreign Minister Köprülü repeated almost the same words when asked about the government’s stance on the Cyprus issue:

“In the official communications with Greece, a friend and an ally, no communications or negotiations had been brought up regarding Cyprus. The reason for this is Turkey’s observation that there is no such thing as a Cyprus issue, and the country’s belief that since the island is under British rule, it would be unlawful to enter into bilateral talks with Greece regarding the island. If one day Cyprus becomes the subject of negotiation

with Britain, the existence of a very important Turkish minority on the island will require our certain intervention on the matter. Otherwise, currently we do not hold any beliefs that would require any changes to the island's current status” (Uçarol, 2013: 1031).

These words of the Foreign Minister were a reflection of the fact that Turkey was trying to procure its own safety against the Soviet threat. After entering NATO, Turkey aimed to further strengthen the homeland security that it had gained. The DP Party's government, which was established after the elections in May 1954, assigned Fatin Rüştü Zorlu as the Minister for Cypriot Affairs. This was the starting point for the acceleration of initiatives concerning Cyprus. Zorlu's increasing influence in the DP's management circles meant that the relationship between Menderes and Köprülü would only become more tense over time. On 27 July 1955, Köprülü was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Zorlu was assigned to duties as Foreign Ministry, in addition to the position of Secretary of State that he already held. These changes in duties before the London conference was an indicator that management of the DP would change course regarding Cyprus (Özcan, 2016: 116).

Turkey attached more importance to the Balkan Alliance, therefore it ignored Greece's application to Britain for Cyprus, which then resulted in a very passive stance regarding Cyprus. The Balkan Pact was signed on 9 August 1954 and on 16 August 1954, merely one week afterwards, Greece applied to the UN for Cyprus, which indicated that Greece was not acting sensitively regarding the alliance. Turkey's initial attitude towards the matter was to approach it from the Western allies perspective, which prompted it to abstain from voting for any option in the UN, since it did not want to damage its relations with Greece and Britain. On 18 December 1954, at the conclusion of voting, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes stated:

“This issue has come to a conclusion. Therefore it is now time to be careful and diligent so that our friendly relations with our ally, Greece, come to no harm” (Armaoğlu, 1994: 531).

Despite this statement, Greek Foreign Minister Stefanapulos was very straightforward in saying that the Greek Government would continue its initiatives with Cyprus (Olgun, 1991).

When the Cyprus issue was not officially concluded with a favorable outcome in the UN, the Cypriot Greeks changed their strategy. Makarios decided to use threats and brutal force to attain their goals, which meant that he would take Greece's underground “X” organization in the era of administration led by Grivas in order to combat communist forces. Makarios' efforts were to foresee every possibility and since Grivas was also a Greek Cypriot, he established contact with him (Kürşad, Altan, ve Egeli , 1978: 137).

EOKA's leader Grivas secretly travelled to Cyprus on 10 November 1954 on a boat named "St. George" (Keser, 2006: 169). In his manifestos, Grivas announced that their aim was to actualize the ideal of Enosis, that this made the British and the Turks their enemies and that they would spare no efforts to defeat their enemies³. Led by Grivas, this underground organization started sabotaging state offices and facilities. Shortly after they commenced attacks on Turkish civilians. On 21 June 1955, 14 Turkish civilians were injured by bombs set off by Greek Cypriot aggressors. Greece supported this organization too, provoking some of these actions. In their activities between 1955-1956, EOKA killed 216 civilians and injured 542; 12 of whom were Turks, 96 British and 108 Greek in 1196 bombing events of various degrees. On 22 June, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the leader of the Cypriot Turks, sent a telegraph to the Turkish Republic, stating that they were requiring the Turkish Government to provide security for Cypriot Turks (Gürün, 1983: 387).

The British government decided that things were getting out of hand and organized a conference in London to attempt to resolve the matter between themselves, Turkey and Greece. Britain did not want to face Greece alone so they involved Turkey in the question of Cyprus. Britain was intending to use Turkey as a balancing factor on the island, which would enable continuation of their rule of the island. Moving forward, they secretly encouraged the Turkish Government to make demands regarding the island (Türkeş, 1996: 27). Britain's primary policy was to create an impression for the global public that what was happening on Cyprus was indeed a complex international problem, rather than a simple decolonization issue. In addition, the British thought that they could use Turkish nationalism as a countermeasure against the Hellenic nationalism that was on the rise in Cyprus (Özcan, 2016: 117). A "Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus" was convened on 29 August 1955 in London. It ended on 7 September 1955 with no particular conclusion since each of the three countries had completely different views. Britain proposed that the island be given autonomy, but Turkey wanted the island's status quo to continue and, if it were to change, then the island should be left to Turkey to rule completely. The privately registered lands of Turks from the Ottoman era were presented as solid evidence that the island must be left to the Turks (Çeçen, 2005: 58). Greece insisted that the island must be left to their rule through self-determination. This difference between Turkey and Greece meant that Britain was able to set their own course and influence both countries, therefore it was a desirable outcome for Britain (Erim, 2014: 10). Britain was preparing to give Cyprus autonomy by the end of 1955. This was also welcomed by Turkey. The Turkish press also launched a smear campaign against Greece. Meanwhile, rumors spread that the Cypriot Turks would face mass murder, which caused a reaction in the Turkish public. The USA also took action,

³ "We have two enemies. One is the British, the other is the Turkish. First we will handle the British, get them off this island, and then we will destroy the Turks. Our will is Enosis. We will spare nothing to achieve this" (Uçarol, 2013, s. 1033).

on the premise that tension between Turkey and Greece would cause damage to NATO, but to no avail.

The Greek Cypriots, who were intending to turn the Cyprus problem into an international issue and to influence the British public, began attacking Turkish villages and slaughtering Turkish citizens. In this way, they would ensure that the Turks left the island and they would then have the opportunity to easily apply the principle of self-determination. The increasing number of Greek attacks on Turks turned the conflicts on Cyprus into a civil war between nations. This also prompted Turkey and Greece to blame each other.

The start of 1956 saw Britain in dialogue with the Cypriot Turkish and Greek community leaders as well as with Turkey and Greece, but no positive results were achieved. The British were also convinced that the autonomy that they would like to establish on the island was being prevented by the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios who was also a high-ranking EOKA principal, consequently they arrested him on 9 March 1956 and exiled him to the Seychelles. However, with this development, the British inadvertently created a legend of Makarios in Cyprus thanks to the Governor General Marshall John Harding (Olgun, 1991: 11). The Orthodox Church and Greek Cypriot politicians generally retained their fundamentalist and strict attitudes. They intended to use this to gain support from the Orthodox world. This was also the underlying idea why Makarios was always seen wearing his religious clothing (Manisalı, 2004: 28). The higher-ranking members of the Greek Cypriots' Orthodox Church were also exiled and this increased the levels of terrorist activities in Cyprus. An exiled Makarios later stated "*We should not baptize the children of the Greek families who do not completely submit to Enosis*" (Keser, 2007: 93). When Makarios was left free on condition that he not return to Cyprus and Harding was also removed from office, Britain also announced that they would allow Grivas to leave the island. However Grivas did not comply and went on directing terrorist activities on the island (Olgun, 1991: 13).

The then British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, in his speech to the House of Commons on 14 March 1956, stated that the conflict regarding Cyprus would not be resolved without Turkey's consent and with only Greece as the addressee, and that Cyprus held great strategic importance in terms of Turkey's defense. Fuat Köprülü, the Turkish Foreign Minister, also stated that the acts of terrorism must stop on the island and that any autonomy would pave the way for Enosis. Despite this, Great Britain continued its efforts to give autonomy to Cyprus. When this became a final decision, Turkey then submitted to this proposal and put forward their own rules for autonomy which prioritized the rights of the Turkish Cypriots to life and freedom. This meant that Turkey accepted the premise of autonomy in 1956 (Uçarol, 2013: 1035).

In the same year, acts of terrorism gained momentum in Cyprus, thanks to support and

provocation from Greece. Britain expedited their work towards the island's autonomy. In June 1956, they tasked Lord Radcliffe with preparing a constitution for Cyprus. After completing his research in Cyprus, Lord Radcliffe prepared a draft constitution which he presented to the English Ministry of Colonies on 12 November 1956. This constitution would give Cyprus autonomy and implementation of this autonomy would depend on cessation of all acts of terrorism on the island. This autonomy would not include foreign affairs, defense and interior security. In these three areas, the British rule would continue and the governor to be appointed would have certain powers. A legislative council and executive and judicial bodies would be established to deal with local affairs in places left under Cypriot administration. Turks would also have a certain kind of autonomy in this administration. This meant that Britain was finally set to give Cyprus autonomy.

On 19 December 1956, when the Radcliffe report was officially announced, the British Minister of Colonies, Lennox Boyd, made a speech in the House of Commons, stating that Britain accepted the constitutional proposals in the report and continued:

“The British Government accepts that for a community of mixed nations in Cyprus, division of the island should be included in the possible solutions to enable self-determination rights to be implemented” (Armaoğlu, 1994: 532).

This meant that Britain accepted the existence of two separate cultures and societies on the island and the right of self-determination would be given to both, which would result in a division of the island. In fact, the United Kingdom decided to implement its policy in Cyprus which it implemented in all countries where it gave up its administration: Divide and administer (Firat, 2002: 604). The Turkish Government accepted this opinion of the United Kingdom as the basis for resolving the problem. After all, this meant that Turkey gave up its sternly defended policy of protecting the status quo on the island and as *“a concession for agreement”*, (Türk, 2003: 6) accepted the idea of dividing Cyprus. On 18 December 1956, Adnan Menderes announced the new policy with the comment *“We are in favor of the division of the island”*. This policy change was more consistent with the island demographics, where only 20% of the population were Turks. Policy change was explained based on strategic reasons. According to this, *“We have 120,000 people living on the island and we cannot disperse these people among the foreigners. We see that it is imperative that we have an outpost in a land that protects the safety of 25 million”*. Against the opposition's criticism, Menderes claimed that with its Cyprus policy, the administration defended the National Oath (*Misak-ı Milli*) and furthered Turkey's interests, which was irredentism in a way: *“If we cannot defend our national interests in Cyprus, then in a case where we need to defend the motherland, we would show restraint. Turkish land and Turkish society must be defended even when they are not included in the extent of the National Oath”*. In 1957, after the Turkish government accepted the policy of division, it tried to have this policy adopted by the Turkish public

on the one hand and to get it accepted by England and Greece on the other. The Turkish Government succeeded in having its new policy adopted by the Turkish public. The new policy bore the slogan “Division or Death”. Students who were accustomed to shouting “Cyprus is Turkish” in the squares inevitably found this change odd (Özcan, 2016: 123).

Greece took the Cyprus issue to the agenda of the United Nations on two occasions in February and December 1957. In February at the UN talks, Greece insisted on their previous demands, which was to give the right to self-determination to the Cypriot community. On the other hand, Britain came up with hard evidence that Greece had provoked terrorism in Cyprus. Turkey stated that they were concerned about Cyprus and that Greece was willing to annex the island, and that they were willing to implement a peaceful solution to the issue. As a result, the United Nations’ Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs accepted a decision which decreed that the related parties to the conflict should negotiate a resolution to the matter. This was also welcomed by Turkey. At the end of the negotiations held in December 1957, Greece’s request for self-determination was accepted by the United Nations’ Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs by 20 to 33 votes. However, as a majority could not be obtained in the General Assembly, Greece’s proposal was not accepted. The Council’s decision from February remained in force.

In an statement made on 20 March 1957, NATO announced that they were taking over the role of convening talks between Turkey, Greece and Great Britain. Turkey and Britain welcomed the mediation attempt, but Greece’s response could not be understood. In December 1957, in NATO’s Paris meeting the General Secretary, Paul Henry Spaak, insisted that the Turkish and Greek prime ministers, as well as the British Foreign Minister attempt to resolve the Cyprus issue, however, no consensus could be reached.

In late 1957, the British Government appointed a civil governor in place of the military governor in Cyprus. This governor began to negotiate with the Turks and Cypriot Greeks with a view to giving the island autonomy, but to no avail. Then on 19 June 1958, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proposed a new plan, according to which, a three-headed administration would be established on the island which was to be based on cooperation between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities as well as Britain, Turkey and Greece (Bilge, 1969: 373). This was accepted by the Turkish people but rejected by the Greek Cypriots. According to Macmillan, this plan could not be properly implemented but it still formed the foundation of the Cyprus agreements to be signed nine months later (Gazioğlu, 1998: 400). With the failure of the plan, the Greek Cypriots increased the EOKA terrorism they had started on the island on a daily basis. Turks began to organize against EOKA. There were some small Turkish organizations already established in Cyprus, but they were not very effective. Grivas came to the island and this made Rauf Denktaş, who was planning to return to legal practice, abandon this idea

and to concentrate on the organization of the Turkish Cypriots⁴. However, the Turks had little opportunity to act. Since they maintained their hopes for peace until this time, they did not invest in warfare and were thus deprived of guns and ammunition. Rauf Denktaş stated as follows regarding the establishment of the Turkish Resistance Organization:

“... But there was something we didn't know. We did not even think that the anger and rebellion born against the multitude of injustices would quickly lead us to an organization that would carry us through to these days” (Keser, 2007: 87-88).

After intensive efforts, Rauf Denktaş and his friends affiliated with the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Institutions established the Turkish Resistance Organization (TRO) on November 26, 1957 (Akkurt, 1999: 13). Hence, the Turkish Cypriots established an effective organization to resist the Greek Cypriots' attacks and to ensure the survival of the Turks on the island. Considering the terrorist EOKA activities that had been ongoing, it is possible to regard the TRO as a natural social reflex (Manisalı, 2004: 24). The local newspapers played a fundamental role in the struggles of the Cypriot Turks. The Greek Cypriots' attempts, supported by a Greek Cypriot press, to generate unreasonable public opinion around the world in their favor, was countered by the local Turkish press. The first two Turkish newspapers in this regard were *“Halkın Sesi”* (Public Voice) and *“Bozkurt”* (Dire Wolf). The first Turkish resistance newspaper, *“Nacak”* (Hatchet), which was first published after the establishment of the TRO, set as its fundamental purpose support for the Cyprus struggle (Atun ve Fevzioglu, 2009).

In 1958 the Turkish public accepted the mantra “Division or Death”. For this purpose rallies organized in various parts of Turkey increased the enthusiasm amongst the public. In the same year, the situation in Cyprus took a very dark turn due to the intensification of terrorism. This began to obscure the Turkish-Greek and English-Greek relations. When this weakened NATO's right wing in the eastern Mediterranean, peace talks between Turkey and Greece were initiated by the USA and NATO. Abiding by the logic of the Cold War, NATO and the US wanted the parties to renounce their national interests and to compromise for the greater purpose of the general interests of the Western alliance in the face of the Soviet danger. These efforts would lead to the establishment of an independent Cypriot State through “Secret Diplomacy” (Kızılyürek, 2003: 23).

Bilateral Talks Between Turkey and Greece for the Resolution of the Cyprus Problem

11 February 1959, the Zurich Agreement

The USA was convinced that communication between Ankara and Athens was at breaking point, so they intervened in an attempt to resolve the problem within the

⁴ For more information, see (Denktaş, 2008).

framework of the NATO alliance. The USA proposal was based on a formula for an Independent Cyprus, provided British bases were guaranteed security and operational freedom. This was in conflict with the policy of division Turkey had announced just one year previously. The DP government, which mobilized the public in line with the policy of division, did not compromise before the 1957 elections. However the fact that the policy of division could not find support in the UN General Assembly, that Britain had decided to leave Cyprus after the Suez Problem, and increasing pressure from the USA, all led the DP government to make a policy change again in 1958.

Greece, on the other hand, brought the Cyprus issue back to the United Nations in late 1958. On 5 December 1958, the General Assembly decided that the disputes should be settled between the parties due to the reaction against the Enosis policy in the United Nations. As a result of NATO pressure and mediation, Turkey and Greece began bilateral negotiations. Turkey's Foreign Minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and the Greek Foreign Minister, Avanghelos Averof, discussed the Cyprus issue at the NATO meeting in Paris. As a result, it was decided that a meeting would be held between the two states in Zurich.

On 5 February 1959, the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, and the Greek Prime Minister, Konstantin Karamanlis, together with their foreign ministers, convened in Zurich. The main point of conflict during the negotiations was Turkey's wish to establish a joint command and establish a base on the island. Ultimately, Turkey gave up its demand to establish a base on the island and reduced the level of military presence they wanted to maintain on the island. Greece accepted Turkey's joint command demand. Upon the resolution of the issues in dispute, on 11 February 1959 the two states declared that they had decided to establish an independent republic administration in Cyprus and they concluded an agreement for this purpose (Uçarol, 2013: 1038). With the Zurich Treaty, it was decided to establish a new status for Cyprus. After this agreement, the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers went to London to meet with the British authorities as it was the third party to the issue. Satisfied with the Treaty of Zurich, the Turkish Government gave up the "division policy" it had previously agreed to, and accepted the policy of an "Independent Cyprus".

19 February 1959 The London Agreement

The London Conference convened and the participants were the prime ministers of Turkey, Britain and Greece, as well as community leaders of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Makarios. The Zurich Agreement, which was signed on 19 February 1959, was accepted as the base and the London Agreement, which consisted of multiple agreements, was signed. These agreements established organic ties between independent Cyprus and Turkey, Greece and Britain (Armaoğlu, 1994: 533).

The decisions announced in the capitals of the three countries on 23 February 1959,

which was then referred to as “the London Agreement”, mainly covered the following four understandings:

1. An Assembly Agreement referring to the transfer of British rule on Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus.
2. A Guarantee Agreement, guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order of Cyprus.
3. An Alliance Agreement, which was to be signed between Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.
4. Agreed measures regarding the preparation of new agreements for Cyprus (Uçarol, 2013: 1038-1039).

Among these agreements, the “Main Agreement Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus” and the “Guarantee Agreement” were of the greatest importance. The Turkish Government considered these agreements a success for all interested parties. The solution to the Cyprus dispute aimed to reconcile the rights and interests of the three states concerned and the two communities on the island. It was decided to establish an independent and federal republic which was based on a partnership between the two communities on the island and which would prioritize productive cooperation between Turkey and Greece.

The Main Agreement also acted as a constitution. According to this agreement, the Turkish and Greek societies in Cyprus would run local affairs through Community Councils, and joint affairs through the executive body which was to be based on a presidential system. A Greek Cypriot would preside over the executive affairs and their deputy would be a Turk. There would also be a Council of Ministers comprising 10 people, 3 of whom would be Turks. The Council of Representatives would be made up of 50 members and 30% of these would be Turks. A Constitutional Court would be established, together with mixed courts for cases between Turkish and Greek Cypriots (Uçarol, 2013: 1039). The President of the Constitutional Court was to be elected from an external and impartial country. German Professor Ernest Forstoff was elected as the first president with the approval of the three guarantor countries (Manisalı, 2004: 31). The cultural, religious and personal affairs of the Turks were to be executed by the authorities of the Turkish Community according to laws to be enacted by the Turkish Community Assembly. Turkish citizens would be able to place Turkish flags in their institutions and houses and to celebrate their national holidays. One of the official languages in Cyprus would be Turkish. Turkish citizens were able to join the island’s army by up to 40% and the joint security forces by up to 30%. These measures were taken to prevent the Turks from falling under the sovereignty of the Greeks. These agreements gave Greece and

Turkey the same rights on the island. The Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, gained the right to rule the island, provided that it operated in its own right and respected the rights of the island's Turkish citizens. The Main Agreement, which established the structure of the Republic of Cyprus, set forth that the constitution of the new state would include the Guarantee Agreement and the Alliance Agreement, that Enosis and a division would be prohibited, that Britain, Greece and Turkey would be given the rights of the "highest observed nation" in every agreement to be signed regardless of subject matter, and that Greece and Turkey would be given rights to financially contribute to educational, cultural and sporting institutions, as well as to charity works within their own communities (Firat, 2002: 611).

The Guarantee Agreement established the Republic of Cyprus's international status. With this agreement, the statutory powers of Cyprus, which was called an independent republic, were restricted and reduced to a position of a dependent state. According to Article 1 of the Agreement, the Republic of Cyprus "was obliged to avoid participation in any political or economic union with any state, in whole or in part". In addition, this Article prohibited any action for the Republic of Cyprus to directly or indirectly promote unification of the republic with any other state or division of the island. In accordance with Article 2 of the Agreement, Britain, Turkey and Greece recognized and guaranteed the continuation of the status referred to in Article 1. The 3rd Article guaranteed the existence of British bases in the Cyprus Island. The 4th Article was the most important article in the Agreement. This article regulated the measures to be taken in the case of non-compliance. Greece, Turkey and Britain undertook to consult with each other regarding the initiatives or measures needed for compliance with these provisions. In case it is not possible to act in partnership or agreement, each guarantor country would reserve the right to take action, but only to re-establish the order set up by this agreement. This was the most controversial article of the agreement. Because according to this article, each of the three states would have the right to intervene to re-establish the constitutional order (Esenbel, 1993: 139). This last provision, was the legal basis for the intervention by the Republic of Turkey on 20 July 1974. The Republic of Turkey relied on its rights arising from international agreements. This was also acknowledged during the meetings held in Geneva under the observation of the United Nations in July and August 1974 (Manisalı, 2004: 30). On the other hand, it is a fact that this intervention in Cyprus did not restore the order established by the agreement. Turkey's intervention rectified the situation envisaged by the Guarantee Agreement, but did not recognize the limits stipulated for such an intervention (Özcan, 2016: 125).

It was decided to establish a tripartite military headquarters in Cyprus in order to achieve the objectives set out in Articles 1 and 2 of the Alliance Agreement. Article 1 states: "The Parties undertake to cooperate for their joint defense and to consult each other regarding

any issues concerning this defense”. Article 2 states that “The Parties undertake to resist any direct or indirect attack or aggression against the independence or territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus”. With these articles, Turkey gained the right to keep a 650-person, and Greece, a 950-person, military force at the joint headquarters to be established in Cyprus (Armaoğlu, 1994: 534). According to Melih Esenbel, (Esenbel, 1993: 126) when Adnan Menderes learnt that Averof had recommended a 150-person limit for Turkey as its military presence on the island, he then said *“The military unit that we would send there must be meaningful in terms of greatness in accordance with the size of Cyprus. I did not come here to send a team of honorary guards to Cyprus”*. On the basis of this article in the Alliance Agreement, a Turkish Regiment entered Cyprus from Famagusta Port on 16 August 1960 under the command of the Colonel Turgut Sunalp (Olgun, 1991: 20).

In addition to the Agreements of Guarantee and Alliance, which allowed three NATO member states to control the newly established independent state, a top secret “Gentleman’s Agreement” was signed between Karamanlis and Menderes. According to this agreement, Karamanlis and Menderes would support Cyprus’s participation in NATO and would also encourage the President and Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus to ban the communist party and communist activities (Kızılyürek, 2003: 23-24).

The agreements and the established state reflect the balances within NATO. The agreements were designed to prevent both the Greek Enosis and the Turkish policy of division, rather than fulfilling the wishes of the island’s locals (Fırat, 2002). According to its constitution Cyprus, which is defined as an independent and unitary state, was denied the authority to change its constitution under the Guarantee Agreement, and its constitution and state structure became federal. By authorizing two NATO members to have a say on the Cyprus issue and on the island’s future, the creation of a crack in NATO was prevented. From this perspective, the agreements can be seen as a response to the international political conditions of the 1950s which took into account the internal balance in NATO (Özcan, 2016: 125). In his comments regarding the agreements, İsmet İnönü stated the following: *“Our assessment is that there were very strong reasons relating to general well-being and security that prompted us to come to an agreement. It is also very obvious that certain suggestions from very powerful friends played an integral role in this”* (Özcan, 2016: 126).

The agreements were approved by the GNDA after lengthy discussions. The discussions focused on the question of why Prime Minister Menderes had abandoned the policy of division that he had announced on 18 December 1956. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu stated that it had not been a sacrifice to abandon the division but that the sacrifice that was made was not taking over the whole island. Hence in very straightforward expressions, the DP administration first followed a policy of ignorance by saying “Cyprus is Britain’s

internal affairs”, then defended an annexation policy by saying that “Cyprus is Turkish”, then gave up on annexation by promoting division with the words “Division or death!” and then gave up on this too, settling on an “Independent Cyprus” under international pressure (Özcan, 2016: 126).

In the Greek Parliament, very severe criticisms were made of the agreements. Liberal Party Leader, M. Venizelos, claimed that Makarios had betrayed the oath of Enosis. The Social People’s Party leader and former foreign minister, M. Stefanapulos, stated that this was the first time Turks had set foot on the lands they had previously lost. Liberal Party Leader, M. Papandreu, firstly expressed his reaction by emphasizing that the ideal of Enosis was forever abandoned. (Esenbel, 1993: 139-141). The supporters of the cause of the Greek Cypriots generally believed that Makarios signed these agreements under conditions of oppression and spiritual sabotage (Uslu, 2000: 39). However, Makarios, who was expected to become the president of the new Cypriot state, attempted to exploit some loopholes in the London and Zurich agreements in order to make these agreements null, as part of the Akritas Plan⁵. For example, the “Municipalities Issue” which was seen as a matter of dispute put forward in 1963, was brought up by Makarios himself even before the establishment of the republic (Akkurt, 2000: 29).

Apart from the lengthy debates held in the assemblies of the two countries, the Cyprus Constitution, which was formed within the framework of the principles described above, came into force on 16 August 1960, thereby marking the official establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. The Cyprus Constitution is an example of compromise reached between very contradictory interests. This compromise, which was achieved when the Greeks abandoned Enosis and the Turks abandoned the division plan, was praised as a “remarkable act of statesmanship” in the UN Security Council when the acceptance of Cyprus into the United Nations was being discussed (Türk, 2003: 8). However, this republic, which was founded following intensive reconciliation efforts, was only able to survive until 21 December 1963.

Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (16 August 1960)

As a requirement of the Zurich and London Agreements, a provisional government was established in Cyprus in late March 1959. In addition, in accordance with the draft Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, commissions were established in London and Nicosia to prepare for the transfer of the administration to the Republic of Cyprus and to implement the decisions taken at the London Conference. The Constitutional Commission of the Republic of Turkey was represented by a delegation presided over by Nihat Erim.

⁵ The Greek Cypriot leadership had prepared the Akritas Plan in 1963. This plan was first published in a local Greek newspaper named “*Pataris*” on 21 April 1966, and the fundamental purpose of this plan was to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus using certain means and, through pre-planned stages, to remove the Turkish community from the island thereby actualizing Enosis (Uslu, 2000, s. 41).

The commissions worked for more than a year, during which time several differences of opinion arose. The most striking of these differences was the Greek Cypriots' objection to the bases to be left to Britain on the island and the rights granted to the Turks. Negotiations regarding the British bases on the island alone lasted for four months, fortunately coming to a conclusion on 1 July 1960 with an agreement. According to the understanding, a total area of 99 square miles in two separate locations on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus would be left to the dominant British bases. The British bases were to be in the region of Dhekelia and Akrotiri. Britain would also have the right to organize training sessions in locations other than at these bases (Serter, 2014: 54). Resolving this conflict also finalized the draft constitution.

On 21 July 1960, the British Parliament adopted a draft law on Cyprus becoming a republic, and the Queen of England approved the law on 29 July. Based on this document, which was then titled "1960 Cyprus Law", Queen Elizabeth II released the "1960 Cyprus Republic Mandate" on 3 August 1960. According to this mandate, the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus would become effective as of 16 August 1960 (Uçarol, 2013: 1040). The agreements for Cyprus were signed on 16 August 1960 in Nicosia, by the Turkish Consulate General, the Greek representative, the Governor Sir Hugh Foot as representative of Great Britain, the Turkish Cypriot community leader, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, and the Greek Cypriot community leader, Makarios. The Constitution of Cyprus was also prepared in accordance with the principles set out in the agreement, and was then made effective on 16 August 1960. This was the day the Republic of Cyprus was officially established. The independent Cypriot state opened a new era for the island, but peace did not last long; an environment of conflict re-emerged on the island, leading to new consequences and turmoils (Uçarol, 2013: 1041).

Conclusion

The Turkish Republic, which stayed true to the foreign policy principles from the Atatürk era, were ignorant to the developments in Cyprus, resulting from Greece's Enosis activities, at all times from the years of single-party administration to the first years of the DP era. The most important factor in this indifference, no doubt, was Turkey's wish to become a part of the Western block. As a requirement of this wish, Turkey avoided any action in its foreign policy that would draw a reaction from the West, especially from Great Britain, hence its indifference to the island's fate. The DP executives established their approach to Cyprus matters mostly in accordance with Britain's Cyprus policies. Britain set their policies in relation to Cyprus, which it had deemed to be a Crown Colony, according to their variable stance in the Middle East. The changes in their policies naturally affected the Cyprus policies adopted by Turkey.

Greece's efforts to bring the issue into the international spotlight by repeatedly taking

the agenda to the UN on many occasions left Turkey in a difficult predicament. With a focus on remaining on good terms with the West, Turkey also faced public pressure about Cyprus on the internal front. However, when Britain began severing its ties with Cyprus, the DP administration was pulled into the epicenter of the Cyprus issue as a result of British political tactics. On the other hand, the USA did not want to see a weakening Western alliance under a global Soviet and Communist threat, therefore their policy upheld resolutions on the Cyprus issue through NATO and peaceful talks between the parties. Despite Turkey's conciliatory policy regarding resolution of the issues through mediation, the actions of Greece and the Cypriot Greek Administration seems to have lead to a deadlock. It is an established fact that Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration and the Orthodox Church, and the ideal of Enosis that they pursued were the driving forces behind the environment of terror created on the island. This is more clearly visible in the post-republic developments on the island when the problems could never be brought to resolution. To the Cypriot Greek, the establishment of a Cypriot state did not in any way mean the exercise of the right to self-determination. It was a fundamental strategy to claim the right to self-determination in order to avoid the founding agreements. The policies, tactics and strategy to be later adopted in the progress was known as the "Akritas Plan".

The agreements which founded the Republic of Cyprus soon began to be broken by Greek Cypriots. They did not recognize the implementation of the constitutional articles which gave rights to the Turkish Cypriots and they began to work secretly to realize their goals on Cyprus. They tasked a group of three, which included Glafkos Clerides, to prepare a secret action plan. The most important objective of the Akritas Plan, which was the product of this group, was Enosis. This plan envisaged a coup against the government to remove the opposition, which would then leave the Turkish Cypriots deprived of their rights and if they reacted, they would be crushed by brute force. If the clashes were to spread, the Greeks would use all the means at their disposal and would declare Enosis. Attacks by Greek Cypriots began again on the night of 21 December 1963. Despite the fact that the acts of terrorism on the island intensified and the Greek Cypriots kept to their uncompromising attitude, the Cyprus problem was always approached from a diplomatic standpoint until 1967. But Greece did not give up Enosis and this invalidated all efforts towards peace. On 20 July 1974, Turkish Armed Forces carried out the Cyprus Operation for Peace, executing their guarantor country rights under the Guarantee Agreement for the purpose of reinstating peace and constitutional order on the island.

References

- Çakmak, Z. (2009). *Kıbrıs'ta İsyân*. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık.
- Çavdar, T. (2013). *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi -1950'den Günümüze-*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.

-
- Çeçen, A. (2005). *Kıbrıs Çıkmazı*. İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları.
- Özcan, G. (2016). Ellili Yıllarda Dış Politika. M. K. Kaynar içinde, *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları* (s. 97-135). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Akkurt, A. (1999). *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı: 1957-1958 Mücadelesi*. İstanbul: Bayrak Matbaacılık.
- Akkurt, A. (2000). *Yakın Mücadele Tarihimizin Bilinmeyen Yönleri ve Yorgacis'in Casusları*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları.
- Armaoğlu, F. (1994). *20. Yüzyıl Siyasî Tarihi (1914-1980)* (Cilt 1). Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Atun, S., & Fevzioglu, B. (2009). TMT Yıllarında Kıbrıs Türk Basımı'ndan 7 Gazete. İ. Bozkurt, & A. Nesim (Dü.), *Kıbrıs Türk Millî Mücadelesi ve Bu Mücadelede TMT'nin Yeri* içinde (s. 379-395). Lefkoşa: Ajans Yay. Ltd.
- Bilge, A. S. (1969). *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1965)*. Ankara: AÜSBF Yay.
- Denktaş, R. R. (2008). *Kıbrıs Elli Yılın Hikâyesi*. İstanbul: Akdeniz Haber Ajansı Yayınları.
- Erim, N. (2014). *Bildiğim, Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*. Ankara: Ajans-Türk Matbaacılık.
- Eroğlu, H. (2001). Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'ni Yaratan Tarihî Süreç (1940-1983). *Kıbrıs'ın Dünü, Bugünü ve Geleceğe İlişkin Vizyonu* (s. 103-147). Lefkoşa: Yakındoğu Üniversitesi.
- Esenbel, M. (1993). *Ayağa Kalkan Adam*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.
- Fırat, M. (2002). Yunanistan'la İlişkiler. B. Oran içinde, *Türk Dış Politikası* (s. 576-615). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Gürün, K. (1983). *Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Politikası*. Ankara: AÜSBF Yay.
- Gazioğlu, A. C. (1998). *Enosis'e Karşı Taksim ve Eşit Egemenlik*. Ankara: Kıbrıs Araştırma ve Yayın Merkezi (CYREP).
- İsmail, S. (1992). *100 Soruda Kıbrıs Sorunu*. Lefkoşe: y.y.
- Kürşad, F., Altan, M. H., & Egeli, S. (1978). *Belgelerle Kıbrıs'ta Yunan Emperyalizmi*. İstanbul: Kutsun Yayınevi.
- Kızılyürek, N. (2003). Birinci Cumhuriyet'ten Yeni Kıbrıs'a". M. Kürçügil içinde,

-
- Kıbrıs, Dün ve Bugün* (s. 13-45). İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları.
- Keser, U. (2006). *Kıbrıs'ta Türk-Yunan Fırtınası (1940-1950-1960-1970)*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları.
- Keser, U. (2007). *Kıbrıs'ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık.
- Manisalı, E. (2004). *Avrupa Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: Derin Yayınları.
- Olgun, A. (1991). *Kıbrıs Gerçeği (1931-1990)*. Ankara: Demiroğlu Matbaacılık.
- Serter, V. Z. (2014). *Adım Adım Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti (1960-1963)*. Ankara: Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt (ATASE) Daire Başkanlığı Yayınları.
- Türk, H. S. (2003). *Kıbrıs Sorunu: Çözüm Zamanı*. Ankara: TESAV Yayınları.
- Türkeş, A. (1996). *Dış Politikamız ve Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: Hamle Yayınları.
- Uçarol, R. (2013). *Siyasî Tarih (1789-2012)*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları.
- Uslu, N. (2000). *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*. Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları.