


SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRED IN TURKEY BETWEEN THE YEARS OF 1980-2000



Editors
OZKAN AKMAN
TAHIR GUR

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PROEM

The third part of the book was studied under seven main headings with the 1980 period, which is considered to be the recent period of Turkish history, but on which only scattered and anecdotal information was available. In this section, both the ideological orientation of the coup and the ideological institutions it created are analyzed in detail. The establishment of a new economic order in accordance with the economic framework determined by the January 24 decisions is analyzed simultaneously with the formation of a political structure under the direction of the National Security Council. 1980 military coup following the emergence of new political parties and movements, Turkey's relationship with the authentic traditions while examining the historical features put forward new political movement. The intertwining of liberal consent mechanisms and the policies of intense political repression, on which militarism and nationalism constitute the main ground, are the points that this section particularly deals with. The 1990s, on the other hand, are being studied to show how a revised upper form of militarism and nationalism in the face of the Kurdish question produced a strict response to all democratic rights and demands by establishing a refusal front. Kurdish issue in Turkey, where historical extend my shape how the politics, the rise of political Islam, the economic crisis and how it affects social life conflictive political environment in which it addresses in particular stands out as the title of this section. In particular, this chapter analyzes comprehensively how the political center became subordinate to nationalism rather than attracting it to the center of nationalism. The section dating from the 1980s to the present, defines itself with the victimization of being excluded from the political sphere and draws power over this discourse of oppression, on the other hand, it deals with the period of power of a political tradition that reshapes the role of the carriers of the political demands of the environment to the center according to the demands of the international capitalist system. It carefully examines the historical roots of power and the points it transforms itself, as well as the roles and transformations of the opposition movements in this power structure. It is necessary to draw attention to some points that need to be stated about the editing of the text. As we mentioned above, in addition to the decisive titles such as coup, militarism, left, nationalism, the Kurdish issue and political Islam, which almost define each chapter of the book separately, the book also includes the political, economic, social and cultural transformations and important thresholds that took place between 1980 and 2000. Particular attention is paid to historical turning points during which various institutions, debates or conflicts have occurred; the sides of the events, prominent actors take their places on the stage to complete the picture. Newspaper, magazine archives, daily newspapers, memories, corporate histories and researches that can clarify the details of the period are included in the text as boxes and constitute a reference that can be read separately.

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EPISODE 1

BAŞBUG ALPARSLAN TURKES AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT PARTY

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Introduction

Alparslan Turkes, who led the construction of the idealistic movement, was the bearer of nationalism's transformation from being a natural element of national identity to a separate political identity. He was born in Cyprus. He is the son of a family that migrated from Kayseri to Cyprus. He immigrated to Istanbul as a family in 1932 and entered Kuleli Military High School in 1933. He graduated in 1936 and transferred to the Military Academy. After graduating from here in 1938, he entered the Infantry Shooting School with the rank of infantry junior and joined the army ranks in 1939 with the rank of lieutenant. In 1955, Staff Major Turkes was appointed as a member of the Turkish General Staff Representative Delegation to the "Permanent Group" in Washington in America and remained in this position until 1958. During this time, Turkes studied international economics and English composition at the night department of George Washington University (Ağaoğulları, 2006). It was sent to Germany in 1959 to the Atomic and Nuclear School. He has been the representative of the General Staff at various NATO meetings in Europe. Turkes, one of the leading figures of the National Unity Operation on May 27, 1960, thought of this movement as a reform movement that would ensure supra-party and national unity. After the intervention, he became a member of the National Unity Committee and the Undersecretary of the Presidency. Presidency under secretariat lasted from 27 May 1960 to 25 September 1960 (Turkes, 1977). Drafts for the benefit of the state and the nation, which could not be enacted like the Union of Ideal and Culture and that became law like the State Planning Organization Law, were prepared with the directives of Turkey. Turkes, who worked to bring the National Unity Operation to reach its real goals in this period, was dismissed from the committee with some of his friends after the Constitution was violated on 13 November 1960 as a result of the suggestions made by some politicians of the party to some members of the National Unity Committee. In 1960, he was obliged to reside in India with the rank of Government Counselor (Turkes, 1975). Returning to the country three years later on 22 February 1963, Turkes established an association, was arrested due to the 21 May incident, 5 September 1963 He was released in. Turkes, who entered the CKMP (Cumhuriyetçi Peasant Nation Party) on March 31, 1964, was appointed as the general inspector of the Party and was elected as the Chairman on July 31, 1965, a year later. The

name of the CKMP became the Nationalist Movement Party in February 1969 with the proposal of Turkes. Alparslan Turkes was elected as a deputy from Ankara in 1965 and from Adana in 1969 and 1973 elections (Alsac, 2009).

With the May 27 coup, a new actor appeared on the political scene: Alparslan Turkes. Turkes took part in the junta that carried out the coup as a colonel (Bayraktar, 2016). Shortly after the coup, a crack formed within the National Unity Committee (MBK), which was in control of the country; On the one hand, the first group, which wants to transfer power to civilians immediately, and on the other hand, the second group that advocates the continuation of the military administration for a while and various top-down reforms (Ağaoğulları, 2006). Turkes was among the group that suggested that power should not be transferred to civilians immediately and that the military administration should remain in power for a while (Ahmad, 1996). The split form of the MBK made the committee inoperable after a while. In the end, the second group of fourteen people, called the Fourteen, including Turkes, was assigned abroad and liquidated. Turkes, has completed its mission abroad after a while and returned to Turkey in 1963 (Akçam, 2009). Turkes tried to enter politics shortly after his return home. First, he tried to join the Justice Party (AP), which was established as a continuation of the Democrat Party (DP) (Akçam, 2009). In the meantime, Turkes supported Sadettin Bilgiç against Süleyman Demirel in the presidential race that was continuing in the EP, but Turkes gave up hope from the AP after Demirel won the race. Later, in March 1965, Turkes and his team joined the Republican Peasant Nation Party (CKMP). Turkes's friends soon got organized in the party and, four months after joining the party, they ensured that Turkes was elected chairman at the extraordinary congress in July 1965. In 1969, the name of the party was changed to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and its emblem to three crescents (Bayraktar, 2016). Ulku Grills MHP and its youth organization, which, in parallel to the whole world between the years of 1960-1980 in Turkey also gave a violent struggle against the rise of the leftist movement (Ağaoğulları, 2006). In fact, this war against the left turned into the MHP's *raison d'être* after a while. The nationalists claimed that they supported the state and helped the state in the fight against communism and motivated them in this direction (Bayraktar, 2016). The situation of the Idealist Movement before the 1980 Coup is explained in the last part of the second chapter (Ağaoğulları, 2006).

Nations system in case the value of the center sat nationalist movements, as well as the world agenda the agenda of Turkey is an ideology that is still quite deeply affected and are also affected (Bayraktar, 2016). At the same time, nationalism has the power to influence other ideologies. Most ideologies contain a bit of nationalism within them; They use nationalist discourses to influence the people, or some ideologies criticize nationalism and nationalists and try to produce discourses against them. Since its inception, nationalism has been an effective weapon against internal enemies, as well

as being a unifying cement against external enemies. Sometimes those who oppose the government are labeled as traitors, enemy agents, and enemies of the state, and the exclusion, prosecution and imprisonment of these groups from society are justified thanks to nationalism; sometimes even the job of silencing the dissidents was carried out by the nationalists (Akçam, 2009).

There are basically two different views on when nationalism arose. The so-called primitives claim that the nation is the same as humanity (Öğün, 2000). Roughly the nation comes before the state, according to the ancients; First, the nation was formed, and then nations created nationalism. Innovative thinking, which has dominated official history and mainstream media, argues that nationalism is created by nations (Poulton, 1997). The age of the nation is quite young compared to the other group, modernists, who are more dominant in academic literature; nation was born in modern times. Modernists argue that the concept of the nation was created by nationalisms (Öğün, 2000).

Nationalism is a political movement and ideology that strives to gain power and justifies it based on nationalist claims. Nationalist claims are based on the assumption that a specific nation has existed forever (Yalçiner, 2014). It keeps the interests and values of this nation above all other interests and values. At the same time, he advocates that the nation should use its own political sovereignty, that is, it should be politically independent. Thus, the nation becomes the sole subject of loyalty and legitimacy. The concept of nation in its current form, that is, the nation as the subject of political loyalty and political legitimacy, is only encountered in the late 18th and early 19th century (Öğün, 2000; Yayman, 2009).

With the establishment of the Millet Party, the number of parties started to increase. The Nation Party is one of the parties that will later form the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) (Yalçiner, 2014). After a short time after the National Party's closure it was founded in the nature of his more Republican Nation Party, in 1958, established previously combine their way with Turkey Peasant Party, which will change its name in 1969 as the Nationalist Movement Party Republican Villagers Nation Party (CKMP) 's (Yayman, 2009). Colonel Alparslan Turkes, one of the defendants in the 1944 Racism-Turanism case, tried to gain a place in politics by trying to join the Justice Party (AP), which was established as a successor of the Democrat Party (DP), as well as with his connections in the army when he was sent from his mandatory overseas post after the military intervention on May 27 (Bora & Can, 1994). Alparslan Turkes, who accelerated his activities with anti-communist associations after his return to the country, was elected as the chairman of the nationalist, conservative rural middle class party CKMP in 1965, after Osman Bölükbaşı's departure in 1960, the party, Turkist and fanatical anti-communist factors. It started to plan. This year also participated in the elections is considered as the first year of the nationalist movement in Turkey (Yayman, 2009). An

important change observed in the party with the advent of Turkes is that while secularism was definitely defended in the statements made for the 1965 elections, this discourse changed in the following years. The party gathered its changing discourse around the idea of a “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” in 1969, Turkes’s famous “we are Turks as much as God Mountain, we are Muslims as much as Mount Hira. Both philosophies are our poems (Bora & Can, 1994).

Alparslan Turkes is a soldier, politician and statesman who has left a mark in Turkish state and political life with his actionary and intellectual personality. Turkes has always had a specific weight, regardless of his military rank, the voting rate of his party, or his representation power in Parliament (Karakurt, 2016). Starting after the death of Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and until 1997, when he passed away, he assumed political and personal responsibility in all the depressing processes of the Turkish state and was involved in a struggle that he believed he had placed on history. In this respect, Turkes, whose memory is remembered by the majority of the Turkish nation in a respectable and exclusive place, has been subjected to constant accusations by a narrow and limited circle (Yayman, 2009). The fate of all actionist figures in history was also manifested in the late Turkes. As a result of the struggles and the current and intense turmoil in this framework, he did not find the opportunity to disseminate his ideas and philosophy in a calm and good cheer (Yalçınkaya, 2011). Perhaps for this reason, the state system envisioned by Turkes and the state philosophy adopted by him have not been studied sufficiently and scientifically (Karakurt, 2016). This article can be regarded as a short essay examining the view of the late Turkes, who presented Turkish nationalism to the Turkish nation as a political program, to the notion of democracy (Yayman, 2009).

The fact that Alparslan Turkes began to be recognized in Turkish political life as a Turkish nationalist intellectual and actionist was mentioned with the events of 3 May 1944. At that time, thousands of Turkish nationalist youth protested the trial of the Turkish intellectual and literary scholar Hüseyin Nihâl Atsız and realized the first peaceful, unarmed and civilian demonstration in the history of the Republic (Bora & Can, 1994). This demonstration is a proof that Turkish nationalists have the courage to seek rights and freedoms even in the oppressive environment of the single-party period, and that no illegal incident occurred in this pursuit of democratic maturity (Karakurt, 2016). The courage and democratic maturity of the Turkish youth was met with a harsh reaction from the single party government, and the nationalist youth were beaten and wounded on the orders of the administrators of the period (Yalçınkaya, 2011).

In 1945, a few years after the end of the Second World War, the Cold War broke out between the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union, which affected almost all countries of the world. Socialist Soviet Union during the Cold War in the face, situated next to the US anti-communist in Turkey, antisosyalist groups have gained

strength. One of the prominent groups of these groups was Turkists. During the 1950s, many Turkist magazines were published and a Turkist association was opened. In the 1960s, nationalists began to organize widely beyond magazines and associations. During this period, the leader of the nationalist movement was Colonel Alparslan Turkes, who read the army's declaration on the radio when the coup of May 27, 1960 took place. In the 1960s, especially after 1968, the rise in the world left movement began to gain strength in Turkey. Against this developing left movement, Turkes and his party, MHP, used an anti-socialist rhetoric and also resorted to violence against left groups by acquiring a paramilitary, fascist character. The Idealist Movement, which saw the struggle with the left as its main goal until the 1980 coup, developed more anti-PKK discourse after 1980. In the 1990s, the Idealist Movement, on the one hand, showed great interest in the Turkic Republics in Central Asia. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Turkic Republics gaining independence, Turan dreams of nationalists in Turkey, it has revived again. During this period, the Idealist Movement, which has pan-nationalism features, made discourses wishing to unite with Turkic Republics. As you can see, the Idealist Movement, which is a branch of Turkish nationalism and Turkish nationalism, has different characteristics in each period. Turkish nationalism, which emerged in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, was divided into many schools, especially in the Republic period. Even the Idealist Movement, which is a subgroup of Turkish nationalism, which is the main subject of this study, has had different characteristics and made different discourses from its birth until today (Bayraktar, 2016).



In the 1970s, it began to rise in political tension in Turkey. The army argued that the conflicts between political parties increased especially after the 1977 elections and this situation dragged the country into anarchy and terror (MGK, 1981: 191, 193). According to the military, this situation between the parties divided the country into hostile camps and weakened the authority of the state. Therefore, the army, the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law given to him by the Republic of Turkey on the basis of protecting and safeguarding September 12, 1980 “has been announced that the act (Resmi Gazete, No. 17103). In the Number One Declaration of the National Security Council, which

was read in the name of the junta on the morning of September 12, it was declared that the army completely took over the administration of the country due to the failure of the state organs (Resmi Gazete, Number: 17103). The activities of all political parties were banned with Declaration Number Seven (Resmi Gazete, Number: 17103). Later, political party leaders other than Alparslan Turkes began to be arrested. Turkes, who had been hiding for a while, surrendered two days after the coup (Zürcher, 2012).



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With September 12, the nationalists sitting on the defendant chair felt a deep sense of deception and use. The nationalists say that the regime used themselves as a gendarme through various games in the past, but that these gendarmerie duties ended with the coup; “Our gendarmerie ended after the revolution. Some of us are on the rope, some of us have found our place in prisons. “ They stated it in their words (Yıldırım, 1991). Leading idealists to prisons and even death; there were soldiers they believed were at least as opposed to communism as they did. The nationalists were quite surprised by the torture they were subjected to in military prisons, which they describe as prison camps. Because the army, which was against communism like them, seized the administration, but the doors of the state, which they regarded as sacred, not the gates of power, were opened before the idealists (Karaaslan-Uzun, 2008).

Having experienced all these changes after the September 12 coup, the idealists have reached a very different point from September 11, 1980. This change is particularly noticeable for nationalists in prisons. During this period, the source of most of the criticisms directed to the state and the upper party level were these idealist prisoners. One of the transformations experienced is focused on religion; Islamization has become increasingly widespread among idealist prisoners. These idealists have now defined themselves as the Turkish Islamic idealists, and the cause they are fighting for is spreading Islam (Bayraktar, 2016).

With the lifting of the political party bans in 1983, idealists, like other political movements, entered in an effort to establish their own parties. During this period, some differences of opinion arose about the future of the idealist movement. One group argued that the idealist movement ended its life with September 12, and that it should remain an organization that deals only with cultural activities. Another group suggested that idealists engage in political activities within right-wing parties. Unlike these groups, a third group stated that idealists should establish their own parties (Uzun, 2005). The Conservative Party (MP), which claims to be the nationalist movement's own party, the continuation of the idealist tradition, was founded on July 7, 1983 (Kaynar et al., 2007). However, this party was able to gather a very small part of its idealist cadre potential. Because most of the MHP cadres turned to other right-wing parties, especially the Motherland Party (ANAP) (Uzun, 2005). Many of the prominent figures of the party have joined the Islamist and nationalist faction led by Mehmet Keçeciler and Mustafa Taşar in the ANAP (Poulton, 1997: 140). During this period, some idealist cadres left politics for good (Uzun, 2005). The MP, who had a shortage of staff, was also in a difficult situation because Mehmet Pamak, a member of the Advisory Council (DM), which was charged with preparing the new constitution by the National Security Council (NSC), was the founding chairman. Pamak, who voted "Yes" to execute some nationalists during his membership in DM, was not adopted as a leader in the idealist community, even if he was a custodian (Yıldırım, 1991). Another difficulty faced by the party was the closure case filed against it. The closure case opened on 5 August 1983 and continued until 3 November 1983 put pressure on the party administration and greatly disrupted the political work of the party. When entering 1984, it has become necessary for MP to arrange a showcase in order to bring fresh blood (Bayraktar, 2016).

These evaluations on rights and power also constitute the essence of the democratic nation state, the framework of which Turkes has determined with very concrete expressions. According to him, no state can be established and sustained only by shedding blood, with the power of weapons (Turkes, 1996) States are the highest artifacts and institutions created by human communities. These institutions can only become a reality with values such as belief, ideal and morality, and a talent such as organizationalism (Turkes, 1994). A state built on these values and abilities will have the opportunity to live in harmony and happiness regardless of religion, sect, race and nationality (Turkes, 1996) Because the nation state is not a class state, it is a state. It is out of the question that both the Liberal state and the Marxist state can provide this. Because the state theory of Western liberal democracy does not express a whole nation, but a few bosses, owners of capital, in other words, a political form shaped within the framework of the democracy of a class. On the other hand, the Marxist system of the East expresses the same crisis. The only difference is that the bourgeois class will be replaced by Communist Party members (Turkes, 1998) in other words, they are far from promising a political project or system

that embraces their citizens as a whole, beyond being class democracies and class states. However, there is a clear reality that “one’s ability to benefit from political democracy, political rights and freedoms depends on his economic possibilities (Turkes, 1994).

The fact that a person who does not have economic opportunities receives a fair and equal share of rights and freedoms remains only in the texts of the constitution and law. In other words, justice and freedom, which are theoretically expressed by both the liberal state and the Marxist understanding of the state, cannot emerge from them as reality (Turkes, 1998). The state as the political form that will allow this is only the democratic nation state. If we list the basic characteristics of the democratic nation state in terms of Turkes; With the democratic nation state, the gap and injustice between different segments of society will disappear. In order for this to be eliminated, the cheats in politics must disappear and it must turn into a structure dominated by feelings such as unity and brotherhood (Turkes, 1996). Together with the democratic nation state, the people will be descended and the people will be known and known. Because one of the most important reasons underlying the problems is the inability to know the public sufficiently (Ağaoğulları, 2006). Therefore, the democratic nation state aims to be the voice of the nation and to defend their rights (Turkes, 1994) According to Turkes, the Turkish nation should not be seen as a stepping stone for power, and democracy should not be understood only as a voting system. In the words of Turkes; It is necessary to “unite in the maximum, not in the minimum commons (Turkes, 1996) Those who rule the people should be from the people, live with the people and work for the people. In this way, the problems of the country can be solved. The only way to achieve this is through the democratic nation state (Turkes, 1998)

The Turkish Union and Turanism in the Works of Turkes Alparslan Turkes’s views on foreign Turks are detailed in many of his speeches and works. In particular, “Turkey’s Issues”, “Basic Opinion” and “9 Light” in his speech in Parliament and has done work includes detailed information on these issues (Ağaoğulları, 2006). Here, some parts of them are presented to the readers as a summary. For example, the outer Turkes has explained why it should be dealt with Turkey: “Whether in Turkey, except for prompts, or no matter where in the universe Turkish nationalist, with interest against Turkey there is full respect (Yalçiner, 2014). Since they are from our nation, who will take care of them other than us? We have to take care of them. This is a principle of our nationalism understanding. The functioning of this principle alone is subject to one condition: We will take care of them, but showing love to them should in no way harm the Turkish State and nation. We will deal with them subject to this condition. If there is any harm, we will immediately cease this relationship. Why is that? Because Earth is the only independent Turkish state in Turkey. Not putting him in any danger is the greatest service to the idea of great Turkism. Why will we take care of them? If you examine the history of Turkish

intellectual movements, you can see four main streams of thought. “ In this context, after mentioning the Ummah and Ottomanism movements, his view on Turkism, which is the third trend, is actually a summary of his view of the Turkic World: “With the bankruptcy of the idea of Ottomanism, a new idea was born: Turks do not benefit from any other than Turks (Nihat & Emre, 1995). Because, saying there was Ottomanism, Hejaz railways and other infrastructure facilities were built in the Balkans, Syria. But Anatolia remained poor. He was in a miserable condition without maintenance, and this idea was born from this point on (Turgut, 1995). They said, “Let’s go back to ourselves.” At the same time the Turks outside Turkey also moved. They contacted each other and published newspapers and magazines. They said, “We are Turks, there is no benefit for Turks other than Turks, let us strengthen our cultural connection and unite” and thus the Turkism movement started. As the fourth trend, Turkes, which deals with the idea of the Turkish Union, defines Turanism as follows: “Turanism: It is the idea of uniting all nations and tribes of Turanian origin under a state, under a flag. this is Turanism in the sense. In the folk language, it is the unification of Azerbaijan, Kirkuk, Iran, Crimea and Turkistan Turks. Turkes stated that those who find the movement of Panturkism (Turkish Union) and the boundaries of this movement wide in addition to Scientific Turanism, suggested the name Panturkmenism (Turkmen Union); He stated that these ideas were spread under the influence of the Turkish Hearth, which accepted the principle of Turkism in ideas, language, everything, and especially Ziya Gökalp, who pioneered these ideas. In fact, these words are a very short and striking summary of Turkes’s view of the Turkic World. Turkes stated that Turkish nationalism was born after the War of Independence, which was won under the leadership of Atatürk, and that those who were afraid of Turkism put forward the idea of Anatolianism; against them to ensure that Turkey’s rise as an idea and powerful “Nine Light” doctrine put forth and say that they are the words concluded: “We have this idea of a political party in the action. This love the Turkish nation, to connect to the Turks, think like Turkey, the Turkish nation to exalt, to avoid damage to Turkey to deal with foreign registration provided that the Turks won their independence, it is to help the development. It is never about taking up arms and attacking (Turgut, 1995). I repeat this requirement: Turkey will deal with them, without prejudice to the record. “ With the establishment of the MHP, Turkish nationalism, which had existed as an intellectual movement until that day, entered the program of a political party with the “National Doctrine Nine Lights”. When we look at the principle of “nationalism”, which is the first principle of the Nine Lights, we can see Turkes’s views on the Turkish world, which we have summarized above, more clearly and broadly. Başbug Alparslan Turkes, in his work titled “National Doctrine Nine Lights”, expressed the ideal of the Turkish Union as follows: The ideal of the Turkish Union is the ideal of gathering all Turks in the world as a nation and state under a flag. The realization of this may seem impossible to some people at first glance. Many people may also characterize this as a harmful dream (utopia) (Turgut, 1995). But it must not be forgotten that every truth

first begins with a dream. Again, remember that in 1919, requires to establish a free and independent Turkey to engage in war against the world's madness and delusion he had characterized as winners in Anatolia. But who believed and gave themselves an ideal, dormitories recovery and succeeded in forming an independent Turkey. Turkish Union also systematically work, insidious and protect Turkey before everything and will certainly one day Hakikat by working to upgrade. Atatürk and Turkes Got Right: The Soviet Union Disbanded (Yayman, 2009). The predictions of Atatürk about the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1933 and Alparslan Turkes in 1944 came true in 1991 and history justified these two leaders. Turkes shared his views and suggestions on how and under what conditions our relations with the Turkic Republics, which gained their independence after this breakup, will develop on various occasions, and in his speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly on December 12, 1991, he briefly said: Turkey's foreign policy has been taking place ever. Turkey's foreign policy has been set by the Soviet Union (Yayman, 2009). But developments in the world, new formations and new developments in other parts of the world in the Soviet Union, Turkey has brought issues such as how to adjust their relationship thereafter. Previously, Turkish Foreign Affairs directly targeted the Soviet Union; Turks in them were never mentioned. Even the Turks to address the issues beyond our Turkey Turkey for various reasons, especially in the political field was seen as a fearful subject, it said it was the accused who have seen little (Turgut, 1995).

As you know, as an old friend of yours who has been in the field of politics for a long time, I spent 55 years of my life dealing with these issues. According to the statistics of the United Nations recently, Turkish is the fifth most spoken language in the world. First is Chinese, second is English, third is Spanish, fourth is Arabic, and fifth is Turkish, so despite having experienced many disasters according to this order, the Turkish nation is still one of the most populous nations on earth (Yayman, 2009). To say "200 million people speak Turkish" means "there are 200 million Turks". The Soviet Empire began to fall apart and dissolve. There are five Turkish Republics living here; These are Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. When we consider them Turkish Republic and Turkey's foreign relations, foreign policy, what should be? She Considering the geopolitical characteristics of the republic, be they economic opportunities have the resources taking into consideration, taking into account the social structure and the non-Turkish other units, such as Armenia, like Georgia and taking into account the situation of others, what should be the policy of Turkey said based on rational and scientific principles. We need a new political plan. This foreign policy cannot be organized with such unprepared, random and fast-paced attitudes. These are people who are the same as our descent and religion, our brothers and sisters, and they feel affectionate towards us. Turkey are in love, they expect leadership from Turkey. Consequently, there is a need to make a policy planning based on new scientific

principles, taking into account these characteristics of them and taking into account the effects of our recognition of other non-Turkish republics on them. In the opening speech of the Turkish Congress on Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation of States and Communities held in March 1993, Turkes expressed this framework more clearly and clearly outlined the boundaries of the relations as follows: The establishment of close cooperation and rapprochement among Turkish communities time will not seek to harm and attack. The aim of the solidarity and cooperation activities desired to be carried out will be to ensure peace and prosperity in the world. No matter where they are in the world, they want to cooperate closely with their neighbors of another nationality or with other communities they live in, based on friendship, goodwill and peace. Having stated this, it is necessary to say a few words about our ongoing relations with the Russians (Yalçiner, 2014). According to Turkes, many Turkish regions were kept alive as Russian colonies until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but this situation should change. Due to the various links divided by geography and historical events, Turks should organize a very close cooperation with the Russians, based on friendly and human rights, in accordance with the principles of democracy. This new order of relations with the Russians should be based mainly on the following principles: “The first principle is the principle of reciprocity (Yayman, 2009). Relationships between us in every issue will be in the same measure, quality and quantity. The second principle is the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. The third principle is that the parties will be in equal terms and equality in the relations. The fourth principle is that the parties will always have equal rights. “ Atatürk and Turkes predicted but could not see: “The Turkish Union Will Be Established One Day Of course! Alparslan Turkes, in his work “1944 Nationalism Event”, and in the book of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt published under the title “History of Revolution” and “Atatürk Revolution” and taught in universities, I have faith that “Turkish Union” belonging to Atatürk will one day become the truth. He says that even if I don’t see it, I will close my eyes to the world in his dreams (Yalçiner, 2014). Like Atatürk, Turkes predicted the realization of the Turkish Union and worked for its realization. Years passed, but even though progress was made on certain issues, it was insufficient and most of Turkes’s proposals regarding the Turkish World could not be realized. On the 100th anniversary of his birth, we cannot end by explaining the contributions of Alparslan Turkes, the Prime Minister of the Turkish World, to Turkish nationalism and the Turkic World (Turkes, 1998). At the Azatlik Square in Baku, the late President of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, who greeted the people together with the gray wolf sign, expressed his feelings after Alparslan Turkes’s march to the right, with these laconic words (Turkes, 1994): “ A great leader who blessed his protection from external enemies for the sake of liberation, independence and the rise of world Turkishness, saw that his struggle was stealing victory and closed his eyes with ease. Many over the years considered him a dreamer (Yalçiner, 2014). He did not believe what he said. Alparslan Turkes still reported in the court of 1944 that, as in 1917, in 1965 or in 1999 a revolution

will begin in Russia, my biggest enemy. And Turkey should be prepared for this. History confirmed the appearance of the great leader by several years. Russian imperial broke up. But what a pity that Turkey had not expected this. Alparslan Turkes has struggled patiently, resolutely and steadfastly for more than 35 years (Turkes, 1996). Turkey fall into the bondage of communism, Moscow or Beijing was brave toy Lack of direction. He believed wholeheartedly that Turks in Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Turkistan, Central Asia, Siberia and other lands would gain independence and acted constantly. Turkey in the training of staff and a great nationalist Turkish youth stand up for their national identities of its services inaccessible (Turkes, 1998).

Result

In the light of which of the birth theories the MHP, which is one of the oldest parties of Turkish political life still continuing its activities, was founded in accordance with the historical background mentioned above, which class parties it is among in terms of party typologies and Huntington's criteria for institutionalization of political parties, Analyzes have been made regarding the state of its institutionalization (Karakurt, 2016). According to this, according to Duverger's classification, it can be said that the MHP entered the Turkish political life as a party of participation crisis from within the parliament, although it received the support of some groups and individuals from outside the parliament. When the MHP is analyzed in terms of political party typologies, it can be said that although it was a cadre party as of its birth, it later acquired the characteristics of a mass party, like most Turkish political life parties. At the same time, looking at the policy of the MHP in the 1970s, it can be stated that it tends to be a totalitarian integration party. Within the scope of other party typologies, it can be concluded that MHP does not conform to the typology of professional parties, and likewise does not enter the cartel and catch-all parties. Likewise, it can be argued that although it was appropriate at the beginning, it did not enter the typology of the leader party because it was able to change its leader and continue on its path without any problems, but it is an ideological party due to its strict adherence to its most important feature, its ideology (Karakurt, 2016).



Alparslan Turkes has managed to become a rare politician who has succeeded in creating a great circle of loyalty and love around him; With his ideas and struggle, he established a unique throne in the hearts of his fans and became the father of ideas of all idealists without exception. In addition, we can even say that he is jealous with a secret envy that is ashamed of being confessed by those who do not like. We can summarize the role, contributions and achievements of Alparslan Turkes and his political struggle, namely the “Idealism Movement” in recent Turkish history: Turkey is a “Turkish state” spread the idea that the audience was massification. For the transportation of youth in politics in Turkey, no one has succeeded in setting Alparslan Turkes and Nationalist Movement. One of the most fundamental aspects of modernity “massification of politics” is that this struggle, Turkey has opened up great horizons in this regard. Turkish Nationalism in the whole of Turkey is provided to reach a very effective weight. However, this power was able to concentrate in the MHP only as a certain percentage. This, MHP has prevented the popularization to and personally power as a party, but since the news has led to something else: almost all mass parties a little bit in Turkey “ülküçüleş have”, and even many ideas and principles advocated by the MHP, this It was implemented as a “state policy” by those who shut down the party and imprisoned its leaders and cadres. In this respect, it should not be accepted as an exaggeration to say that even the State is “idealized” in some respects. In this respect, the numerical vote values of the MHP cannot be taken as a healthy criterion for the real power of both Turkish Nationalism and the MHP mission in the broadest sense, more clearly, “Idealism”. The MHP is only a fraction of this power, the portion of an iceberg above water. Thanks to Alparslan Turkes, the degeneration of Turkishness was prevented by restricting it to Anatolian geography and Anatolian-Turkish history, and the idea that it has a very large geography and a very deep historical dimension surrounding Anatolia has always been kept alive. As a result, the holistic and encompassing idea of “World Turkishness” gained vitality; Azeri, Turkmen, Kyrgyz etc. A terrible disaster throughout history such as the disintegration of the World Turkishness was prevented by the transformation of names such as names into separate nations (Hocaoğlu, 1997).

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EPISODE 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD TURKISH NATIONALISM AND MUHSİN YAZICIOĞLU IN THE IDEALIST MOVEMENT

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Nationalism which is an intellectual current and political movement and can be considered to be the most influential throughout the history, followed a different course in Ottoman Empire comparing to France, which is accepted the country where it emerged. Turkish Nationalism in which cultural codes have been more important than genetics maintained far away and against to Racism during Republic of Turkey which has been considered as the follower of Ottoman Empire after her collapse. Alparslan Türkeş who undertook the leadership of Turkish Nationalism during 1960s, when it turned to be ideational and an actual movement, adopted it to be unified with Islam as the pioneering intellectualists and he gave a new name as Idealism. During 1970s when the global politics was dominant on Turkey Türkeş and Idealists, who fought against to the enforcement of East Block; Communism, were subjected the same treatments as their opponents who were against the state by the 1980 military coup and stayed at prisons and even some of them were executed. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, who was the leader of Ülkü Ocakları during 1970s, the youth organization of the movement stayed at prisons like Türkeş. Via a plebiscite to turn back the democracy Türkeş and Yazıcıoğlu who started policy again fell into conflicts during the new emerged world order after the collapse of communism and afterwards Yazıcıoğlu established Great Union Party to be open to larger communities by leaving Nationalist Work Party. Although the newly established GUP was not very weak, it was never very strong. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, besides being loved and adopted by the public, has become an example that being loved, respected and reliable is not enough to achieve successful results in politics. In this work, the ideological and political development of the Turkish Nationalism, the political affairs of Alparslan Türkeş in 1960s and 1970s and the Nationalist Movement between 1980-2000, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and his party are analysed, events taking place after 2000 are not tackled.

Introduction

The effects of the French Revolution, one of the events that influenced the political history of the world most, are still shaping domestic and foreign politics of the countries. With the aim of solving the accumulated sociological problems, this revolution which took place more effective and painful than it was planned became also the source of the long chaos and nationality winds which pioneered the collapse of the rooted empires

completing their evolution in hundreds of years yet integrated with certain diseases. The sociological problems that feudalism produced in the European societies started to be tackled in the work of thinkers such as Rousseau, Hume, Locke, Voltaire, Kant, Diderot, Rene, and Descartes within the Enlightenment Philosophy and the change and transformation ideas were put into act at the end of the century with the French Revolution. We observed that the historical roots of the French Revolution started with The Renaissance and continued with the Reform Movement, because people were under oppression, economic conditions became unbearable, free thinking could not disperse and the sociological structure was worn out because of long wars that people did not believe in and these caused the Revolution which paved the way of modernity in Europe. Here, Europe became equipped and a rival to the Ottoman Empire.¹

Nationalism that turned into the core of racism, developing a discriminatory and marginalizing identity in many European societies fed the concept of nation holding together different races, turning into a uniting identity in some societies. Turkish nationalism, without depending on an enmity towards another nation and putting forward the understanding of sustaining its own existence followed a different path from other nationalism flows, shaping its identity a hundred years after the Revolution.²

Another important event observed when the historical development of societies are analysed is the Industrial Revolution marking the XIX century. With the use of steam power in industry and help of ships reaching distant places, companies which started to manage the resources of these lands received regulations from their states and in this way colonialism was based on legal foundations.

As these forced laws would be achieved through military methods, colonialism which also earned a political identity earned its intellectual foundation through Social Darwinism which legalizes the theory *the strong is right*.³The Ottoman Empire which found it difficult to adapt to the developments in the world, could not embrace the Enlightenment Philosophy, could not realize the Industrial Revolution, and lost the Mediterranean income because of the Geographical Discoveries could not prevent its society from getting restless in this period when it deteriorated in economic, political and military areas.

Nationalism in Ottoman Empire

The reflections of the idea of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire the French Revolution put forward are first seen with the rebellions of the non-muslim societies in the Balkans. Cultural pluralism named as *Pax Ottomana* in western sources and *Millet Sistemi (Nation System)* in the Ottoman sources ensured the freedom of speech of the Balkan societies in

¹ Acun Fatma, Atatürk ve Türk İnkılap Tarihi, Siyasal Kitabevi, 12.Baskı, Ankara,2013, s.32

² Kösoğlu Nevzat, Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Osmanlı, Ötüken Neşriyat, 3. Basım, İstanbul,2013,s.43

³ Acun, Fatma, age.,s.34

the sense that it withheld an idea opposing the torture of the Ottoman individual and an Ottoman society.⁴ However, it functioned in the opposite direction of its aim by leading up to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Serbians first obtained concessions in the rebellions in the Balkans, and then Greek seceded from the Ottoman Empire with the contribution and guidance of the imperialist countries.

Before nationalism became the official ideology of the state in the Ottoman Empire first Ottomanism and then panislamism policies were tried to hold the existing elements in the society together. The failure of the Ottomanism theory which claimed protecting the political unity of the state by creating an Ottoman nation where there were no religious and ethnic differences was first seen by the rebellions and seceding of the nonmuslim elements in the Balkans and then the uncompromising and separatist acts of the nonmuslims⁵ in the Turkish Parliament I (Meclis-i Mebusan) formed after the Constitutional Monarchy I (I. Meşrutiyet). Following, the failure of the Panislamism theory, named then as *Ittihad-I İslam (the Unity of Islam)*, was revealed thanks to the unexpected Albanian events in the Balkans⁶ and the revolt of the Muslim Arab societies in the Hedjaz region against the state during the World War I in the line of the promises of the imperialist Britain and France. Turkism which was an alternative perspective for so long became the official policy of the state in the last period of the Empire after the re-conquer of Edirne in the Balkan War II. Ottomanism, Panislamism and Turkism were analysed in the article *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* which the Republic's activist nationalist intellectual Yusuf Akçura wrote in 1912.⁷ In 1913, in Ziya Gökalp's article *Üç Cereyan*, it is stated that Turkism, Panislamism and Westernism are not conflicting areas, yet they complete each other.⁸ In Akçura's article, Tanzimat was the Ottomanist understanding period where the Ottoman elements found the ground to be represented. The other period was the Panislamist period⁹ where Abdulhamid II who noticed the failure of this theory, moved from the title of the Islam Khalif and the developed an understanding the unity of the continuation of the state by the unity of Muslim people. Turkism was put into act to maintain the state with the land remaining as the only alternative as Panislamism, the next target, did not work after Ottomanism, the most comprehensive concept, failed.¹⁰

The lines "*Ben bir Türk'üm benim cinsim uludur/ Sinem, özüm ateşle doludur./ İnsan olan vatanının kuludur./ Türk evladı evde durmaz, giderim*" (*I am Turk, my religion and origin is noble/ my heart my core is full of fire / A human being is the servant of his state/ Turkish son does not stay at home, I go.*) which Mehmet Emin Yurdakul wrote during

⁴ Fahri Yetim, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Dağılma Döneminde Balkan Milliyetçiliği ve Büyük Güçler", Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Yıl 2011, Sayı 25 (Mart 2011), s.289

⁵ Özçelik M. Hakan, Yusuf Akçura'nın Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset Makalesi Üzerine Düşünceler, Anadolu Bil Meslek Yüksekokulu Dergisi, 2015, C.38, s.59

⁶ Taştan Yahya Kemal, Kanonik Topraklardan Ulusal Vataana Balkan Savaşları ve Türk Ulusçuluğunun Doğuşu, Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi *Journal of Turkish World Studies*, X1/2, Kış 2012, s.9

⁷ TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, Müellif: Azmi Özcan, 2001, C.23, s.62-65

⁸ Hamarat Ercenk, Türk Milli Eğitim Düşüncesinde Ziya Gökalp, Balıkesir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi Necatibey Eğitim Fakültesi Yüzüncü Yıl Özel Sayısı, 2010, C.12, S.22, s.56

⁹ Aydın Suavi, Modernleşme ve Milliyetçilik, Gündoğan Yayınevi, Ankara, 1993, s.138

¹⁰ Özçelik, agm., s.62

the 1897 Ottoman – Greek War are important in the sense that they reveal how deeply Turkism and patriotism were placed in state system.¹¹ Turkism appearing just before the World War I reached the peak following the failure of the other policies and this stemmed from the reflex of regaining the 400-year state lands lost in the Balkan Wars. Big losses that were seen in political, economic and military areas made it impossible for the 600-year Empire to be saved; however, the idea of liberty and nationalism dominating the last period of the state paved the way of the foundation of a new republic. Turkish nationalism, the liberation method of the Turk, became the legal action of the people to defend the land where people owned as homeland for a thousand years against the possibility of being sent away from this land, which was a plan since the 1815 Vienna Union named as Eastern Question and aimed at sending Turks away first from Europe and then from Anatolia. The Sevres Treaty was signed for this.

New Republic and Process of Turkish Nationalism

With the foundation of Turkish Republic after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it is observed that Turks displayed a new beginning. Turkish nationalism formed the intellectual basis of this new state.¹² Turkish nationality that Ziya Gökalp, one of the sociologists of the period, drew is not based on ethnicity, yet it embraces a cultural identity. Gökalp rejecting Islam as an opposing movement to Turkism embraced a method valuing westernization and nationalism together as they withhold a progressive identity, together with Islam as one of the core values of Turkish nation.¹³ Nationalism, one of the six principles the state is based on, is a uniting notion where whoever sees himself as a part of this state within the lands of the state, grows up within the culture of this geography, and desires unity and prosperity of the state under any circumstances is accepted as Turk regardless of his religion, sect and race.¹⁴

While the perspective of the Turkish nationalists growing as a citizen of the Ottoman Empire was mostly to save the state with the help of the Turks within the body of the Ottoman Empire, the perspective of the other nationalists whose sources was Russia and the Soviet Union was getting together the Turks all around the world.¹⁵ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who saw Ziya Gökalp as his teacher and Yusuf Akçura as his comrade preferred a more realistic nationalist perspective covering the land declared in the National Pact while founding the Turkish Republic and accepted this area as the state.

The new state which relatively fewer races formed came into life at a time when empires ended and nation states were founded. However, not every society could found a state nation. Some existed as dependent states within the lines drawn for them where colonial

¹¹ Yesevi Çağla Gül, Türk Milliyetçiliği, Kripto Yayınları, Ankara, 2018, s.141

¹² Özçelik, agm., s.62

¹³ Yesevi, age., 151, 152

¹⁴ Akandere Osman, Semiz Yaşar; Milli Mücadele ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi, Eğitim Yayınevi, Konya, 2018, s.260

¹⁵ Bayraktar Özgür, Ülkücü Harekette Bölünme, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi ve Büyük Birlik Partisi, Hacettepe Üniversitesi SBE Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Anabilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara 2016, s.3

western state governors were assigned. The Republic of Turkey on the other hand, maintained its progression by valuing other ethnicities equal to Turks, the founding elements, and preserved its unity despite some problematic riots seen in the early years of the republic by embracing Turkish nationalism which it saw the representation of its core values, like a challenge to imperialism.

Even if the Republican People's Party tried to move into the multi-party democracy twice in the period of passing the reforms, leaving some old implementations and maintaining the progress of the public via some new implementations they postponed this because of some cyclic reasons. The reasons and results of the mentioned period will not be analysed in this article.

*Türk Ocakları*¹⁶ which stated to work in 1912 and which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the state, was also the member of, set the course of the Turkish nationalism. Although the state sometimes highlighted nationalism as a result of international developments which also indirectly affected Turkish Republic and some developments in the domestic policies, it sometimes preferred keeping this idea in the background. The closing of *Türk Ocakları* can be an example for this.¹⁷ The changes in political discourse of Turkish Republic's principle of nationalism appears in relations with the Soviet Union and especially in the periods of Germany – Italy Ally progress in the first part of the World War II and of Russian, British and French ally progress in the second part of the World War II.

It was observed that The Soviet Union which took possession of some fronts in the war threatened Turkish Republic and claimed right on some cities in the Eastern Anatolian Region claiming that Turkish nationalists put forward a *Turanic* approach on the Turkish people on its lands. Upon these developments, Turkish Republic approached the West Block, the rival of the Soviet Union, in order not to be alienated in the international area. The government which turned a blind eye to *Turanic* movement to keep straight the support for Germany while the war was going bad for the Soviet Union, changed the policy according to the course of the war by opening a case against *Turanic* defendants among whom was also Alparslan Türkeş in 1944 May in order not to offend the Soviet Union. In the same period, it closed leftist magazines named *Yürüyüş*, *Barış Dünyası*, *Yurt ve Dünya*, *Adımlar* to avoid disturbing the balance. The government which faced open threats became withdrawn and displayed a hesitant attitude.¹⁸

The fact that the state's ideology, Turkish nationalism, deteriorated within these developments and nationalists were oppressed via courts decisions caused disturbance in nationalists, who later embraced the idea of setting up political parties which would

¹⁶ Şapolyo, Enver Behnan, Milli Mücadelede Hamdullah Suphi *Türk Kültürü IV* (45), Ankara, 1966, s.800

¹⁷ Mustafa Arıkan, Ahmet Deniz; *Türk Ocaklarının Kapatılışı, Borçları ve Emlakının Tasfiyesi*, Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2004, S.15, s.407-410

¹⁸ Akın Rıdvan, *Türk Siyasal Tarihi 1908-2000*, 3.Baskı, XII Levha yayınları, İstanbul, 2015, s.335

help them speak up in the political environment to reset the state to its original identity and to eliminate these problems.

He was characterized as the follower's completing factor in Fevzi Çakmak and Osman Bölükbaşı's statements, who were the pioneers of the multi-party democratic period which was formed via the disengagements from the Republican People's Party. A group of politicians resigned from the Democratic Party in 1948 stating that it could not be an alternative in its current shape differently from the Republican People's Party and Democratic Party to set up the *Nation Party* as a *Third Way*. In its foundation, the Nation Party started its political life on a conservative line in democrat, nationalist and social senses. With the death of Fevzi Çakmak in 1950, the Nation Party whose development came to a halt could not find an opportunity to rule and evolved into the Republican Nation Party in time. On the path of gaining new energy, the structure uniting with Turkish Villagers' Party to take the name Republican Villagers' Nation Party (RVNP) always appeared on the stage changing its name as the Nationalist Movement Party in 1969 Congress, the Republican Conservative Party after the 1980 coup and then the Conservative Party; however, despite the names and politicians constantly changing it has always been at the center of the nationalist ideology in the Turkish political life.¹⁹

Alparslan Türkeş and Idealism

This political movement which found an area through populist statements under Osman Bölükbaşı's leadership settled on a sociological foundation centered around conservative rural middle class and tradespeople. In 1960s, with the departure of Osman Bölükbaşı, it lost power, yet with Alparslan Türkeş's being the chairman, it managed a new breakthrough in the eye of the society with a corporatist, developmentalist and modernist perspective. After Alparslan Türkeş was elected the chairman, the Republican Villagers' Nation Party which acted on Turkic and anti-communist statements increased its city organisation which were 25 in 1965 to 61 until 1967. In the Adana Congress gathered on 8 February 1969, the name the Republican Villagers' Nation Party was changed as the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP). Alparslan Türkeş elected the chairman in the congress in 1965 started to be called as *Basbug* and owned a dominant role over the organization with supreme authority.²⁰ The emblem of the party became *Three Crescents*. The youth organization became the *Grey Wolf with Crescent*.²¹ In the same congress, Huseyin Nihal Atsız who put forward ethnic notion via his Turkic discourse and his friends called *Bozkurtçular* were defeated to Alparslan Türkeş who defended both being Turk and being Muslim and his friends referred to as *Üç Hilalciler*. Thanks to the collective signatures or the Three Crescents group, the Three Crescents were chosen as

¹⁹ Limoncuoğlu, Alihan. (2015). "The Evolution of Turkish Nationalism between 1904 and 1980", Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Akt: Limoncuoğlu Alihan, Türkiye'de Üçüncü Yolun Başı: Millet Partisi 1948, Akademik Hassasiyetler, 2018, C.5, S.10, s.146-149

²⁰ TDK Sözlüğü, 2009 baskısı, s.215

²¹ Baydur Mithat, Siyasi Tarihimizden Kesitler, İrfan Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1999, s. 223-224

the party emblem; however, the Grey Wolf symbol which the opposing group wanted to be the party emblem was not ignored and was accepted as the emblem of the Ülkü Ocakları, the youth organization of the movement, with the addition of a crescent, which symbolizes Islam, in the emblem. For Alparslan Türkeş, using the Grey Wolf as the party emblem would leave the party face to face with fascism accusations. The Three Crescents on the other hand would melt being Turk and being Muslim in the same pot. In the first half of 1970s, people highlighting Turkic ideas alone were sent away.²²

Alparslan Türkeş who appeared as the Republican Villagers' Nation Party chairman in politics in 1965 Congress had a say in the Turkish politics by being a 1944 Turan case defendant, being one of the implementers of the 1960 coup, taking an active role in National Unity Committee which was found after the coup, being expelled as a member of 14s group as a result of the dispute with the committee in time. Along with using the title *Basbuğ* which means unquestionable leader in Turkish history, Türkeş took his leadership to the supreme level with the principle "*The leader, Organization and Doctrine are unquestionable*" ²³as a reflection of his military character.

Many years later in his interview with Hulusi Turgut from the Sabah Newspaper, referring to Atsız's statements in Ötüken Newspaper claiming that: "Islam is the religion of the Arabs, Turks' religion is Shamanism, Türkeş aspired to sharia-religious laws, and Racism, Turkism and Turan idea are inseparable facts", he said that it was not possible for him to tolerate and accept those. ²⁴

In the light of data, it can be deduced that Alparslan Türkeş embraced being Turk and Islam as two inseparable values and the movement which he represented was there to glorify these concepts and did not leave space for nationalists with the opposing notions. Also, this approach is in line with the ideas of Ziya Gökalp, the mastermind of the Turkish Nationalism, in his book *Türklesmek, İslamlasmak, Muasırlasmak*.

Communist movements which Türkeş thought the Russian used against Turkey with the idea that they served for gaining access to the warm waters disturbed Türkeş quite a lot. Türkeş who prepared ideological background for it even when he was the chairman of the Republican Villagers' Nation Party with the idea that Turkish nationalist youth could prevent this paved the way for the youth close to his party to act with an anti-communist understanding. ²⁵ At the stage of this idea to become reality, organizing the Turkish youth through the party was problematic. The ideological basis of this organization which would be managed by the young should not have been different from that of the party; however, this youth organization should not have been in politics in this struggle which

²² Baran Dural, Pratikten Teoriye Milliyetçi Hareket, Bilge Karaca Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011, C.1-2, s.409

²³ Yanardağ Merdan, Mhp Değişti mi? Ülkücü Hareketin Analitik Tarihi, Gendaş Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, s. 33

²⁴ Hulusi Turgut, Türkeş'in Anıları Şahinlerin Dansı, ABC Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995, s.409-411

²⁵ Akpınar Hakan, Kurtların Kardeşliği CKMP'den MHP'ye Ülkücü Hareketin Kısa Tarihi, Kamer Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016, s.44-45

would be carried out by the young.

In his Republican Villagers' Nation Party years, Türkeş published a nine-principle program which he named as *the 9 Lights* which stated the doctrinarian understanding of the party and directed the movement. This program was followed after the name of the party changed as NMP. The 9 Lights which Türkeş published in his book are as follows:

- 1- Moralism
- 2- Nationalism
- 3- Idealism
- 4- Communitarianism
- 5- Scientism
- 6- Liberty
- 7- Support for Villages
- 8- Development and Populism
- 9- Support for Industry and Technique ²⁶

It will be seen when the principles are analysed that this program that Türkeş put forward for Turkish people as recommendations is not a political party program, yet it is a struggle to give direction to progress of the state in political sense and the society in sociological sense on a national line. With a reference to Idealism target and as Türkeş said "*We are idealist...*" ²⁷ the movement was called the Idealists. The definition idealists has become the name of the sociological group which is separated from other groups defending Turkish nationalism with Turkish-Islam statement and does not embrace other sharp Turkic points and statements.

The Idealist movement which followed a characteristic Turk – Islam path in Turkish politics in 1970s became the center of the war against communism which was a big threat before people with the use of the slogans such as "*Islam is like our soul, being Turk is like our body.*", "*the consciousness and pride of being a Turk, the moral and virtue of Islam*", "*A Muslim as high as Mount Hira, a Turk as high as Mount Tanrı*", "*the guide the Holly Kuran, the aim Turan*".²⁸ This sociological/political movement which would be recognized as the *Idealists* in the Turkish Political history to come from then on would gather their young people in the youth organizations which they would call the

²⁶ Türkeş Alparslan, CKMP Eminönü İlçesi, Sulhi Garan Matbaası, 4.Baskı, İstanbul, 1967, s.5-24

²⁷ Türkeş, age., s.8

²⁸ Bayraktar Özgür, age., s.68

Ülkü Ocakları for the ideological and active struggle against threatening and assailant action of the period, communism.

As one of the thinkers of the movement Mümtaz Turhan indicates the party was based on a uniting nationalism, not a discriminative or racist nationalism.²⁹ However, the reason why the young people in idealist organizations such as Ülkü Ocakları most members of which were especially from tertiary education (1966) and the Young Idealists Organization (1968)³⁰ members of which were from high schools were considered as extreme nationalists was the militarist attitude they displayed in their de facto struggle against communism.³¹

Ülkü Ocakları was born in 1966 when Turkish Nationalist young people carried out cultural activities such as setting up student clubs and getting boards against the leftist acts. Ülkü Ocakları which were founded first in Ankara University Faculty of Law, and then Ankara University Faculty of Language, History and Geography and Faculty of Agriculture multiplied in the time to come and continued their acts as the *Ülkü Ocakları Federation* against the *Idea Clubs Federation* that young people supporting communism founded.³² Ülkü Ocakları was officially recognized as an association in the same year by preparing Ankara University Ülkü Ocağı Regulations in universities via student clubs.³² No matter how close they would be thought to the NMP it is stressed that the Ocak had nothing to do with politics in the Regulations mentioned.³³

While Ülkü Ocakları in different universities moved as associations via the relationships they formed in their own cities such as Ankara Ülkü Ocakları Association, Istanbul Ülkü Ocakları Association and were engaged with agendas in the shape of social and communal warning such as “*No to Common Market*”, *Memorandum for Iraqi Turkmen’s Autonomy*”, “*Week for Warning to TRT*”, “*March for the 9 Lights*”, “*March for Malazgirt*”, and “*Meeting for Mehmet Akif*” they became the target of armed assault of the opposing leftist groups. The killings of idealist university students in armed assaults such as Ruhi Kılıçkiran on 4 January 1968, Süleyman Özmen on 21 March 1970, Yusuf İmamoglu on 8 June 1970, Dursun Önkuzu on 23 November 1970 caused serious indignation among idealists.³⁴ Idealists do not accept classical “heroism” teachings which means self-sacrifice shown when necessary and define heroism as loving the ideal as much as to sacrifice all stages of life³⁵ that displayed itself with the sacrifice of their lives, which was impossible to be seen in any other political movement.³⁵ In the following years, the outbreak of mutual shoot outs dragged the state into a serious anarchy and chaos.

²⁹ Alparslan Türkeş, age., s.27

³⁰ Öznur Hakkı, *Ülkücü Hareket*, C.2, Alternatif Yayınları, Ankara, 1999, s.235

³¹ Tamer Balci, *The Rise and Fall of Nine Lights Ideology*, Politics, religion & Ideology 12, Routhlodge, no 2, s.153

³² Akpınar Hakan, age., s.45-46

³³ TURHAN Metin, *Ülkü Ocakları 1966-1980*, Ankara: Panama Yayınları, 2016, s.1-2, Akt: Acar Hasan, *Türkiye’de Milliyetçi Hareket Düşüncesinin Gençlik Teşkilatlarına Etkisi: Ülkü Ocakları Örneği*, Uludağ Üniversitesi SBE, Siyaset Bilimi Kamu Yönetimi Bilim Dalı, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Bursa, 2018, s.85

³⁴ Küçükşiz Recep, *Bu Davaya Can Verenler Ülkücü Şehitler Antolojisi*, Yenisey Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1990, s.16-24

³⁵ Salman Tuğrul, *Türk İslam Ülküsünün Temel Meseleleri*, Kripto Yayınları, Ankara, 2016, s.20; Akt: Acar Hasan, age., s.102

1980 Military Coup

Thousands of loses in both sides between 1975-1980 overwhelmed the society and the 12 September 1980 coup was seen as a *necessary and appropriate intervention*. However, another issue that arises in the research that still continues today, the army despite the state of siege that lasted more than 20 months during the event escalating each day did not prevent young people from killing each other as they did not put the necessary effort on to the stage in order to justify a probable coup to take place in the future. General Kenan Evren who was the Chief of General Staff of the period and was seemingly planner and implementer of the coup stated that the events did not come to a halt as mentioned and went on a few months more. He then added “*A military intervention without events being unbearable any more would bring harm rather than being beneficial*”, which was put forward as proof in Süleyman Demirel’s *Anı deęi İltiraf* written in 1990 and criticized harshly.³⁶

The deterioration of the economies of the countries is a factor in the deterioration of domestic policies and social security, which cannot be ignored. 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation was realized with success despite the imperialist United States of America’s rejection and threats, then an answer by closing the İncirlik Air Base against arms embargo implemented by the USA was given and an upright stance was displayed in the foreign policy. Thanks to this operation, together with lives of the Cyprus Turks Turkey’s strategic targets in the Mediterranean Sea were secured. However, Turkey went through 5 years when there was an economic recession observed as a cost of this success and there were public order problems coming with heavy burdens. Paul Henze who was the counsellor for members of the National Security Council at the time, as a sort of confession, shows America’s role in the political unrest in Turkey by saying “*...actually Washington let the events progress in this manner, because our benefit required this*”³⁷ The treaties which left the state’s economy to the IMF were signed during the junta authority lasting between 1980 and 1983.³⁸ Also, the imperialist powers gained a lot of benefits in the expense of lives of Turkish youth and it is interesting to notice who the coup made wealthier.

Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and His Effects Upon the Idealist Movement

When the stages of the Idealist Movement before the 1980 coup are analysed it is noticed that although the chairmen of the Ülkü Ocakları were selected among young people they were influential on the ideological line of the movement. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu was one of the most famous and loved chairmen in the movement thanks to his mark in the political events and anarchy atmosphere during his duty.

³⁶ Demirel Taner, 12 Eylül’le Doğru Ordu ve Demokrasi”, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Ankara,2001, 56-4,s.45-46

³⁷ Birand Mehmet Ali, Bila Hikmet, Akar Rıdvan, 12 Eylül Türkiye’nin Miladı, Doğan Yayınları, İstanbul,1999, s.194

³⁸ Özçelik Pınar Kaya, 12 Eylül’ü Anlamak, Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, Ankara,2011,66-1,s.78

When MuhsinYazıcıoğlu who was born in Sivas Şarkışla in 1954, came to Ankara University School of Veterinary for his education in 1972 he had already been in the movement in the Young Idealists Organization since 1968. Yazıcıoğlu,who continued his acts in the General Center of Ülkü Ocakları after he came to Ankara, executed the Chairmanship of Ülkü Ocakları between 1977 and 1978. Yazıcıoğlu was the General President Consultant of the Nationalist Movement Party before the 12 September 1980 coup and he was the Chairman of the Idealist Youth Association in 1978. He was sent to prison in Mamak Military Prison for 7.5 years 5.5 of which were in a hole because of the anti-democratic verdicts of the 12 September military courts which was the biggest interruption of the Turkish democracy. He was released with no penalty in the NMP and Idealist Organizations case in 1987. Yazıcıoğlu who started to execute the Chairmanship of Social Security and Education Foundation which was set up to help suffered idealists and their families right after he was out of the prison where he had to stay guilt free stepped into the politics in the Nationalist Work Party in 1987 and became the Secretary General.³⁹

When its history is analysed National Turkish Students Association (NTSA) which was founded in the early years of the Republic and remained on the Turkic line until 1960s became the core for Ülkü Ocakları like it was an example for other nationalist organizations.⁴⁰

Idealists who tended to look for a beauty in the work of the state for long years because of the idea “*Devlet-i Ebed Müddet*”(State till Forever) felt betrayed by the state when 49 idealists including Türkeş were convicted to death and 212 idealists were sentenced to long imprisonment⁴¹ and went through a long questioning period. The loss of confidence and frustration towards Türkeş who based his defence on “*individual criminal responsibility*” in the NMP and Idealist Organizations case started in this period.⁴²

The political organization of the Idealist Movement based on an ideological foundation was formed under the roof of the Conservative Party after the 80 coup. The party which appeared on the political stage on 8 September 1983 could not attend the elections on 30 November 1985 and changed its name to the Nationalist Work Party. Within the party, clashes, participations and departures took place at a normal level as a result of the politics in the years to come. The first general president of the Conservative Party left not only membership of the party but also the political path of the Nationalist Movement. The natural leader of the movement Alparslan Türkeş became the General President of

³⁹ www.bbp.org.tr ---son izleme: 17.08.2020

⁴⁰ Acar Hasan, Türkiye’de Milliyetçi Hareket Düşüncesinin Gençlik Teşkilatlarına Etkisi: Ülkü Ocakları Örneği, Uludağ Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Anabilim Dalı, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Bursa, 2018, s.63

⁴¹ ETE Hatem, TAŞDELEN Hamza, ERSAY Sami Orçun, “Ülkücülükten Tepkisel Milliyetçiliğe: MHP’nin İdeolojisi ve Seçmen Eğilimleri”, Ankara: SETA Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları, 2014..Akt: Acar Hasan, *age*. s.67

⁴² BAYRAKTAR Özgür, Ülkücü Harekette Bölünme: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi ve Büyük Birlik Partisi, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2016..Akt: Acar Hasan, *age*. s.68

the Nationalist Work Party in 1987 with the removal of the prohibitions.⁴³

Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu who stayed in prison for more than 7 years with no guilt was released in 1987. The youth leader of the Idealist movement who was welcomed out of the prison with a great crowd started his civil life with the love and trust of the most people in the party foundation differently from the party leaders. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu who founded “the Social Security and Education Foundation” to help “suffered” idealists and their families of the 12 September Coup helped the idealists in prison and their families. Then, he founded an association in the name of “the Youth Culture and Art Ocakları” which continued the traditions of the Ülkü Ocakları. He continued to gain love and reputation of the nationalist society.⁴⁴

The Nationalist Work Party got 2.93 % in 1987 general elections and 4.14 % in the local elections. It won the Elazığ, Erzincan and Yozgat municipalities in 1989 elections.⁴⁵With this result, it stayed alive with a growth trend, regaining the votes the Motherland Party got from it.

The Conflicts Between Türkeş and Yazıcıoğlu

Even if the party got strength with the joining of Yazıcıoğlu and his fellow friends he worked with in Ülkü Ocakları in the congress in 1988, the independent idealists profile that they created with their stories shared and statements made in the YCAO caused certain problems within the party. On the other hand, Yazıcıoğlu and his fellows who tried to have active role in the party in the congress to come started to publish “Bizim Dergah” magazine as an alternative to “Bizim Ocak” magazine. Bizim Dergah magazine especially focused on telling about the torture made in prison and sorrow and was of a more Islamic and anti-capitalist perspective.⁴⁶Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and his fellows’ work was limited by Alparslan Türkeş by stopping the event named “the Tear Drop Nights” carried out in the body of the YCAO. The lists which Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu supported were abolished by the Headquarter with no reason although they won the elections in 22 city congresses.⁴⁷

Even if the tension was not desired to be noticed by the bottom community of the movement events which made it impossible to hide took place. Apart from the results taken in the congresses, the Nationalist Work Party (NWP) which was to be represented by 19 MPs in the parliament had the biggest problem about the MP distribution in the parliament. The True Path Party (TPP) which could not found the government alone wanted to found the government with the Social Democratic People’s Party (SDPP). The TPP leader Süleyman Demirel wanted Alparslan Türkeş’s support for this government

⁴³ https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milliyetçi_Calışma_Partisi son izleme: 15.10.2020

⁴⁴ Bayraktar Ö., *agt.*, .Akt: Acar Hasan, *age.* s.37

⁴⁵ https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milliyetçi_Calışma_Partisi son izleme: 15.10.2020

⁴⁶ Yanardağ, M. *age.*, s.408, Akt: Bayraktar Ö., *agt.* ,s.38

⁴⁷ Yanardağ, M. *age.*, s.408, Akt: Bayraktar Ö., *agt.* ,s.38

to be founded. However, some MPs of the separatist People's Labor Party (PLP) entered the parliament with the SDPP's support and got reaction because of their attempt to make the national oath in Kurdish. The idea of supporting the government where there was also the party supporting this other party scared the nationalist society. When Trkes insisted on supporting them, Muhsin Yazıcıolu publicized his reaction by not attending the voting with his friends Esat Btn, kke endiller, and Saffet Topakta. ⁴⁸

Yazıcıolu and his friends entered the headquarter management by preparing a different list apart from the one which Trkes wanted in the congress held in 1991. Following this, the fights between the Bizim Ocak and Bizim Dergah magazines made the tension de facto seen. Although Yazıcıolu wanted to meet Trkes upon the escalating tension his demand was rejected and he with all his friends was purged as he was released from all his tasks.⁴⁹

Because of the problems and ideological separations within the party, Muhsin Yazıcıolu and five MPs resigned with a press meeting in Ankara. Yazıcıolu said *"I have been in the nationalist movement for as long as I have known myself. I want to declare with pride in the moment that I resigned from the NWP that I am a nationalist. My resignation has nothing to do with another political party or organization. We hereby left the party as we cannot continue our honest and our faithful stance."*⁵⁰

After he left the NWP Yazıcıolu did not jump into a process of founding a party. He carried out meetings with the name *"the New Formation"* in many areas of Turkey to explain the resignation period, causes and got ideas for their aims. Yazıcıolu and his friends published a newspaper named the *Yeni Hafta* *"New Week"* and a magazine named *Nizam-ı Alem* *"the World Order"* for the new movement as they thought media did not convey their messages enough. They formed Nizam-ı Alem Ocakları for the young people who acted with the Turkish-Islam perspective. ⁵¹

"The National Agreement Text" was presented to public where the universal problems that the Islam world was having were explained as an invitation to all humanity in the period of resignation from the NWP. In it, consultation and consultancy concepts in place of decisions made by one person were tackled. Also, unity in the crowd instead of authoritarian leadership was praised. Therefore, the formation of a bigger unity where there were people with similar national and moral values was aimed instead of a formation which only Turkish nationalists could see as an alternative. ⁵²

In an interview done with him, Erdem Karako who was the chairman of the Istanbul lk Ocakları about the resignation took place stated that *"Yazıcıolu's resignation was*

⁴⁸ Selvi, A., ve Seven, E. (2010), *İkence Koularından Siyaset Meydanına*, Nesil Yayınları, İstanbul,s.99

⁴⁹ Yanarda, M. age., s.408, Akt: Bayraktar .,agt. ,s.38

⁵⁰ Umur mer, *Trk Siyasi Tarihinde Byk Birlik Partisi*, Maarif Mektepleri Yayınları, Ankara,2017,s.98

⁵¹ Umur .,age,s.103

52 Umur .,age,s.106-107

completely political and he took this path to take a shortcut to a political success". The period's MWP MP Osman Sevimli on the other hand, claimed that "Resignation was wrong and harmful while there was an opportunity to form a group in the parliament by making the PM number to 20 which was 19 then".⁵³

Yazıcıoğlu and Great Union Party

The New Formation movement Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and his friends started became the Great Union Party officially on 29 January 1993. As the symbol of the party, the "*Crescent*" which symbolized Allah in the Turkish history and "*Rose*" which symbolized Prophet Muhammed (were chosen. The party was founded on Friday and there were 99 founding members.⁵⁴ When the methods and symbols in the process of being a party are analysed, Yazıcıoğlu acted putting Islam in the center in his party's perspective as he embraced in the 1970s.

It is seen that the GUP never achieved a serious political success in the years following the party's foundation. The GUP acted on a certain discourse and program which the political environment was not used to. The party said that it would not meet many demands of the voters with the idea that actions it would take to realize individual requests of the people to vote would be morally and ethically problematic. Also, because of the election threshold concept used in the politics, the party founded without the support of the big capitals was considered not to "*win an election*" as it would face economic problems in the eye of the voters. Yazıcıoğlu however, did not produce policies to overcome the prejudices. With the stance he took in critical periods, he held the idea that being a politician who was beside his nation was indispensable for himself and his party.⁵⁵

When the attitude of Yazıcıoğlu and the GUP are analysed the most striking thing is the period of forming the government gone through thanks to the election alliance with the Motherland Party (MLP) on 24 December 1995. Yazıcıoğlu won eight representations in the parliament with this alliance. However, none of the parties including its ally MLP could reach the majority to found the government in the parliament. Yazıcıoğlu first worked to help Mesut Yılmaz's Motherland Party (MLP) and Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (WP) to found the coalition government. When Mesut Yılmaz made statements about acting with the True Path Party (TPP) after his meeting with the WP, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu left the election alliance on 28 October 1996. The government the MLP and the TPP founded could not reach the minimum MP support number for the vote of confidence. The vote of confidence was cancelled when Erbakan lodged an appeal with the constitutional court. Then, the WP and TPP coalition government under the leadership of Erbakan was founded thanks to 8 votes of the GUP.⁵⁶ The WP which was

⁵³ Umur Ö., *age*, s.100-101

⁵⁴ Umur Ö., *age*, s.127

⁵⁵ Umur Ö., *age*, s. 192-195

⁵⁶ Umur Ö., *age*, s. 154-157

elected with the favour of the public as the first party was exposed to military oppression and forced to resign on 28 February 1997 in a period called the Postmodern Coup. Erbakan resigned before the coup took place that the passing of the tanks in Sincan county of Ankara pointed at. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, the sufferer of the 1980 coup stated that he would not surrender a coup and a coup could not easily take place in Turkey again, saying “*I do not salute the tank which turns its barrel to the nation*”.

It is seen that he adopted a different path in the Turkish politics with his attitude towards the issue of joining the European Union which was the biggest agenda of the Foreign Affairs in the 1990s. Differently from the other center-right and center-left parties, the GUP claimed that the process had to be ended immediately as it damaged the state’s unity. It stated that Turkey should take place in a union with the name the *Khazar Joint Project* producing energy which Asian states would found and be the planner of this union instead of joining in a Christian Club which would harm Turkey like the European Union. One of the other most discussed topics of the period was about the *Poised Hammer*. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu stated that the Poised Hammer which was based on the region in the expense of the damage to the state had to be removed immediately as it fed the PKK terrorist organization living in the Northern Iraq.⁵⁷

In the process of founding his party, Yazıcıoğlu held meetings with the Turkish citizens in Europa sending his founding friends via the Europa Turkish Union Federation to act in coordination with them and founded the *Europa Nizam-ı Alem Federation*.⁵⁸ The phrase “Nizam-ı Alem” which he referred to especially in the youth organization is the name of the idea which Turks used at the Ottoman and Seljuks period meaning bringing order to the universe/world. Yazıcıoğlu who seems to have identified his long term goals as bringing order to humanity struggled to make Turkey active in the areas such as Caucasia and the Central Asia where their ethnic kins lived intensely after the GUP was founded. He often verbalized that the unity of alphabet, language and work areas were necessary and a vision needed to be put forward in the 21st century.⁵⁹ With his statements, it is observed that Yazıcıoğlu wanted to make real the famous Turkish thinker İsmail Gaspiralı’s theory *unity in the language, work and idea* and with Khazar Joint Project, he wanted the Turkish states producing energy to be an energy market for western countries consuming energy.

Conclusion

Nationalism which has been one of the most effective and valid concepts in the history of the world developed and progressed differently in the Turkish society from the ideas and feelings of the other states’ people. Turkish Nationalism is shaped around the idea that people who live with the same culture and feelings rather than factors like blood and

⁵⁷ Umur Ö.,*age*,s. 242-248

⁵⁸ Umur Ö.,*age*,s.103

⁵⁹ Umur Ö.,*age*,s.254

gene developing out of the individual's will build a future together and has never been away from the reality of religion. Turkish Nationalism whose route the thinkers who are considered the founders of the modern Turkish Nationalism such as Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura shaped blended Islam most of Turks believe in with Turkic consciousness. A cultural blend arose with other cultures thanks to the long empire tradition; however, the effective factor and pioneer of the unity was the Turkish community. The empire tradition which carried Islam remaining limited to the Eastern world into the center of Europa followed a similar pattern in the new republic founded in place of the collapse of the big empire and never had a racist perspective looking down upon and oppressing other nations. Turkish nationalism sprouting in the Republic of Turkey founded in 1923 went through a long path with ups and downs and reached today under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş in the 1960s with the name Turkish-Islam Idealism turning into an ideology. The Idealism ideology which tried to move on legitimate and legal ground has existed in an institutionalising manner.

In the 1970s, Idealists started to defend the Turkish state and the values of the Turkish Nation in the right-left fights the world politics brought into Turkey, which put Idealists in the target of communism. No matter how much they tried to be the topic in the society via cultural events they could not stay away from being a side in shoot outs. Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the movement and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, the chairman of the Ülkü Ocakları which is the youth organization continued to be beside the Turkish nation in this environment. Idealists lost many lives in the escalating terror events in the years to come. When the state reached 1980, a coup took place and the coup plotters accused Idealists of the same issues as those of terror organizations. Although they were released guilt free many years later, Alparslan Türkeş and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu stayed in prison for long years.

In the transition to democracy the political prohibitions of Alparslan Türkeş were removed with a public voting and he overtook the leadership of his movement again. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu also overtook responsibilities in similar political organizations after he got out of prison. The new political positions, the changing conditions of the world brought caused certain problems between these two Idealist leaders and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu founded a new party with the name the Great Union Party in 1993, resigning from Türkeş's Nationalist Work Party. The GUP criticized the NWP stating that they digressed from the ideological origin. The protagonists of the NWP claimed on the other hand that the GUP and Yazıcıoğlu disrupted the unity although they used the noun "unity". Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and the GUP which supported the idea that not only Turks and people with nationalist ideas but also all people with national and moral values must form a unity could not perform a high success in the political sense; however, they left actions, statements and organizations in the domestic and foreign politics which left a mark.

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EPISODE 3

AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA RELATIONS

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The developments that took place after the Cold War, which left its mark on the post-World War II period, against the Soviet Union towards the end of the twentieth century, in the framework of the adventure of getting rid of the seventy-year old shackles of the nations held by them; In this study, in which the Karabakh problem is examined in the context of its effects on Turkish-Azerbaijani-Armenian relations, firstly, the historical background of the problem was revealed.

Azerbaijan was de facto divided into two with the Turkmenchay Agreement signed between Russia and Iran in 1828 and Northern part of it was occupied and annexed by Tcharist Russia in the nineteenth century, has gradually gain independence after the Bolshevik revolution. This period, which started with its independent declaration in 1918 and lasted for twenty-three months, ended with the occupation of Azerbaijani lands in 1920 by Soviet Russia. After nearly 70 years of Soviet rule, Azerbaijan regained independence in 1991 and started to wave its flag among its contemporary states with dignity and pride.

Through the independence process Republic of Turkey was the first country to recognize and the most important supporter of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan-Turkey relations as a general framework of historical, cultural, ethnic, social and political foundations upon, rests on a foundation dating back to the past to the present.

Armenia, which has been the implementer of Russia's interests in the region since the Tsarist Russia period, attempted to occupy the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan to follow these interests in the post-independence period. With the actual support of the Russian Armed Forces, he carried out various genocides in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and still occupies the region.

Because of the Karabakh events, Turkey closed the land border with Armenia along with its airspace to prevent the passage of any of the country's assistance to Armenia. Trying to represent Turkey as a "state that genocide" in the public opinion due to problems experienced during the First World War, Armenia, fulfills its duty of being the tongs of the global and regional powers in the Caucasus region in the best way.

Introduction

In the 1980s, comprehensive reform programs, Perestroika (restructuring) and Glasnost (openness), put into practice by Mihail Gorbachev, who was brought to the General Secretariat of the USSR KP in March 1985 to find solutions to the economic, political and social problems experienced by the Soviet Union, the flow of history could not be prevented and the Soviet Union could not be saved from falling apart.¹

Economical system was established in Azerbaijan in accordance with the Moscow-based planning and like all other union members, she didn't have the ability to turn a raw material into an end product and sell it. This situation prevented the efficient use of the country's resources and caused great loss of income.² Efforts to move to a free market economy in order to ensure more efficient management of resources have caused the need to democratize the political environment; this situation paved the way for the collapse of the socialist system.³

This period, when ethnic separations began, resulted in the great collapse expected by Western Circles.⁴ Democratic formations have sprouted in the political system as a result of this process in which peoples are now using their right to determine their own destiny; Political structures with names such as Çenlibel, Yurt, Varlık, Müstakiller, Terakki laid the ground for the establishment of the Azerbaijan People's Front, which will direct the national movement of Azerbaijan.⁵

Political awakening and political organization in Azerbaijan gained a different dimension and momentum with the actions of radical Armenian nationalism, which reappeared in this period and which we will touch upon in the future, and the pro-Armenian attitude and decisions of the Moscow administration. During the deportation of 230 thousand Azerbaijani Turks living in the borders of the Republic of Armenia in 1988, 185 villages and other settlements were evacuated, 214 people were killed and 1154 people were injured.⁶

Azerbaijan People's Front led by the growing struggle for independence given under these difficulties and war, blood, tears have been the main theme of this period. This theme is continued within the framework of the blinded Armenian policies implemented through unfair and unlawful occupation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

¹ Musayev, SB (Ed.), Political History, C.II, Publication of Baku State University, "Azerbaijan Encyclopedia" Publications Polygraphy Union, Baku 1998.pp.288

² Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the 21. Century, (Translated by Fikret Udcan) , Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Publications, 3rd Ed., Ankara 1999.pp.298

³ Nazım Cafersoy, Azerbaijani Foreign Policy of the Elçibey Period (June 1992-June 1993) Diplomatic Story of a Struggle for Independence, Eurasian Strategic Research Center Publications, Ankara 2001.pp.8

⁴ Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Grand Failure, (Translated by Gül Keskin - Gülsev Pakkan), Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Publications, Ankara, 1992 (shown as a source with reference to the entire book.)

⁵ History of Azerbaijan, C.VII (1941-2002), Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, AA Bakıhanov Publications of History, Elm Publications, Baku 2008.pp.246-247

⁶ History of Azerbaijan, C.VII (1941-2002), Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, AA Bakıhanov Publications of History, Elm Publications, Baku 2008.pp.250

Historical Development of The Karabakh Problem

The most important problem of Azerbaijan during and after the independence process was the “Nagorno Karabakh Question” or more precisely, the protection and maintenance of the territorial integrity of the country. This problem, which emerged from the beginning of the XX. century, has remained an unresolved issue for over a hundred years. The Azerbaijan State, which gained its independence at the end of the century, continued to experience the problems of not being able to solve this heavy heritage of the past, and today it is one of the leading elements that direct the foreign policy of Azerbaijan and shape it. It is also clear that the problem is not limited to the artificially formed Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, which is only part of the historical-geographical region called Karabakh in Azerbaijan. These chronic issues, which are seen as “source of life” or “raison d’être” and an important threshold that must be overcome to achieve to “Great Armenia” by Armenia and its foreign policies main actor “Diaspora”, having key importance to keep their thesis on a global scale .

During the Soviet era Armenia continued to be systematically cleared from Turkish people of the region as a result of a policy that aims expulsion of the Turkish Republic of Turkey’s ties with Turkestan. Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region is an artificial arrangement which was formed by Soviet Russia in 1923 to favor the Armenian population lives in the mountainous part of Karabakh. The collective arrival date of the Armenians to the region is after the Caucasus region came under the control of Tsarist Russia. Official datas indicate that between 1828 and 1830, 40,000 Armenians from Iran and 84,000 Armenians from the Ottoman Empire were settled in the provinces of Elizavetpol (Gence) and Revan (now Yerevan). However, the real figures are over 124 thousand and more than 200 thousand Armenian populations are located in the region.⁷

Collecting Armenians in the region collectively, continued until the beginning of the XX. Century. Tens of thousands of Muslims and Turks were killed between 1905-1906, 1914-1918 and 1918-1920 as a result of attempts to establish an Armenian State on Azerbaijani lands. In this period, when a significant part of the Azerbaijani lands with Turks came under control of the Armenian forces, the Zengezur region was left to Armenia as of 1920, and the attempt to unite the Karabakh region to Armenia was fruitless. However, in 1923, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region-NKAR was established and a step was taken to break Karabakh from Azerbaijan.⁸

The issue of uniting the autonomous region, which was brought back to the agenda in 1945, with Armenia has not achieved its goal as a result of the determined attitude of the Azerbaijani administration. In the partial comfort environment of the Armenia was Gorbachev era, which expressed the desire to merge with the Nagorno-Karabakh

⁷ Vagif Arzumanlı, and Mustafa Nazim, Black Pages of History, Exile, Genocide, Migration, Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences, National Relations Institute Publications, Gartal Publications, Baku 1998, pp.89-96

⁸ Fariz Farzali, XX. Azerbaijan-Turkey relations in century (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Kayseri, 2011. pp.16

region in various periods and environments. She most clearly expressed its intention in this matter in 1988 by the Armenian-origin advisor of the Soviet president, Abel Aganbekyan.⁹

Immediately after this statement anti-Turkish demonstrations, violence and looting against the Turkish population in Armenia was emerged. Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region's decisions in the direction of joining to Armenia and reactionless of both Soviet Union/Socialist Azerbaijani authorities caused demonstrations that lasted for 18 days which also ignited the awakening of the national consciousness in Azerbaijan¹⁰

In Karabakh conflict which is the most decisive part of Azerbaijan -Turkey relations, Turkey even carefully follow the developments from the beginning of the conflict in 1988, didn't intervene the problem, perceive it as an internal problem of the Soviet Union until 1991. After the independence of Azerbaijan, Turkey, closely interested the issue and try to solve this conflict in the framework of fair, Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, provide peace and stability in the region.¹¹

Initially, Turkey wanted to do as a neutral intermediary role in Armenia - Azerbaijan dispute and the continuing war but Armenia opposed to the initiative. In a period of increased Armenian attacks, Turkey tried to find a just resolution on international scale to the conflict and start a diplomatic initiative in the eyes of European capitals. Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin tried to draw the attention of the western governments and the USA and put the problem on the agenda in the eye of the OSCE.¹² Thus, on March 24, 1992, the Minsk Group of OSCE was established to ensure peace in Nagorno-Karabakh.¹³

After invasion of Shusha and Lachin towns, Armenia directed pressure toward the Nakhchivan. Instead of exercising the right of intervention arising from the 1921 Moscow and Kars agreements, Turkey has become a party to the solution of the problem in the eyes of international organizations such as the UN , OSCE and NATO.¹⁴ Although Turkey declared not to set an diplomatic relation with Armenia until she recognize the legitimate border of two country; Turkey closed the land border and the airspace with this country due to the Armenia's indifferent attitude to Turkey's moderate position, using international aids in war against Azerbaijan and not leaving revisionalist activities.¹⁵

⁹ History of Azerbaijan, C.VII (1941-2002), Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, AA Bakıhanov Publications of History, Elm Publications, Baku 2008. pp.236

¹⁰ History of Azerbaijan, C.VII (1941-2002), Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, AA Bakıhanov History Estitus Publishing, Elm Publication, Baku 2008. pp.237-245

¹¹ Cemalettin Taşkıran, Karabakh Issue from Past to Present, General Staff Printing House, Ankara 1995.pp.164

¹² Mustafa Aydın, "Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia", Oran, Raid (Ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy, Cases, Documents, Comments, Volume II, 1980-2001, Communication Publications, Istanbul 2001, pp.402

¹³ History of Azerbaijan, C.VII (1941-2002), Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, AA Bakıhanov Publications of History, Elm Publications, Baku 2008.pp.301

¹⁴ Mustafa Aydın, "Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia", Oran, Raid (Ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy, Cases, Documents, Comments, Volume II, 1980-2001, Communication Publications, Istanbul 2001, pp.403

¹⁵ Elif, Şimşek Özkan, "1991' den Bugüne Güney Kafkasya ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası", Nejat Doğan, Ferit Kula, Mehmet Öcal (ed.), Türkiye'nin jeoekonomisi ve jeopolitikası : Türkiye geleceğin neresinde?, Nobel Yay., Ankara, 2007.pp.513

During this period, occupation of Kelbajar, Elchibey's weakening position in internal politics, not taking necessary support that is expected from Turkey, Surat Huseynov led by Russian-backed military emergence of opposition are important developments which prevents the solution in the OSCE Minsk group and deepen the Armenian occupation in the region.¹⁶

Efforts to penetrate Azerbaijan by both Russia and Iran have given significant impetus to the instability of the country's domestic political life. As a result of the rebellion caused by the military opposition which was backed especially by Russia, Elchibey resigned from his post. During the Kalbajar occupation, Ganja rebellion and overthrow of Elchibey, Turkey lost her friends and allies and this caused an adverse effect on Turkey's image in middle Asia Turkic Nations.

With the transfer of managerial authority to Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan, rapidly distanced from the Elchibey's policy, Azerbaijan has started to maneuver to ease Russia's anger on this subject. Awariness of Russia's responsibility on deteriorating stability and continuing war against Armenia Heydar Aliyev; assigned Colonel S. Huseynov as prime minister to take under control. Although the country has been restored to stability, defeats have not been able to be prevented in the ongoing war with Armenia. In the summer and 1993 of 1993, Ağdam, Fuzuli, Cebail, Gubadlı and Zengilan were lost. Thus, 20% of the Azerbaijani lands were occupied with the addition of these five cities after the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and Laçın and Kelbecer, while the number of refugees in the country reached 1 million. Although the human dimension of the wounds caused by the war cannot be expressed, the damage caused by the Karabakh wars to the Azerbaijani economy is reflected in official statements, the value of which amounts to 60 billion USD.¹⁷ By May 1994, a "Armistice Protocol" was signed between the parties in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, with the initiatives of Russia.¹⁸ The agreement, which came into force on 12 May 1994, continues to the present day, although it is sometimes violated by Armenia.

Turkey's Attitude in Karabakh Issue

When we look at Turkey's stance on the Karabakh issue may be mentioned two periods. In the former, from date of the first events began in Karabakh in 1988 to on which Azerbaijan gained her independence in 1991 Turkey, saw developments as internal affairs of the Soviet Union. In second period which starts with the independence of Azerbaijan and the collapse of USSR and ongoing until today Turkey, has followed a policy which is ensuring Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and trying to solve the problem

¹⁶ Araz Aslanlı, and İlham Hesenov, *Azerbaijan Foreign Policy in the Period of Heydar Aliyev*, Platinum Publication, Ankara 2005, pp.56-58

¹⁷ State Committee Of The Republic Of Azerbaijan Affairs on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Available at: <http://www.refugees-idps-committee.gov.az/az/pages/16.html>

¹⁸ History of Azerbaijan, C.VII (1941-2002), Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, AA Bakıhanov Publications, History of Elit, Elm Publications, Bakı 2008, pp.332

under international law in the Karabakh issue. Turkey's political stance in this problem is in parallel with the opinion of Azerbaijan's.

Turkey expressed her attitudes about Azerbaijan's territorial integrity on almost any platform and that has continued too. Azerbaijan government has brought up at any occasion about the Karabakh issue, not only in the eye of UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, international organizations and institutions such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, but also countries in the region such as Russia, Turkey, and which have interests in the region such as the United States, Britain, France, Germany but this effort made no concrete result. Regarding Heydar Aliyev's ten-year rule, there are also comments that political stability has been achieved in the country, serious developments have been made in terms of economic and military structures, but the Karabakh issue has been left to its fate.¹⁹

On the other hand, even though no result has been achieved in this regard, Azerbaijan continues to strive for the solution of the issue. Identifying and directing Azerbaijan's almost ten years political life (1993 - 2003) Heydar Aliyev, made the accounting of its ruling period on the Karabakh issue at the National Assembly of Azerbaijan in February, 2001.

In speech dated February 23 at the session of the parliament of the country, President voiced that they're trying to ensure territory integrity at the diplomatic platform but that efforts could not come to a conclusion yet. Negotiations on this issue with both international organizations like the UN and the OSCE, and all the senior officials of foreign countries, Aliyev express that "Karabakh conflict and refugee problem is the first and far most important item in the negotiations". Despite some exceptions, declaring they always face with the double standard when talking to international organizations in the western world about this issue Aliyev, because of this situation progress is very slow in this issue and expressed that attitudes of central Asian Turkic States are very uncomponiable. Expressing no other country or international organization except Islamic Organization Conference, Iran and Turkey, that see this issue as occupation and Armenia as occupant. Aliyev, stressed that it's important to declare this situation in every platform.²⁰

Generaly Karabakh issue had played a key role in shaping Turkey's Armenian policy. As in previous chapters also expressed despite Turkey recognizes the Armenia who put forwards some unfounded claims against Turkey and occupies Azerbaijan soil but closes its frontiers and cuts diplomatic ties with this country. Until Karabakh conflict end with a fair solution; Turkey has stood up the pressure of both US and European powers and has stood by Azerbaijan in this issue. On the other hand, it continued to contribute to

¹⁹ Mehmat Dikkaya, Adem Çaylak, "Azerbaijan's Economic and Political Transformation at Haydar Aliyev Era, Opportunities and Problems, C.3, S.5, OAKA, 2008.pp.134

²⁰ Haydar Aliyev Elektron Senedler Toplusu-2001 Yılı".pp.58-59

the solution of the issue with the work carried out by international organizations such as the UN and the OSCE. In Karabakh issue which is Azerbaijan's most important foreign policy title, Turkey moves with Azerbaijan and contribute to OSCE Minsk Group activities to find a peaceful, fair solutions to this issue.

When Azerbaijan declared its independence, there is no regular and disciplined army. This situation has made severe hardship to this country and she has paid an expensive bill. It was also neglected in the nationalization of weapons, military vehicles and materials belonging to the former Soviet Army, and these weapons and equipment were either disrupted by Russian soldiers or taken over by separate groups and individuals.²¹

Elçibey, who came to power in such a period, made serious attempts to change this negative picture and establish the national army. In this context, assistance was requested from Turkey. While in one hand Turkey was sending her retired soldiers to reorganize Azerbaijan's army; On the other hand was starting to accept 200 students to train in military schools.²² Azerbaijani officials hoped that Turkey directly intervene the conflicts against Armenia but that have not been able to happen.

Military relations between the two countries were established more seriously and systematically in the period of H. Aliyev. After the Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement that have been made to restructuring the army in Azerbaijan, Turkey has seen as founder of the business and in this context has been established in close relations with it. Since this period, military and security issues have frequently come to the fore in bilateral relations and cooperation agreements have been signed in this direction. Since the second half of the 1990s, the Turkish Armed Forces carried out activities for the training, technical, logistical structure and development of the Azerbaijan Army. Turkey is carrying out a policy of strategic importance to the development of Azerbaijani Army and structuring.

NATO member Turkey has made serious attempts in favor of Azerbaijan and make her to take advantage using of the facilities of these institutions. Within the framework of its strategic objectives, Azerbaijan operates in cooperation with NATO in the context of its integration into Euro-Atlantic political, security, economic and other structures. Within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council and NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program, Azerbaijan attaches importance to the development of relations with NATO, which is not only military but also political. These relations are regarded as a serious and important issue by the Azerbaijan state in the context of foreign policy and security. This aspect of Azerbaijan-Turkey military relations, is evolving in both bilateral developments and within the NATO framework

"Partnership for Peace Program" in the framework of the NATO military again in the

²¹ History of Azerbaijan, C.VII (1941-2002), Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, AA Bakıhanov Publications, History of Elm, Elm Publication, Bakı 2008, pp.296

²² Nazım Cafersoy, Azerbaijan Foreign Policy of the Elçibey Period (June 1992-June 1993) Diplomatic Story of a Struggle for Independence, Eurasian Center for Strategic Research Publications, Ankara 2001, pp.12

standard application configuration policies employees of Azerbaijan education, defense, infrastructure, technology many military projects, such as hardware realizes with the help of Turkey.²³ Turkey, Azerbaijan Army's restructuring and reform has made an approximately \$ 170 million in military aid.

Conclusion

In 1991, along with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan-Turkey relations have entered a new era. This new situation has given some opportunities and possibilities to Turkey in one hand; but on the other hand has forced Turkey to set new policies on the ground of uncertainty and chaos. Forced to adapt to this new era Turkey, has seen is not ready to this new era by living which was foreseen by the founding leader at the end of the 1930s.

Besides being the first country to recognize Azerbaijan, Turkey, supported the consolidation of Azerbaijan's independence and aimed at ensuring territorial integrity and opening up to the outside world. Although the relations between the two countries have been influenced by foreign factors from time to time, a common attitude has been developed for the protection of peace and stability especially in the region. Serious collaborations have been made in economic, strategic and military fields besides diplomatic-political relations. Especially the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline play an important role to being reach the Caspian oil to the outside world. This aims to make Azerbaijan become a significant player in free world. In this way energy resources easily and safely can be transported to outer world and in the context of transport Azerbaijan-Turkey relations are hovering above a rising graph.

Azerbaijan's integration into the international arena, in the context of maintaining regional security, political, economic, scientific and cultural aspects of the multifaceted cooperation with Turkey to development is given great importance. Although Azerbaijan proves its legitimacy on Karabakh and refugee issue, both the OSCE and the United Nations have not demonstrated the power and will to remove Armenia from the Azerbaijani territory it occupies. While some researchers consider the UN Security Council's decisions as an "ineffective decision series"²⁴, some researchers Armenian questioning of what the impact of these decisions in the face of the attacks suggests that it should .

While Armenia is continuing its unfair occupation movement with the support it received from the Russian Federation; Azerbaijan and its natural ally Turkey's main aims have to be to set a proper transportation infrastructure to carry natural resources in the hands

²³ Aygun Askerzade, "Azerbaijan-Turkiye Military Cooperation and Regional Security Problems in NATO Concept", Karadeniz Araştırmaları, 20 Winter, 2009, pp.5-10

²⁴ Araz Aslanlı, and İlham Hesenov, Azerbaijan Foreign Policy in the Period of Heydar Aliyev, Platinum Publication, Ankara 2005.pp.63

of Azerbaijan to the markets, to support Azerbaijan to be a respected member of the international community, to establish a disciplined, well trained, well equipped army to protect its strengthened economic gains. The works to be carried out with the understanding of “One Nation Two States” will liberate the occupied lands, which are the desired result, and 1 million refugees can go back their main lands.

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EPISODE 4

A SOCIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ON INSTITUTIONALIZATION PROBLEMS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY

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Introduction

Institutionalized that they create a problem of NGOs in Turkey from a sociological perspective, it's also at various levels (usually publications are examining this aspect) Although not the subject of study is important because it indicates the seriousness of the situation. Given the institutionalization of the scientific dimension, it will be seen how far behind the NGOs are in this process. In the simplest case, institutions arise when a need arises. As Martindale said, a new institution should be able to offer “standard solutions to collective problems”. From this point of view, it can be seen how many NGOs are far from collective problems when the situation is assessed. Of course, we do not get the result that NGOs are unnecessary here. On the contrary, it can perform a social function as an auxiliary power beside the existing foundation institutions. In fact, the community is the closest unit or organization to the capillary vessels.

Durkheim defines social truth as “laws, morals, beliefs, customs, and fashions that generally exist in society as a whole, independent of the images of its individuals.” Thus, Durkheim later elaborated on the meaning of social realities and used the concept of “institution” which means “beliefs and behaviors established by association”. He defined sociology as “the science of the creation and functioning of institutions and institutions” (Wallace & Wolf, 2004: 27).

From a sociological point of view, an institution is neither a person nor a group. The institution is a part of culture and an important part of people's lives that is patterned; social relationships and roles also constitute the basic elements of the institution. The institution is a combination of behavioral patterns shared by the majority and aimed at meeting some basic group needs (Fichter, 2006,139). On the other hand, the institution is also the main key to the infusion of living in a society. According to Soyer (1996: 54), the basic element that determines the institutions and gives them their introductory characteristics is the objective conditions of the society they live in. Institutions are shaped by society in order to reinforce and strengthen these conditions.

Adler (2000: 135) also states that the grouping and integration of statuses and such

stereotyped behaviors around some basic needs is called “social institution” in the language of sociology.

The concept of social institution, according to Ozankaya (1986: 139), with the thoughts, beliefs, traditions, customs and behaviors that form a relative whole coordinated and organized; Expresses the continuous arrangements consisting of material elements (structures, goods, documents, symbols). For example, the state, law, family, education, divorce are social institutions.

According to Marshall (1999: 438), the use of the concept of institution, which reflects the established aspects of society, especially in sociology, has a meaning very close to its common use in English. Again, there have been some changes in the full conceptualization of the concept of institution over time, and differences in analytical precision have been observed. In some respects, an institution can be viewed as behavioral patterns, folklore, custom, and a kind of “top-custom” that encompass certain social interests (such as law, economy, and family). In this framework, the social institution meets all the structural components of a society that regulate the basic concerns and activities and meet social needs (such as order, belief and reproductive needs).

It is socially important for an organization to be institutionalized. While the benefit of NGOs to gain an institutional identity and feature to society increases significantly, it is obvious that non-institutionalized NGOs cannot go beyond being the focus of individual gains rather than social benefit. Civil society, which enables the emergence of NGOs or creates the ground, is also an indicator of the relationship of societies with democracy.

The Emergence of Civil Society and NGOs

The concept of civil society was born and developed within the development process and political tradition of Western societies. The concept, which reaches up to the ancient Greek sites and has a historical past, has been defined by thinkers and political scientists with different meanings (Özer, 2008: 87). It is not accidental that interest in civil society first emerged in the West. It is related to the history or experience of the West’s approach to man and man. With the discussion of Giambattista Vico, that man is an agent who forms himself and his culture in society, it has created the agenda.

The idea of civil society has become one of the most talked about and debated topics all over the world, especially since the 1980s. In discussions about civil society, the identity, characteristics, functions etc. of civil society. problems are handled and resolved. However, a complete consensus on this issue has not been reached yet. Because civil society is associated with different problems by different circles and various contents are loaded in this context (Ercan, 2002: 69). The fact that civil society is discussed and associated with different fields shows that it is important for modern societies.

According to Karakurt Tosun (2007: 2), in the Middle Ages, civil society began to be seen as the opposite of the concept of religious society. The characteristic of civil society as a symbol of secularism and modernity has started to take hold since this period. From Aristotle to the end of the Middle Ages, the concepts of state and civil society are in an inseparable union. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, radical changes took place in the definition of civil society and civil society started to be used as a “transition from a state of nature to a state of civilization”, as well as as a concept expressing freedom, rights and obligations as an urban citizen requirement. With the phenomenon of civil society, citizen or citizen has come to the fore as a key concept, and the individual defined as a citizen has been seen as the basic defining element of civil society.

According to Saribay (2001: 1 34; cite Karakurt Tosun, 2007: 2), John Keane states that the traditional understanding of civil society based on Aristotle and Cicero began to collapse in the middle of the 18th century, and the process of change, especially in England, France and Germany. Explains with the four stages experienced in. The first stage involves the breaking point of the traditional concept of civil society. Second stage; The understanding that it is legitimate for independent ‘societies’ within civil society to defend themselves against the state has become widespread. Although the discrimination was preserved in the third stage, the trust of the ancients in a free and independent civil society began to be reversed in favor of sovereign state activity. So much so that the freedom included in civil society was seen as the source of conflicts in social life; state intervention has been deemed a conflict prevention factor. Finally, the fourth stage emerged in response to the third: the stage in which it began to fear that state intervention would gradually strangle civil society.

Çulhaoğlu (2001: 32-33; cite Talas, 2011: 390) divided the approaches about civil society into three groups. The first is the view of Larry Diamond that explains civil society as an order established by the free will of the citizen, separate from the state. The second is Ernest Gellner’s approach. This view is an understanding that encompasses a wider area. According to this thesis, civil society is a structure that fills the gap existing between the family or individual and the state. According to this view, civil society is a system consisting mostly of intermediate institutions such as trade unions, political parties, religious organizations, pressure groups and associations. The third example is John Keane’s approach from the left liberal segment. Accordingly, they are organizations that protect and transform their identities by applying pressure and control over state institutions through non-state activities formed by civil society members.

In fact, the concept of civil society is generally defined as a self-regulating autonomous sphere, which characterizes the economic and social sphere outside the state and state authority and operates according to its own principles and rules. Civil society is an autonomous area outside the state and its authority, but it is not completely detached

from the state. Civil society is a model of society with legal values, based on the rule of law. Civil society means society that is a member of the state, abides by its laws and is obliged to act that does not harm other members. Therefore, the relationship between civil society and state expresses an important part of the definition of the concept of civil society (Karakuş, 2006: 15). Another reality is that the state or political authority is seen as an obstacle to the realization of civil society.

The contemporary understanding of civil society is at the center of the questions about how this process can be continued and reproduced once a formal level of democracy is reached in any society. In addition, civil society is also associated with current concerns regarding the provision of preconditions for democratization in societies with authoritarian state structures. In addition, although the understanding of civil society meets a historical concept, in recent years, groups defined as “New Social Movements” such as feminists, environmentalists, greeners and alternative lifers have become stronger and occupy the agenda, the revival of ethnic and religious identities, especially within the framework of postmodernism discussions, and Eastern Europe. It has become an area where many people from different circles say different things in line with developments such as the emergence of [civil] groups that have accelerated the winds of political change in the Bloc (Beckman, 1998: 1; Göle, 1998: 115; Usul, 1997: 78- 79; Walzer, 1992: 33-41; cite Ercan, 2002: 70). Civil society continues to be the focus of discussions with different perspectives and approaches.

One of those who try to define civil society is Yıldırım (2003: 228). According to him, the common name of developed and democratic societies is “civil society”. With this dimension, civil society is a group of individuals and organizations that can direct and make sense of their own development, possess the necessary dynamics for this, autonomous from the state, and are in a continuous development without reference to any upper identity and reality.

From another perspective, Karakuş (2006: 4) accepts civil society and non-governmental organizations as ‘structures’ between the state and the individual. Therefore, it defines a very large area. For this reason, sometimes, when defining civil society, the emphasis is not on what civil society is but what it is not. Civil society today is above all the opposite of political society. It is against sovereign authority and monopoly. However, its most basic task is to influence the sovereign authority in line with its own interests. The means of this is to organize. Civil society represents itself through many means. Today, NGOs are the most important means by which civil society expresses itself.

Undoubtedly, the basic foundation of non-governmental organizations is the idea of civil society, the development of this idea in societies and its finding a social ground. NGOs that have an important role in the expression of individuals, groups or groups in the

social structure also; They are “organizations that provide public services in public life, in matters that concern everyone, in order to contribute to the realization of a set of valuable goals, with knowledge and knowledge on the subject” (Kuçuradi & Çakmak, 2003: 8; cite Güleç & Sancak, 2009). It is quite difficult to define non-governmental organizations and to reveal the structures that fall within this definition or not. NGOs play a vital role (sometimes more than the state and government) in terms of establishing and maintaining participatory democracy by directly contributing to the social and economic development and civil society order of the country where organized citizens live. The European Economic and Social Committee (ESC) ‘recognizes as NGOs all organizational structures that take responsibility for the benefit of society and act as an intermediary between public authorities and citizens. This definition specifically covers all economic, social and professional organizations that are the basic elements of an organized civil society and administration (Güleç & Sancak, 2009). Non-governmental organizations can be considered and evaluated in terms of whether they have formed their corporate identity or not. Corporate identity is an indicator of how seriously the work is taken or not.

In summary, when defining non-governmental organizations, it is necessary to define the environment in which they live and develop, namely the civil society. Otherwise, the definition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may be a little incomplete. There are many different, sometimes complementary and sometimes conflicting theories that define civil society. In addition, changes in the world system have caused different values to be attributed to the definition of civil society (Marshall, 1999: 662). The existing socio-cultural structure should not be ignored in both the development and therefore the definition of the civil society. Because civil society has come to this day by going through different stages of development in each society. For example, the development course of civil society in the West and the course of development in the east have been very different from each other.

Emergence of Civil Society and NGOs in Turkey

Civil society organizations in Turkey (NGO) said that the concept of a very short history. Rio Summit on Environment and Development in 1992 had passed without much influence in Turkey. However, this summit was one of the most important turning points that NGOs were accepted by the administrations. In 1996, the UN Summit to be held in Istanbul in Turkey was enlivened by the NGO environment in a few years ago. At the time of the decision regarding this conference in Istanbul, no committee was formed to ensure communication between non-governmental organizations. In 1994, members of some non-governmental organizations came together and formed a host committee with their own means. They took an active role in the communication between non-governmental organizations. However, there was no public space definition for NGOs yet. Before the

UN Summit, a response to the concept of “non governmental organizations (NGO)”, which is one of the participating parties according to international standards, was sought. In those days, there were those who used concepts such as “non-state organizations “, “non-governmental organizations”. Although another group introduced the concept of ‘voluntary organizations’, this concept was far from defining this new need. However, ‘establishment’ was added to the concept of ‘civil society’ in some translation publications on these dates and thus the NGO was accepted as the equivalent of the NGO concept (Gümüş, 2004: 12). The approach that the NGO name is the exact equivalent of NGO is still approached with suspicion. Because the full experience of NGOs in Turkey, “non-governmental organizations -NGO-” is understood that the application does not have the function of which I have.

Indeed, the number of non-governmental organizations, whose existence or absence did not attract much attention before 1980, has increased significantly during this period and as a result of the restrictions on rights and freedoms in the society, the laws imposed by the 12 September Constitution, different segments of society can express their demands with political and cultural content. They have turned to non-governmental organizations as a place. As a natural consequence of this situation, the concept of “civil society”, which has not attracted the attention of almost anyone in our country except for a small number of social scientists, has suddenly started to attract the attention of many people from different circles in recent years. However, the use of non-governmental organizations, which are quite numerous today, by various interest groups outside of their main purposes has led to serious debates on the issue. However, what is the civil society, intellectuals, civil society organizations of the functions of which should be what a civil society which properties owned and being able to achieve any consensus on issues such as where there is to what extent the conditions in Turkey can be built on these features, discussion of dimensions one more time. So much so that almost every segment put forward a civil society understanding specific to their political climate and argues that this is the most realistic approach (Ercan, 2002: 70). NGOs, which have become an extension of these civil society conceptions, have remained quite inconsistent in their behaviors and goals. This situation has made NGOs the focus of uncertainty, selfishness, selfishness and therefore confusion.

The root cause of the background of this turmoil experienced in civil society in Turkey, mostly in Turkey to be Eastern type-centralized with a state tradition and since the Enlightenment in the West, socio-economic, inadequate monitoring the developments occurring in the political and cultural fields and waste is that it cannot act. Debates continue on the same issue in the Western intellectual field. However, civil society concept that can be traced back to Aristotle in the West, thinkers working on this issue, especially developed from the 17th and 18th centuries, laid down the theoretical

foundations and that the bourgeois class found that was created in the framework of historical forms of development in Western European countries, the debate Turkey It displays a quite different view from the ones. In this context, the theoretical foundations and civil society, a relationship that can not be imitated in the West who have already created the perception in Turkey that is missing is integrity. The fact that some important studies have been carried out in order to eliminate the theoretical deficiency in our country and the attempts to create a Western type society model that has been continuing since the foundation of the Republic were not sufficient in solving the problem. On the other hand, the fact that almost everyone who was adversely affected by the military coup of September 12, regardless of their political environment, became a supporter of civil society and emerged a positive view towards the concept of civil society, however, it made the situation more complex (Ercan, 2002: 71). So become a member for a large part of what they see as political interests or otherwise to obtain a political tool to oppose men who want to participate in activities as a member of a civil society organization in Turkey.

In addition, civil society in Turkey, size, objectives, activities, political stances, exhibits a heterogeneous structure which differs in terms of audience and member profiles. However, there are basically two main categories that reflect NGOs in legal terms. These are associations and foundations. In quantitative terms Balk up roughly 150 thousand in Turkey is known to be non-governmental organizations. 60 thousand of them are seen as fellow countrymen associations, 80 thousand as NGOs (today this number is around 120 thousand), around 5000 professional associations and around 3000 as foundations (Güleç & Sancak, 2009). On the other hand, Keyman (2004; cite Güleç & Sancak, 2009) NGOs in terms of their main fields of activity are donation and charity organizations, socialization and cultural activity organizations, local citizen solidarity organizations, organizations for working life and professional organization, environment, wildlife and organizations aiming to protect and develop nature, organizations aiming at research and educational activities, organizations aimed at promoting and spreading a certain ideology, service organizations for the realization of religious services, organizations aiming to defend individual freedoms and human rights, health services oriented organizations, social service oriented organizations, organizations for development and housing, sports-oriented organizations, think-tank organizations, international activity organizations.

After the 1983 elections by the end of the period of military rule in Turkey, civil society organizations, is considered as mechanisms that will protect individuals across the state. Thus, the concept of civil society was given a magical meaning and started to be used in daily language to name the “form of society free from military rule”. As a result, a political attitude has emerged that we can define as “civil societyism” and is cared for rather than

the social political reality expressed by the concept of civil society. Therefore, today with an understanding of civility, depending on the historical origins of the concept of civil society in Turkey, in a very important area exceeds theme or philosophy of history is no longer interested in the social history of Western Europe with an argument. So much so that the concept of civil society serves to express some symbols and moves away from its original meaning (Mardin, 1997: 9-10; Belge, 1989: 71; Sarıbay, 1994; cite Ercan, 2002: 71). The main reason for non-governmental organizations to move away from the functions assigned to them is their politicization. However, the most general function of CSOs was to provide a tool to establish relations between state institutions and civil society.

On Institutionalization Problems of NGOs

In a society, “the absence of free political institutions prevents the formation of social actors and facilitates the repressive control of the wheel of the state over social demands and mobilizations,” says Tourain (1997: 142). He is also uncomfortable with the dominance of political parties in civil society. Because both political institutions and other social institutions inevitably fulfill an important function in the functioning of the system (Tourain, 1997: 143). Therefore, institutions and institutionalization should be considered in social dimensions. Because, the institutionalization of NGOs or their failure to institutionalize will show their level of importance in their relations with the state or individuals. NGOs that have gained a corporate identity will have an important place both at the state level and in the eyes of individuals.

Institutions are in a normative order and functioning. This order can be based not only on official norms such as laws and regulations, but also on unofficial norms such as customs, ethics and religious rules. In addition, like every social group, there are positions and behavioral patterns such as status, role patterns that determine the place and authority of each member in social institutions (Soyer, 1996: 55). Institutions have an indispensable importance especially in the formation of modern societies. The functionality of institutions is a precondition for societies to function as a whole. Can NGOs, which arise with the claim that it will be beneficial in maintaining the functionality of the society, fulfill the roles assumed by institutions with an institutional seriousness? In fact, it is necessary to look at how NGOs emerged to meet what needs.

According to Talas (2011: 392), the frequently expressed expression “developed society is” organized society “is a situation that can be explained by having strong non-governmental organizations or not. Given the impossibility of societies to cope with today’s competitive world societies alone with state facilities and energy, it will be easier to understand how important non-governmental organizations have become.

Institutionalization should be handled from different perspectives such as organizational,

sociological, political and economic. Evaluating institutionalization in terms of environmental compliance, March defined it as “ensuring organizational change with environmental change and standardization in line with this change”. In this definition, the following three points (Karpuzoğlu, 2001: 17; Cite Güleç & Sancak, 2009) draw attention:

- a-Change with environmental change,
- b-Learning this change,
- c-Developing standards suitable for the new situation.

According to Selznick, who looks at institutionalization from a different perspective; It is the process of the organization gaining a distinct identity and the social needs and pressures becoming a sensitive and flexible organism as a natural product. Therefore, institutionalization; The fact that organizations have rules, standards, procedures, a bureaucratic structure, their own way of greeting, methods and methods of doing business rather than individuals, thus it is the process of becoming public by having a distinctive and distinctive identity from other organizations (Karpuzoğlu, 2001: 17; Cite Güleç & Sancak, 2009). There are some internal dynamics that enable institutionalization. The institution is to reach the corporate identity to the extent that it realizes these dynamics. From this point of view, some non-governmental organizations may face problems.

In addition to these, some institutionalized non-governmental organizations have a highly developed communication network. In these NGOs, communication between subordinates is easily established, and scheduled and unscheduled group meetings are held among employees at all levels. This intensive communication environment in institutionalized organizations emerges as a result of informing people, keeping the innovative process alive and increasing loyalty to the organization. Another feature seen in the organizational structures of institutionalized NGOs is that the decision-making authority is not gathered at the upper level but spread to the lower levels. Distributing responsibilities along with authority and informing individuals through an intensive communication network enables employees to fulfill their responsibilities to their institutions with full commitment (Akat & Atılgan, 1992: 39-40; cite Güleç & Sancak, 2009). Completing the institutionalization process will be beneficial in overcoming various difficulties that may arise in the process.

The fact that non-governmental organizations can have a long life line, increase their effectiveness and reach a position that gives confidence to the public for the future varies in proportion to their level of institutionalization. The fact that non-governmental organizations create only a strong structure and systems open to innovation is not enough, given the increasing tendency of organizations to grow and spread. Because,

with institutionalization, non-governmental organizations will fulfill their management functions effectively, increase autonomy and entrepreneurship in management, and will target the society and its employees (Güleç & Sancak, 2009). With institutionalization, meeting the expectations of NGO members begins with more specific rules.

In summary, the dominance or weakness of democratic elements at the level of political institutionalization of the state will greatly affect the institutionalization of civil society. In the words of Tosun (2001); “If political institutions are weak and the current political regime is deemed ineffective and illegitimate, civil society activity can become an alternative to politics by satisfying their basic needs for unsatisfied citizens and increasing their energies. In such cases, coexistence will likely undermine political stability and have negative consequences for democracy by deepening divisions, increasing dissatisfaction and providing rich resources for opposition movements. A civil society that develops under these conditions signals administrative and institutional collapse and portends abuse for political stability and democracy. With this understanding, the development of civil society is a precondition for NGOs to settle in a society.

In short, the existence of NGOs can only be possible with a democratic environment. However, he is expected to comply with the rules of functioning of a democratic society. NGOs that have acquired a corporate identity can act more skillfully in fully fulfilling their social functions. Otherwise, NGOs become in the hands of certain interests to serve their interests.

NGOs and Social Integration

The effects of NGOs on social integration have been discussed. This effect can be considered in two dimensions. The first of these is the positive or positive effect on social cohesion, the second is the negative or negative effect. It is known that NGOs are called pressure and interest group before this name. Pressure is the current system, and interest is to gain material or moral benefits from the current system. In this process, in order to get rid of the negativity associated with the name of pressure and interest, it turned into its name, which is today a “Non-Governmental Organization” (NGO). In order to have an important place in social integration, NGOs are very important, especially in Western countries, and are supported financially and morally. Germany allocates a significant budget for NGOs. This budget is used by NGOs under state control. The expected benefit here is that the state wants to get rid of the hump on its back, wants to organize and control the public through these NGOs, and perhaps most importantly, it is to prevent NGOs from resorting to illegal means or illegal thoughts / ideologies from realizing their goals through NGOs.

According to Karaca, (2012), the harmony between the concept of integration in the sociological sense and the elements that make up a society is explained. In other words,

social integration is used as the integration, functional union or harmonious functioning between individuals, groups, institutions and organizations that make up the society.

Arslantürk and Amman (2008: 348-354) treat the integration processes as socialization processes. Socialization refers to the process of mutual interaction between certain individuals, which enables the transfer of targeted and purposeful examples of internal and external behaviors to ensure group integration. Thus, the individual has the opportunity to learn and adopt the processes of cooperation, competition, conflict and adaptation in the socialization process and integrate with the society. Therefore, social integration is also the case where the functional relations between the structures and institutions of the social group form an integrity. In short, social integration enables the functional relationship between the parts of a society to form a whole. In other words, the institution, group, tradition and custom etc. that make up the society. The harmony of socio-cultural elements such as maintaining their coexistence may be through social integration.

In short, according to Karaca (2012), social integration efforts, which are tried to be formed as a mortar in order to strengthen the social structure, increase the harmony between the parts of the same whole, as well as the risk of deepening the gap between the different ones and opening the social distance and creating a front is always in question. However, it should not be overlooked that if marginalization starts to become a common disease, segregation, alienation and conflicts based on various differences between members of the same society may become inevitable. Therefore, it can be said that emphasizing the minimum commons and trying to create an encompassing culture of coexistence that corresponds to a wide area of coexistence would be a healthier integration effort, instead of constantly emphasizing differences in the effort to ensure integration.

Conclusion

Although every organization active in the field of civil society is seen as a non-governmental organization, in modern societies, it does not pursue an economic purpose and works on the basis of collective benefit; Organizations acting on a voluntary basis to enlighten and direct the public are seen as non-governmental organizations. The most distinctive features of non-governmental organizations are that they do not only serve their own purposes and values, are independent from governments, public authorities, political parties, do not pursue commercial interests, do not seek profit, and mediate between the central authority and the citizen. Non-governmental organizations act within these criteria and fulfill the requirements of being a non-governmental organization in a sense. Thus, they ensure that the whole society takes action towards the solution of social problems (Özer, 2008: 91). NGOs must have acquired a corporate identity in order to fulfill these functions. The most important factor in the acquisition of corporate

identity is closely related to how much the current society has internalized civil society. Because NGOs can exist based on civil society. The stronger the understanding of civil society, the stronger the NGOs.

On the other hand, Güleç-Sancak (2009) stated that in today's changing conditions, the idea that everything will be done by human beings again for human beings has forced institutions to adopt an attitude towards people, and it is revealed that valuing the human factor is very important for people to be effective and productive in the organization. Cooperation and opinion of employees at all levels are important in achieving organizational goals in human-oriented management systems. To convince people that they are doing a meaningful job, to appreciate their work, to make them love their work, and to see them as partners / participants, examining, researching and thinking individuals in order to reach the goal, not a tool to achieve the goals, will lead both leaders and organizations to achieve their goals.

According to Talas (2011: 398), people have struggled to meet their economic, social, cultural and political needs in an organized and organized manner. In this sense, association, foundation, interest union, pressure group, chamber, initiative group, union of forces, etc. They are organized by name. In the face of many problems that cannot be overcome alone, there has been an obligation to act together. Especially in the last 20-30 years, the societies equipped with such organizations are called non-governmental organizations and the organizations themselves are called non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Mainly due to the inability to precisely fulfill the requirements of modernity in Turkey, the Western source description of the civil society, NGOs present in the country were insufficient to express the concept. For this reason, apart from the necessity of civil society for our country, it is necessary to make a realistic assessment in the light of current conditions, regarding the definition, justification of this, what its features and functions are / should be. The realization of the expectations regarding civil society depends primarily on reaching a consensus on what the concept of civil society means. To do this, understanding the basics of civil society must be questioned seriously and they should be evaluated in the context of Turkey's unique conditions. Such an approach will greatly clarify what the basic requirements for the formation of civil society are fulfilled and how it can be improved. The clear presentation of these issues will bring along what the functions of civil society should be. Approaching the problem from such a perspective will help solve the problem. However, it does not seem possible to overcome the problem of civil society only if certain circles produce theories on this issue. For this, all social institutions should be mobilized and the society should be re-conscious about the civil and political sphere (Ercan, 2002: 76-77). This is because it does not seem possible to consider and examine the phenomenon of civil society independently from other institutions. On the contrary, it is particularly relevant to all institutions. On

the contrary, it has a very close relationship with civil society, especially the legal and political institution.

According to Tosun (2001), in the relationship between the state and civil society, the duties of civil society such as controlling the state power expected from it, ensuring participation, establishing democratic attitudes, shaping social needs and demands, softening polarization, raising new political leaders, and increasing the level of social responsibility of the system. In order for it to be implemented, the democratization process must work in both directions. Structuring the relationship between the state and civil society over democratic values does not weaken the state, on the contrary, by enabling citizen participation by strong and organized NGOs, the crisis of representation and legitimacy experienced by the system can be overcome and the ethical values of politics that are considered to be contaminated can be reproduced. Citizens will be taken from the passive participation level where they remain only voting voters, and they will be activated as individuals who form associations, ask, consult and make decisions, thanks to NGOs. Therefore, for shifting to overcome the consolidation process of transition to democracy in Turkey, “state versus civil society” or “state versus civil society” abandoned the approach in many areas, it is necessary to implementation of joint projects.

The contribution of civil society to democracy is possible with the number and diversity of organizations in the field of civil society, as well as the democratic relations that these organizations will come together and establish with each other and assimilate democratic values in their internal relations. Otherwise, it is clear that such formations cannot go beyond being a civilian extension of authoritarian or totalitarian policies (Aslan, 2010). What determines the level of relations between CSOs in various societies is whether or not they acquire a corporate identity.

Non-governmental organizations have a particularly important place in terms of the integration of societies. For modern societies, NGOs are the duty of NGOs in society what the vessels are in the human body.

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EPISODE 5

TURGUT ÖZAL AND ANAVATAN PARTİSİ (THE MOTHERLAND PARTY)

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Introduction

Turgut Özal was born in Malatya as the first male child of Mehmet Sıddık, an officer at Ziraat Bank, and Hafize Hanım, a primary school teacher, on 13 October 1927. Mehmet Sıddık, who started his civil service in Malatya, took his family to these cities as he later served in Bilecik, Silifke and Mardin (Çölaşan, 2008: 19). Turgut Özal, who started his primary education in Söğüt district of Bilecik, completed secondary school in Mardin as his family moved to Silifke and Mardin, respectively. However, due to the fact that there was no high school to continue his education in Mardin and the financial situation of the family, he started high school education in Konya High School as a boarding student. Due to the fact that his brother Korkut Özal would also start high school, the family, which had more financial difficulties, brought the two siblings together at Kayseri High School, and Turgut Özal completed his secondary education in Kayseri High School in 1945.

Turgut Özal, who started his university life in the Department of Electrical Engineering at Istanbul Technical University thanks to the scholarship he won, came to Istanbul for the first time. Özal, who grew up in a conservative family and whose political ideas began to take shape during his university years, participated in the events of the ITU Student Union and the Turkish Culture Center. He actively took part in the burning of the left-wing Tan Newspaper and the eventful funeral of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak (Çölaşan, 2008: 21). Özal, who stayed in the dormitory of the university with his brother Korkut Özal, was also interested in the intellectual and religious activities that Istanbul offered to them (Birand & Yalçın, 2001: 22-23).

Turgut Özal and His Experience in Bureaucracy

Özal, who graduated as an Electrical Engineer in 1950 and started to work in the Electrical Works Research Administration in Ankara to do his compulsory service for a while due to his scholarship, went to the United States in 1952 to specialize in engineering economics. His first visit to the USA and his impressions there greatly changed Özal's worldview. Having acquired a great knowledge here, he expanded his worldview and vision and returned to his home country and started to work at the Electrical Works Research

Administration, but this time as the general manager technical advisor (Laçınok, 2007: 538). Özal mentions the contribution of his trip to the USA with these words: “... *but I learned this. Only talent is not enough for vision. In order to see what and how it will happen in the future, it is imperative that you go to countries that have progressed more than you and analyze them. This is essential for vision. If you add experience to talent, your vision improves...*” (Barlas, 2000: 56).

He made his first marriage to Ayhan İnal, the daughter of a family from Malatya notables, but this two-year marriage ended. He married Semra Yeğınmen, who worked as a secretary in the same government office, in 1954. Özal completed his military service in 1959 at the Army Ordnance School in Ankara, and Süleyman Demirel, who did his military service in the same place, was among the students he taught. As a conservative bureaucrat, he supported Prof. Dr. Ali Fuat Başgil against the presidential candidate of the military in the aftermath of the 27 May 1960 coup (Acar, 2008: 186).

Özal, who served as the Deputy General Manager of the Electrical Works Research Administration until 1965, served as the deputy general manager for one year in 1966. Özal, who also participated in the establishment works of the State Planning Organization in this period, was later appointed to the Prime Ministry Special Technical Consultancy and in 1967 to the Undersecretary of the State Planning Organization. With his extraordinary practices here, he tried to develop engineering consultancy services in Turkey. For his practices during his duty as undersecretary, Sakıp Sabancı, one of the important businessmen of the period, commented as: “*Mr. Turgut Özal became the Undersecretary in charge of Planning. Until then, there were so many formalities that put industrialists in distress; I was one of them. For example, to obtain an incentive certificate in any area you had to apply a committee where seven ministries were represented per law. Moreover at the level of undersecretary. It took ages to get a result. Because it was really hard to convince these seven undersecretaries with different thoughts and characters and that they reach a consensus and confirm your project. When Turgut Özal was appointed to Planning. It was like a dream. A dream came true. He gave this authority to Planning and became a dynamic person who decided with his own team instead of seven people. We loved him very much. Because we were moaning.*” (Birand & Yalçın, 2001: 35).

Özal, who had to resign from his duties in the bureaucracy after the government resigned after the 12 March 1971 military intervention, went to the USA when he took an offer from the World Bank (Sınayuç, 1994). Özal, who stayed there until 1973, worked as a consultant at the World Bank’s Industrial Office and gained deep experience in the field. His wife, Semra Özal, explained the process of Turgut Özal’s departure from office and the process of going to the USA as follows: “*Turgut Bey was previously invited to an international meeting in Switzerland as the Planning Undersecretary. Believing that he should go to that meeting, he went to the airport, checked in his luggage, but he was not*

allowed to pass through the police checkpoint. He returned. To be more precise, I was in Ankara. This event happened in Istanbul. Unfortunately, in the meantime, like a fugitive or a murderer, I do not know what happened, under the conditions of that day, they started looking for Turgut Bey in Istanbul and they went to my sister's house and searched my sister's and my mother's house. To see if Turgut Bey was there. However, Turgut Özal had come to Ankara at that time. Of course, this incident upset him immensely. Because it was a terrible thing for us that would go as far as searching the house. We were both saddened by this incident. And at that time, he contacted the World Bank President McNamara. McNamara said to him: "Take the plane and come here immediately, and let's have a talk." They knew each other. They used to be friends. He wanted him to go immediately and he went. The late Sunay called me, "Tell him to come over, and talk. There has been a mistake, let's fix it immediately, he can stay and work here." But he phoned. McNamara told him to start working at once. Start working as my advisor. Özal asked my opinion. What will you do with the kids if I stay there? Because he took his bag and left. I told him to start working there, and that I would take care of the works here. And I really had a hard time. I wanted to take our good old belongings that we used at home. Because the World Bank paid for our shipping. Even the carpets we used created a lot of problems, the customs officers said that they were almost historical, antique rugs, and could be taken out of the country. And as a result, the late Naim Talu also helped. We got permission and sent them. And I took the kids and went to America. We stayed there for about two and a half years." (Birand & Yalçın, 2001: 41-42). After working for the World Bank in the position of advisor, Özal returned to Turkey and started to work as a senior manager in the private sector (<http://www.malatya.gov.tr/ozal-ve-malatya>).

Turgut Özal, who had been interested in politics since his youth, first stepped into active politics in 1977. Although he wanted to be chosen as an MP from the Justice Party in the 1977 elections, he was not invited by the party, and upon the insistence of his brother Korkut Özal and his close friend Recai Kutan from Malatya, he became a candidate for the National Salvation Party (MSP) Izmir MP and lost with a very small difference of votes. Despite having a conservative worldview, he had become a candidate with the intense insistence of his close circle, although he advocated a completely different and liberal policy from the model of economy and politics proposed by MSP in the elections. Turgut Özal later explained his candidacy for Izmir MP from MSP as follows: "Well, at that time in 1977, Süleyman Bey would nominate me again. Then they said that they would nominate me, but I had gone. Neither nomination nor anything, nothing ever happened. Neither did they offer me, nothing like that happened. They came and insisted. They said, "You promised before." My family does not agree, and I'm not very willing. I have things to do. After that, I was ultimately nominated from Izmir! But that was also an experience. Look, let me be honest, it is the first time I got involved in politics. How to talk in a coffee house, in a public square. That's how I entered politics, my family (wife

and children) didn't want it, they got up and left. There was not a village or town that I did not set foot in Izmir in a month. As a result, of course, we were not elected, here we came back again “ (Barlas, 2000: 88).

Being a candidate for Izmir MP and entering politics for the first time provided Turgut Özal with a great experience for his later political life in terms of public relations, integration with the grassroots and experience. Shortly after the election, Özal became a member of Turkey's most powerful employers' organization, Metal Goods Industrialists' Union (MESS), and after a short time, he was elected as the General Secretary of this organization and appointed to the chairman in 1979 (Sinayuç, 1994). After the defeat of the government established with independent MPs under the leadership of the Republican People's Party in 1979 in the midterm elections, the administration resigned and as a result, a minority government was established under the presidency of Süleyman Demirel. Upon a special invitation to correct the bad economy in the established minority government, Özal returned to his service as a civil servant and was appointed as the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry and the Deputy Undersecretary of the State Planning Organization. He took an active role in the preparation, persuasion of the parties, and implementation of the 24 January decisions aimed at the liberalization of the Turkish economy (Güzel, 2008: 616).

Establishment of the Motherland Party (ANAP)

The incident that enabled Turgut Özal to rise in bureaucracy and to reach the highest point came with the duty given to him after the military coup of 12 September 1980. After the military coup, he became the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Economic Affairs in the Bülent Ulusu Government before the transition to the civilian period between 1980-1982. Due to measures such as the prohibition of strikes and trade union activities under military rule, and the determination of maximum wages, the implementation of the January 24 economic decisions prepared under the leadership of Özal was not met with any resistance, and inflation started to decrease and exports started to increase. However, as a result of the interest rates being set free in 1981, the bankers emerged with the promise to pay high-interest rates in 1982, but soon they started to go bankrupt one by one. And, as a reflection of these incidents, especially the incident of “Banker Kastelli”, Finance Minister Kaya Erdem was dismissed and Adnan Başer Kafaoğlu was appointed in his place.

Unable to accept the dismissal of Kaya Erdem by the military administration of the time, Özal resigned from his post on July 12, 1982. He described his relationship with the soldiers during this period as follows: *“There was concern among the soldiers that the economic situation would always remain in a critical line. They also needed outside assistance and support, as they did not fully believe that the situation would improve.*

I know this job very well. At first, they offered foreign economic relations. But when I said there, 'You must grant all economic powers,' they agreed unwillingly. But, there was something I felt. I was constantly in custody. Because I was the right hand of the previous government. That is why the soldiers always looked at me with suspicion ..." Özal responded to the question, 'Did you work in harmony with the soldiers?' as follows: *"When I felt that the events were developing in a statist direction, I resigned several times. I was always prevented. For example, we removed price controls. They say that they would implement price control. They wanted to deviate from the free market principle. When Bülent Ulusu also favored price control in the Council of Ministers, I wrote and gave my resignation. After all, what I wanted to happen, happens but I always struggled. In this sense, it is difficult to explain the issue to people who have no economic notion"* (Barlas, 2000: 22-25; Küçükşabanoğlu, 2019: 117). Resigning from his position, Özal went to Side district of Antalya. Side is the place where the founding idea of the Homeland Party was developed, its intellectual foundations were shaped, and physical contacts were established for this purpose. Mehmet Keçeciler, one of the people he contacted during this period, describes this period as follows: *"Özal called me one day. He had resigned from his post as the Deputy Prime Minister at that time. "Yes, sir." I said. "Mehmet, can you come over? Do you have annual leave left?" he asked. And I said to him, "How can someone use his annual leave when working with you? I still have 60 days off. Of course, I will come," I said. He said to me, "You had a party founding business, right? Let's talk about it. But first I have to go to the USA and get my heart checked. Let's see if I can go into politics or not"* Özal went to the USA with a weight of 116 kg, stayed there for 20 days and returned as 82 kg after having lost 34 kg. *He came back with a slim appearance. There was also a change in his image. They said many words that he got approval from the USA. It was obvious that he went to the doctor. The doctor supposedly told him to enter politics. At that time, the opposition frequently said, "Özal got permission from the US and came back." It was totally irrelevant."* (Küçükşabanoğlu, 2019: 119).

Turgut Özal went to Washington, where his son Ahmet Özal was residing, after staying in Side for a certain period of time. He rented an apartment in Şişli, Istanbul which he would use as an office after he returned to Turkey in 1983. Here, they carried out the establishment works of the new party they planned to establish in the future. Özal's desire to establish a new party and his attempts in this direction were heard in a short time. In particular, the military administration wanted Özal to join forces with Bülent Ulusu instead of establishing a party on his own. The widespread belief was that if he participated in the elections with a new party instead of joining with Ulusu, he might be vetoed from the election by the soldiers.

Özal, on the other hand, knew that acting with a figure who could be perceived by the

public as a representative of military tutelage would negatively affect the public image of the new party to be established. For this reason, he insisted on his decision to enter the election with a party that he would establish and become the leader of, rather than to enter the election on the side of Ulusu and be a simple deputy. Özal explained the exchange of ideas he made with Kenan Evren on the way to form a party as follows: *On the one hand, Bülent Ulusu was forcing me "Come with me." I said 'no' to him. And then I got up and asked for an appointment with Evren Pasha. I want to start a party. Will you let me do this? I need to get the answer to this question first because starting a party is not an easy job. You will enter, you will get a lot of people talking, you will undertake a lot of financial burdens, then they will not let you. Therefore, it the best idea to get permission in advance. Evren told me: 'Of course, we cannot say no to your establishing a party, but don't admit people from MSP and MHP into it.' I mean, he sort of said that. As he assumed that we would not accept the leftists, he kind of said 'Don't let these ones in, either.' I explained that I was thinking of forming a party that would unite everyone.*" (Barlas, 2000: 37-38).

All political parties which were active before 12 September 1980 in Turkey Grand National Assembly (Parliament) were closed after the military coup, their members were banned from politics, their leaders were taken under custody, and all their political activities were forbidden. Two parties were established by the National Security Council, which ruled the country under the leadership of Kenan Evren, in order to participate in the elections that were planned to be held for the transition to civil life, albeit per-functionary. One was the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP), the party of Retired General Turgut Sunalp, and the other was the Populist Party (HP) founded by Necdet Calp. The military administration did not believe that the new party that was tried to be established under the leadership of Özal would be successful. Özal later explained this situation as follows: *I explained that I was thinking of forming a party that would unite everyone. I said that we had no prejudices against any political wing or thought. But these or my views were not important at the time. Soldiers thought I would not be able to get even 10 percent of the votes at that time. Accordingly, the miniature party that I would establish would be proof of democracy in Turkey* " (Barlas, 2000: 38).

The motherland Party under the leadership of Turgut Özal, which would leave its mark on the political history of the Turkish Republic from 1983 to 1991, was faced with obstacles in its foundation phase, and it even experienced difficulties in preparing the legally required 30-person founders' list for the establishment of the party (Çölaşan, 2008: 190-191). This situation was also valid for other parties. Even MDP, which was seen as the party that would certainly win the election by the soldiers, was looking for deputy candidates with newspaper advertisements (Cemal, 1986: 371). After deciding to establish the Motherland Party, Özal explained the founders' problem they experienced

with the following words: *“While establishing ANAP, I had a hard time finding the founders. Whoever came became the founder. That’s how we brought together the 37 people. Maybe, if I was to start a new party today, I would never accept some of them. But then we had no alternative. Some of the people we visited were afraid of being a founder. Some came up with advice. Kazım Oksay was the lawyer of Asım Kocabıyık. Mehmet Yazar brought Abdullah Tenekeci Pasha. Vural Arıkan wanted to work with us, Şarık Tara brought him. Then Leyla Yeniay Köseoğlu brought Mesut (Yılmaz)”* (Barlas, 2000: 43).

Turgut Özal would now be able to establish his party and enter the elections. Although seven important names in the founders’ list such as Yıldırım Aktürk, Hüsnü Doğan, Mehmet Keçeciler, and Erol Aksoy were vetoed by the National Security Council (Birand & Yalçın, 2001: 181; Akyol, 2009: 99), on May 20, 1983, the petition for the foundation was submitted and the party was officially established. The following statements were made by Turgut Özal in the preface of the Motherland Party program announced in 1983. (<https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/handle/11543/603?show=full>): *“MOTHERLAND PARTY was founded on 20 May 1983 and took its place in the political life of our country. The symbol of our party is the map of Turkey covered with honeycomb and honeybee. HONEYBEE refers to diligence, and HONEYCOMB means making our beloved homeland prosperous even to its farthest corner. In our program, the issues of our country and what we think about their solutions are expressed in a short, clear, and concise manner. Our aim is to create a political picture that will make Turkey a developed and modern country free from political fights by ensuring people to join around this program. We are a nationalist, conservative, and socially just political party relying on the free-market economy based on competition. For this purpose, we invite those who believe in our program, regardless of their previous political tendencies. This party serves the people. We believe that we can serve our nation in the best way, and we hope that Allah Almighty will help us in our endeavors.”*

In Article 1 of the general principles section of the Motherland Party program, the aims of the party are stated as follows (<https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/handle/11543/603?show=full>): Motherland Party is a political party which

- ✓ considers national sovereignty and supremacy of the nation, national unity and integrity above all else,
- ✓ Believes that the manifestation of the will of the nation and the establishment of national sovereignty can only be possible in a free democratic order where the free vote of the people is essential,
- ✓ Considers basic human rights and freedoms indispensable,

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- ✓ Assumes the understanding of “Justice is the basis of property”,
 - ✓ Adopts nationalism and loyalty to national and moral values as a principle,
 - ✓ Aims to reach the level of contemporary civilization in the direction of the principles and reforms of the great leader Atatürk, the founder of our Republic,
 - ✓ Believes in social justice and equality of opportunity with the view that “the main issue is the happiness of individuals and society”,
 - ✓ Envisages the acceleration of economic development, the elimination of unemployment and poverty, and the generalization of welfare by reducing the income distribution differences,
 - ✓ Considers the entrepreneurial power of individuals as a basis in economic development,
 - ✓ Sees educating our young people, who are the guarantee of our future, as civilized individuals who are loyal to the ideal of modern and developed Turkey, who have adopted our national and moral values, have scientific thought, and display love respect and tolerance towards everybody, as the main goal of national education,
 - ✓ Considers persuasion, compromise and respect for ideas as the only way in the democratic political struggle, and aims to reach the ideal of free, independent, developed, reputable, great and powerful Turkey. We consider it our indispensable duty to work and struggle for taking and implementing all kinds of social, economic, administrative, legal, political and other measures in order to realize the issues stipulated in this program and in the light of the principles specified in this program, and we see it as the reason for our being a political party.

As can be understood from the program of the Motherland Party, it wanted to bring the Turkish nation out of political and ideological conflicts and to reconcile it around economic development. It would achieve this by embracing the whole nation. This party, designed and created by Turgut Özal as a synthesis of the country, led the people into thinking about not only today but also the future by realizing the economic and political transformation which was seriously needed in a period in the history of the Republic of Turkey (Birand & Yalçın, 2001: 338).

Elections: The Rise and Fall of the Motherland Party (ANAP)

Turgut Özal, who was the architect of the January 24 Decisions and successfully served in the offices that guided the economy for many years, managed to establish his party despite all the obstacles. The newly formed party would have the opportunity to measure

the favor directed towards it in the public thanks to the ballot boxes in such a short time as five and a half months after its establishment. Seven parties applied to participate in the elections. These parties were The Motherland Party led by Turgut Özal, the People's Party led by Necdet Calp, the Nationalist Democracy Party led by Turgut Sunalp, the Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan, the Social Democracy Party led by Erdal İnönü, the Conservative Party led by Alparslan Türkeş, and the Great Turkey Party led by Süleyman Demirel. However, only three parties were allowed to participate in the elections by the National Security Council. Accordingly, the Nationalist Democracy Party led by the right-wing Turgut Sunalp, the People's Party led by Necdet Calp from the left, and Özal's Motherland Party could participate in the 6 November 1983 elections.

Turgut Özal expressed his views on the 6 November 1983 elections as follows: *"We prepared really well for the elections and I had no doubt that we would win the elections. Maybe there were quite a few of our friends who were doubtful, but I don't know, let's call it a feeling or a hunch. We thought we would get quite many votes, we would be in power alone. As a matter of fact, that day, towards the end of the election propaganda, it started to appear. In other words, the people were trying very hard not to express their opinion, perhaps because of the emergence of the military administration's tendency to support a particular party. In other words, it was as if they were hiding us from the public"* (Barlas, 2000: 59-60).

On the way to the elections of 6 November 1983, an important development took place in determining the fate of the election and the tendency of the voters. The election debates of the party leaders, which started on television screens for the first time in the 1983 elections, became a very important turning point for the three parties that were allowed to enter the election. These public debates on television screens significantly increased Özal's popularity and familiarity in the public eye. Unlike other party leaders, Özal was displaying a discourse that was more liberal, more democratic and more distant from the putschists on television programs. For these reasons, there was an increasing interest from the public towards the Motherland Party. Özal's party was seen as a hope of salvation from the economic bottleneck and high inflation, rather than the parties supported by the military (Çölaşan, 2008: 198).

As the election date approached, the military administration, realizing that the public's interest in the Motherland Party had increased greatly, wanted to intervene in the course of events indirectly. On November 4, 1983, two days before the elections, President Kenan Evren clearly targeted the Motherland Party, even though he did not name it in his speech on radio and television. This situation was publicly interpreted as the soldiers wanted people to vote for MDP leader Turgut Sunalp, and this comment was also right. Contrary to expectations, this intervention caused the masses to approach the Motherland Party more sympathetically (Akyol, 2009: 107). Despite all difficulties in the elections

that took place two days later, the Motherland Party won the absolute majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and became the first party by taking 45% of the votes.

While Turgut Özal and the Motherland Party were the undisputed winners of the election by making a big surprise contrary to expectations, the loser of this election was the Nationalist Democracy Party, which the soldiers openly supported and expected to win the election. Public interest in the election was enormous and there was a record 92.30% participation. The people showed their attitude against coups, that is, soldiers, by going to the ballot box and using their votes. In this success, the fact that ANAP was a new and unworn party with a progressive vision and that it followed a compromising, unifying line without ideological discrimination between people was also an important factor (Keçeciler, 2014: 87).

In the Motherland Party, which unexpectedly came out as the sole power in the elections, now the debates whether ‘the authority to establish a government will be given or not by the military administration?’ began. In this uncertain and tense environment, Turgut Özal was finally assigned by President Kenan Evren to form the government on 20 November, after 14 days from the elections. Finally, the government of the Motherland Party under the Prime Ministry of Turgut Özal, who took office on December 13, was formed. Along with the winning of the power alone by the Motherland Party in the first election it entered, the decade of Özal started in which Turkey was irreversibly transformed in socioeconomic terms. The voting rates and the number of deputy seats won by the Motherland Party in the general elections from the date of its establishment on May 20, 1983, until the 2002 general elections, when it was excluded from the parliament, are as follows (<http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/milletvekili-genel-secim-arsivi/2644>):

Election Year	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002
Rate of votes	45.14	36.31	24.01	19.65	13.22	5.12
Number of Deputies Won/ Total Number	211/400	292/450	115/450	132/550	86/550	0/550

The decline of the Motherland Party, which was the only dominant party in the country from 1983, when it first entered the election, until 1991, began with the loss of the referendum on lifting the political bans in 1987 with a very small difference of votes, it deepened when Turgut Özal left the leadership of the party in 1989 and became the president. Until this date, arguments increased among the party cadres gathered around the undisputed charismatic leader Turgut Özal, and the conflicts of leadership and authority deepened within the party organization. After the party lost its founding leader, it quickly began to lose both popular favor and power in the assembly. The names of the leaders of the Motherland Party starting from the date when Turgut Özal officially left the party leadership on 31 October 1989 are as follows (https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anavatan_Partisi#Genel_ba%C5%9Fkanlar%C4%B1):

Name	Election Date	Date of Leaving Office
Turgut Özal	20 May 1983	31 October 1989
Yıldırım Akbulut	31 October 1989	15 June 1991
Mesut Yılmaz	15 June 1991	27 November 2002
Ekrem Pakdemirli (By Proxy)	27 November 2002	11 January 2003
Ali Talip Özdemir	11 January 2003	13 December 2003
Nesrin Nas	13 December 2003	25 November 2004
Halil İbrahim ÖZSOY (By proxy)	25 November 2004	2 April 2005
Erkan MUMCU	2 April 2005	25 October 2008
Salih Uzun	25 October 2008	31 October 2009

Turgut Özal: Climbing to the 864-Altitude Hill

The official process of the presidential election was started in the first session of the 20th assembly of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on October 20, 1989, 20 days prior to the end of the term of the current President Kenan Evren. Only Motherland Party deputies attended the election session upon the boycott of other parties (Arcayürek, 1989: 152-153). Burdur Deputy Fethi Çelikbaş also applied for the Presidential candidacy. Considering the quorum ratios to win the Presidency at that time, the total number of members of the TGNA in that period was 450, the two-thirds majority was 300, and the absolute majority was 226.

CANDIDATES	1st Voting (20 October 1989)	2nd Voting (24 October 1989)	3rd Voting (31 October 1989)
Turgut ÖZAL	247	256	263
Fethi ÇELİKBAŞ	18	17	14
Null	17	9	8
Invalid	3	2	0
TOTAL	285	284	285

None of the candidates could get two-thirds majority vote stipulated by the law in the presidential election voting that would determine the 8th President of the Republic of Turkey. In the third vote held in the first session of the 24th assembly on 31 October 1989, in which the absolute majority vote would win the election instead of the two-thirds majority vote, Turgut Özal got 263 votes and became the new President. The opposition did not participate in the voting process, Turgut Özal was elected only by the votes of the deputies of his own party, who held the majority in the parliament, and officially started his new duty on 9 November 1989.

After the founding and charismatic leader of the Motherland Party, which was in power, assumed the post of Presidency, the agenda of the country was locked on who would be the new party leader and as a consequence, the prime minister. Turgut Özal, as a result of some negotiations he made during this process, brought Yıldırım Akbulut as the leader of the party he was the founder of, who had a calm personality and thus would not

object to his intervention in government affairs (Mangırcı, 1999: 169). However, things develop contrary to expectations. Especially the opposition parties launched an intense criticism campaign, claiming that Özal, despite the termination of his relations with the Motherland Party officially, continued to lead the party in breach of the constitution, was involved in government affairs because he did not break his organic bond, and Yıldırım Akbulut condoned it (Akyol, 2009: 315). In this process, as Yıldırım Akbulut, who was very worn out, could not dominate the party and especially he did not support the president's ideas in the atmosphere of the onset of the 1st Gulf War looming, Mesut Yılmaz became the new president of the party and the new prime minister of the country at the party's third major congress held on June 15, 1991.

The most important event that enabled Turgut Özal to be active in politics and the country's agenda was the neighboring country Iraq-based Gulf War that started on August 2, 1990, and ended on February 28, 1991, during his Presidency. As he tried to actively manage the policy that Turkey would adopt during the war, he experienced problems particularly with the opposition parties, the government of his own party and especially with the Chief of General Staff Full General Necip Toruntay (Birand & Yalçın, 2001: 439-442). The most important argument of the opposition was the concern that the proactive strategy that Özal wanted to implement could drag Turkey into the war. Özal, who saw the Gulf Crisis as an opportunity for Turkey, consulted with opinion leaders in the region during this period and sought to obtain various big gains in the oil-rich regions in northern Iraq (Barlas, 2000: 126-131).

Özal, who was totally dissatisfied with the developments in the Motherland Party and the new direction in which the country evolved politically, considered to return to politics again, and even though he determined new strategies to implement when he returned, his lifetime did not allow this (Akyol, 2009: 462-466). President Turgut Özal, the 8th President of the Republic of Turkey, passed away as a result of a heart attack on 17 April 1993. Turgut Özal expresses his life briefly as follows (Binark, 2008: 47); *"I am a child of a middle class family. I was born in Anatolia, I am a person who believes in the line of fate in all my past. My fate gave me a pretty colorful life. When closely examined, considering the period I studied at various schools in various places and transferred to the state at the last moment, I started public service at the lowest level. Also, I started engineering. I gradually came to the position of chief, director, general manager, undersecretary, minister, deputy prime minister, prime minister and ultimately president. In all this line of development and destiny, I have struggled and worked hard to obtain the achievements in my life."*

With his days of office as a civil servant at various levels for many years following his graduation from ITU in 1950, his leadership and Prime Ministry of the Motherland Party, which started in 1983 and ended in 1989, his practices in the Presidency office,

which he successfully continued until his sudden and doubtful death in 1993, which still had many question marks, his vision, and his projects, be them implemented or not due to his untimely demise, Turgut Özal was a charismatic leader who left deep marks on the political life of the Republic of Turkey and enabled Turkey to be a modern country in economic, political and social areas.

Conclusion

Turgut Özal was a visionary and pragmatic leader who came from a simple family from among the people of Anatolia, exhibiting sincere behavior. Özal wanted to implement a liberal-conservative understanding of the country's politics by synthesizing the conservative values he acquired while growing up as a worldview with the liberal economic understanding of the era. He was the dominant leader personality at one of the cornerstones of Turkey's history, who left his mark on the recent periods of the Republic of Turkey with his efforts to modernize the cumbersome state structure, the management system, and underdeveloped economy model through his new rationalist methods. He correctly identified the changes in the world in the '80s, developing new trends, new blocks, and new commercial relationships and tried to ensure that Turkey would obtain a positive place with the network of relations he established out of this newly developing conjuncture.

Turgut Özal, who came to power after the constitution that took effect after the military coup of 12 September 1980 and the partially free elections, chose to solve the chronic economic problems of the country as his first target. According to him, a country that steadily gains momentum in economic development will have the opportunity to develop in the areas of modernization and democratization as well. In other words, he considered economic development as an indispensable and necessary precondition for political development. Therefore, in the early years of his power, he focused more on economic change and transformation. For this, he changed the Turkish Currency Protection Law and paved the way for exports. Even his innovative practices in the economic life such as the introduction of computers and faxes into daily life during this period, the proliferation of pagers, the increase in the number of home phones, the popularization of color televisions and the permission for private channels show us the type of perspective and vision Özal had.

In the development of this vision, the fact that he came from within the public, and that he received specialized training in the USA and gained experience by working in the World Bank and in the private sector enabled Özal to get to know the global economic system. Even when Özal was a bureaucrat, his first practice in the economic field was to try to establish a free market economy in order to encourage exports. Özal made many radical changes in the traditional structure both with the 24 January decisions

and during the period when he was in power with the Motherland Party and was the prime minister. Turgut Özal showed the success he achieved in domestic politics due to his unique approach and his pragmatic new approaches in foreign politics as well. As a politician who left his mark on the 1980s, the most important feature of Turgut Özal, which should be emphasized differently from other politicians, was naturalness that caused the people to love him. Özal abandoned the distant and cold attitude, which was considered a necessity of being a statesman according to the understanding of the period. The fact that he inspected the military units in shorts, that he showed that he listened to arabesque music despite its being banned on TRT, that he mixed with the public with his wife by getting rid of his armed bodyguards with his car, and that he displayed unusual behavior that the public had not witnessed before in politicians led to the development of great sympathy for Özal.

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EPISODE 6

PKK TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AND HARMFUL ACTIVITIES

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Introduction

The concept of terrorism is described as a state or non-state actor's activities to achieve their political goals by using violent techniques. Terrorism implements systematic and organized strategies employed to achieve this goal (Baharç  ek, 2000, p.12).

Terrorism is generally based on an ideological background, social, political, religious, and ethnic foundation. States defined as global and imperialist powers frequently resort to terrorist organizations, one of the most fundamental arguments of the East-West struggle. As in the definition of strategy, one of the most common ways of policies taken as a kind of martial art is the efforts to build an environment of chaos and terror under their control. The ultimate goal is to ensure conflict and confrontation within society. Therefore, it is the systematic change of the existing legal and political structure in the targeted regions (Bozkurt, 2013, p. 8; Akman, 2016).

In the background of the terrorist incidents in the Ottoman period, the imperialist states' destructive policies and the separatist ethnic-based goals they have performed under the so-called liberation. It is observed that the imperialist powers, which are enemies of Turks and Islam, first implemented the strategies of "Break up and destroy" (Daba  yan, 2006, p.22), which they resolved on the axis of the Eastern Question, in the Balkans and they were successful. The next targets of terrorist events and policies focused on the Greeks and Armenians in Anatolia. It is quite significant that, in the report prepared by Captain Clayton, it is stated that the Kurds should be utilized for Armenian ideals. The same report declared that the Kurdish elements should be put under Christianization pressure and integrated with the Armenians (      , 2001, p.90). The European imperialist states, firstly in the Balkans and then in Anatolia, step by step achieved success with the policies they put into practice a hundred years ago and were prepared to receive their awards with the Treaty of Sevres. The Turkish nation managed to stop what happened with the last effort. This success was registered with the Lausanne Peace Treaty.

The efforts of those who thought that they had achieved these goals after the Armistice of Mudros, primarily to establish a puppet state under the control of the Armenians, ended with the Lausanne Peace Treaty. After that, the new goal was to end the Turkish-

Kurdish unity and to end the Unitary State structure through the separatist Kurds. Founded by different names in the past and which was launched in the activities of terrorist organizations in the Ottoman Empire Hunchaks , finding life with names like the Dashnaks, the Republic of Turkey ASALA, PKK and DHKP-C have found new life with names like YPG. The end goal is the same.

As we look to the PKK during the period until the rebellion, fifteen rebellion emerged during the Ottoman Period, and the period of the Republic of Turkey has experienced twenty-five rebellions. Significantly, two of these riots took place during the Ottoman state and seven during the Republic of Turkey struggle with foreign states. The open provocation and support of the foreign forces to the rebellions is apparent (Küçükşahin, p.81).

The dream of establishing the State of Armenia, which was revealed clearly by the imperialist states in the Treaty of Sevres, could not come true with the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. The newly established Republic of Turkey has learned lessons from these incidents and has accelerated its policies, which homogenizes the demographic structure. Separatist Kurds, the only ethnic difference that can be employed in the demographic structure that became homogeneous after the commutation, has become the imperialists' target in the new period. It is noted that there were external factors in all Kurdish rebellions, primarily in Sheikh Sait Rebellion. In this context, it has become the only argument in their hands to disrupt the unitary structure with organizations, such as the PKK, and establish an autonomous Kurdish state under their control.

The Establishment Process and Strategies of the PKK

PKK is the continuation of ASALA, which started armed struggle with KGB assistance. The presence of many Armenians, especially Abdullah Öcalan, in the organization is concrete evidence of this. KGB agent Karen Brutents (<https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/ PKK>) was the founding father behind both organizations.

The initiation of the PKK, whose foundations were laid in the meeting held by Abdullah Öcalan (Artin Aramyan) and a few of his friends in Ankara Çubuk Dam in 1973, is Partiya Karkerên Kurdîstanê (Demir, 2019, p.3). Its Turkish is the Kurdistan Workers Party (İşeri, 2008, p. 59). After this meeting, the organization started the planning phase ideologically. While Abdullah Öcalan stayed in Ankara, sub-managers such as Cemil Bayık and Kemal Pir started to operate in cities like Gaziantep and Siirt. They began to recruit sympathizers into the organization. By 1977, Öcalan made a two-month trip covering provinces such as Ağrı, Kars, Tunceli, Elazığ, Şanlıurfa, and Gaziantep. Information about the latest situation was obtained from the region's organization members during the trip, and military evaluations were made (Özan, 1999: 36-37).

As a result of the studies carried out in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, the organization phase was completed in five years, and on 27 November 1978, it officially completed its founding by holding its first congress in the Fis (Ziyaret) village of Lice district of Diyarbakır. General Secretary Abdullah Öcalan, Cemil Bayık, Şahin Dönmez, Mehmet Hayri Durmuş, Baki Karer, Mehmet Karasungur, and Mazlum Doğan took part in the management of the organization. On 30 July 1979, they declared the establishment of the organization with the armed attack against Mehmet Celal Bucak, who was the Şanlıurfa deputy of the Justice Party, which was against the organization at that time and was a pro-state (İşeri, 2008, p. 60).

The first PKK members moved to Lebanon via Syria in 1979 and started to receive training from the Palestinian Democratic Liberation Front in Beka Valley. In 1981, up to 150 militants from Turkey, 50 from Europe participated in Lebanon's training militants. Öcalan started to stay in a private house in Damascus (Bozkurt, 2013, p.98). Terrorist activities began when Öcalan started to send trained militants to Turkey to carry out actions (İşeri, 2008, p. 60).

The Bucak tribe leader and the tribe members, who survived this assassination wounded, engaged in combat with the PKK. After the casualties, it was decided to direct the PKK actions to the Turkish Armed Forces. For the first time, three private soldiers were martyred on 10 May 1983. Afterwards, PKK supporters, worrying that the Turkish Army would enter Mosul during the ongoing Iran-Iraq war, started to push the organization for action. Öcalan gave an action order in June 1984. The first planned attack was carried out on 15 August 1984 at 21.30 in Eruh and Şemdinli (Özan, 1999, p.94-95).

After this occurrence, the existence of the PKK terrorist organization was officially acknowledged, and a state of emergency was declared in Diyarbakır Center, Bingöl, Van, Siirt, Mardin, Elazığ, and Tunceli with the decree numbered 285 on 19 July 1987. Besides, a Temporary Village Guard System was introduced to help the security forces with the enacted Village Law (Bozkurt, 2013, p. 101). Since then, this system has continued in the region.

Terrorist Activities of the PKK

This struggle of Turkey has been going on for almost 40 years. Even though the strategies, tactics, and weapons used in this process have been reshaped every day, their consequences have caused significant economic and social damage.

Although terrorist acts and anti-terrorism techniques have developed in parallel with the advancements experienced, they generally preserve their unique characteristics. In this context, the PKK has strategically adopted and implemented two main ways since its establishment. The first is the strategy of rising regional tensions with intense conflicts

by increasing the pressure and violence on people. The second is the strategy of armed violence targeting innocent civilians. A large number of people were killed, regardless of age and gender. Thus, they planned to ensure both their existence and continuity in the targeted regions (Altındağ, 2020, p. 37).

The main topics of the organization's activities between 1984-2008 can be listed as bomb attack, armed attack, raid, ambush, burning, sabotage, hostage-taking, and kidnapping. While the number of actions taken between 1993 and 2012 was 1724, 4598 actions of 23 various types were carried out in 2010 alone (Cantener; Tümlü, 2016, p.5-8).

The growing attacks of the terrorist organization in the early 1990s and the general elections held in the same year allowed them to gain strength in the political platform after the SHP-HEP alliance. Therefore, the organization created the image of being robust in society. The organization, which propagated that they would dominate the state in the future, suddenly increased the participation in the PKK. The numerical increase started a new process, and they began raiding military posts (Özan, 1999, p. 133). The state caused significant losses to the organization thanks to the operations that began in the spring of 1994 and lasted throughout the year and new measures implemented.

To compensate for the losses, the organization chose people with low education levels using the recruitment technique, mostly from Anatolia. In an instruction sent by the organization leader to its executives in the 1990s, he determines the PKK's suitable militant profile as ignorant and uneducated. He states that there is little opportunity to benefit from educated people (Ministry of Interior, 2017, p.34). The organization had kidnapped women and men by force, drugs, threats, and religious propaganda. It has implemented all kinds of oppression and persecution, especially rape, in organization camps (Ministry of Interior, 2017, p. 47).

In terms of financing, we see that they are organized with the support of several states with political aspirations in Turkey. Besides, they obtained financial gain within activities such as extortion and road blocking during the establishment phase. Over time, they continued to provide financing through illegal means, including drug, arms, and human trafficking. The most significant evidence of this is that in 23 of 41 drug operations carried out worldwide in 1992, PKK connections were detected (Altındağ, 2020, p.37).

In the new strategies planned within the Great Middle East project's scope, efforts to create new state administrations were initiated by provoking ethnic and religious differences and utilizing the pressure and oppression of existing administrations politically. The first step of this policy was initiated in Tunisia. The PKK is the counterpart and the argument used in Turkey by the forces behind the Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia as of 2010 and soon spread to the Middle East and North Africa (Pusane, 2014, p. 116). The organization thus assumed a new mission. It converted into the most used organization in the triangle of Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

While the PKK actively engaged in terrorist activities at sometimes, at other times, with the effect of losing its power, it began to declare a so-called ceasefire. In particular, a planned ceasefire was declared between 1999-2004 when the organization leader, Öcalan, was captured and brought home on 15 February 1999 at the Greek embassy in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. Although the organization started the disintegration process with the effect of being leaderless in this process, it began to be restructured as the administration, taking advantage of the 2001 crisis and the developments in the following period. In this context, it changed its name in 2002 and took the name KADEK. Although the AK Party government, which came to power in the same year, pledged reform and relieved the restrictions, this goodwill was abused. The organization quickly started recruiting militants and illegal activities. The organization, which was renamed the PKK in 2005, resumed its armed activities. During the democratic initiative process that started in 2009, the organization retook a breath and gained great power (Cantener; Tümlü, 2016, p.12). The opportunity, which was seized with the solution process initiated in good faith, was missed in 2015 as the attacks increased gradually. Unquestionably, European states, which have connections with the organization, have significant impact on missing this opportunity.

When we look at the terrorist activities of the PKK, in the 1990s, it mostly carried out ambushes and attacks on military points, but after 2004 it turned into mined attacks. As of 2007, it as concentrated on military points again. Since the initiative process, terrorists have started to infiltrate city centres and organize attacks there. The organization, which is getting more robust in the city centres, has become more assertive in recruiting militants from Anatolia as before. Especially since 2015, we see that children of Kurdish origin in the terrorist organization have increased, and children are abducted and forced to receive militant training. In the Human Trafficking Report prepared by the United States, it was noted that the PKK and the Syrian branch of the PYD/YPG, including under the age of 15, abducted boys and girls to make members of the organization and trained in camps (Ministry of Interior, 2017, p.5-5. 6). The organization employed children in arson, reconnaissance, and intelligence work, expanding the audience, and making black propaganda (Ministry of Interior, 2017, p.5-6; 19).

The massacres of this bloody terrorist organization, which has murdered 100,000 people since its establishment in 1984, resemble the Armenians' massacres. It is not acceptable for a Kurd to kill its people; children, old and women without exception. Notably, most of the village raids' militants are of Armenian origin, and the deceased are Muslim Kurds. It is an indication that ASALA and the PKK are marching for the same ideology and goal. The activities carried out with the support of the imperialist states to these two organizations not only kill people but also harm Turkey's economy. When the investments that could have been made with the one trillion-dollar spent in this struggle

by Turkey considered, the magnitude of the damage of Republic of Turkey and its people will be better recognized (Çankaya, 2020, p.37).

Conclusion

The concepts of terror and terrorism are a universal problem that does not only involve violence. The reasons active in the background are political. In processes where states cannot directly fight each other, they support these formations underhand and use them like pioneering forces. The deterioration of peace and trust through these activities among societies and, if possible, turn into a civil war is a desired outcome by the imperialist states.

In this context, the role and interests of the great imperialist states behind the terrorist incidents in the Ottoman and the Republic period has unquestionably existed. The memories of Captain Clayton and Russian General Mayewski, who came to inspect the reforms against minorities in the Vilayet-i Sitte during the Ottoman period, confirm this situation. When we look at the activities of the Armenian terrorist organizations known as Dashnak and Hunchak at that time, it is recognized that there are remarkable similarities with the criteria imposed under the name of EU accession during the Republic period and the activities of terrorist organizations such as ASALA, PKK, and YPG.

On the contrary, totalitarian regimes have come to life in the Balkans, the Middle East, and other geographies where they came with the slogans of so-called freedom, democracy, and civilization. No one cares about the murder of innocent civilians and the suffering to achieve this. The blood and tears that begun with Dashnak and Hunchak in the past continue today with the PKK. The PKK is a bloody terrorist organization that has killed innocent civilians and poisoned them with drugs and attacked the security forces with armed violence. Now, the PKK, tomorrow YPG, and all of the terrorist organizations organized under a separate name the next day will continue to serve their ambitions as a toy of the imperialists.

The Republic of Turkey was in a fierce struggle with ASALA from 1975 to 1985 and suffered material and moral losses. After this date, the organization changed the tactics and sought political requests from Turkey in the international arena. It is not a coincidence that the PKK emerged and started terrorist activities at the moment ASALA withdrew. Their superior minds and supporters believed that the Kurdish people would give their support that they did not give to ASALA, to the PKK, which they put into action under the so-called Kurdism.

Although the names of the organizations have evolved, the goals and demands have not changed. While ASALA makes territorial claims from Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia for Great Armenia, it is observed that the PKK has undertaken terrorist activities with

the demand for land from the same region. These are confirmed by the treaties between ASALA and the PKK.

In this context, both ASALA and the PKK terrorism that has been going on for nearly 40 years have harmed the Turks and the Kurds. The fact that most innocent people who died in the massacres are Kurds is evidence that this movement is working for Armenians, not for Kurds. The Republic of Turkey is in a deep sadness for the experienced losses. But it must be accepted that Turkey cannot give up this struggle until the end.

As a result, the Republic of Turkey's legitimacy in combating the PKK is regarded as a reasonable reality by a neutral perspective. Yet, it is also a reality that this fact is not accepted as an absolute truth in line with the states' interests dominating world politics. Turkey will be successful in its valid fight against this evilness, as long as it is strong economically and politically. Like the Ottoman State at the time, we can assume that the Republic of Turkey was left alone against terror supported by internal and external powers. In this context, the military strength of the state depends on its economic strength. Being able to become a self-sufficient country again is remarkably essential for the survival of the state.

Knowing that Turkish-Kurdish unity, integration, solidarity, and brotherhood is a result of a very long historical process, we must protect this unity at all costs and carry it to future.

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EPISODE 7

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, PRODUCTION STRUCTURE AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GOALS OF ECONOMY SPECIFIC TO DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN TURKEY BETWEEN THE YEARS 1980-2000

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Introduction

Immediately before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the policy of the Turkish economy was determined in Turkey Economic Congress (1923) held in İzmir where final military victory was obtained.

The papers in the congress were collected in a book titled “Our Principles of Economics”. On the other hand, the congress that took place during the period when Lausanne Talks were suspended can be handled multi-dimensionally. The common feature of these dimensions is the emphasis of M. Kemal Atatürk, Kazım Karabekir and other speakers on “independence” in economy and foreign policy.

It was adopted that the Republic of Turkey, which would be founded in the congress, would develop with the National Economy model and decisions were taken related to partial liberal properties under the name “Pact of Economics” and “Farmers, Merchants, Principles Regarding Industrialists ‘and Workers’ Groups”.

The traces of these decisions which were taken in the Turkish Economic Congress may be seen in the Ottoman Empire. Seyitdanlıoğlu (1996) stated that the Ottoman statesmen aimed to establish a state structure with a liberal understanding of their own, instead of taking as an example France and England, where liberalism was born and developed, after the Tanzimat was declared. As an example of the works written in the period, Müntahabât-ı sar ‘, in which Sâdık Rıfat Pasha introduced liberal ideas to the Ottoman public, and “Mebâdî-i İlm-i Servet-i Mîlel” of Sakızlı Ohannes Pasha who gave economics lessons at Mekteb-i Mülkiye and was influenced by Adam Smith’s liberal understanding of economics. Such examples can be multiplied, and it can be seen that the liberal thought peculiar to the Ottoman Empire flourished in the works, articles and policies written with the Tanzimat. During the Committee of Union and Progress (1913-1918), the idea of National Economy started to flourish under the influence of intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura (Ergin, 2017). Varlı and Koraltürk (2010) stated adoption of national economic policy, on the basis of Turkification of the

economy as continuity in the transition to Turkey from the Ottoman Empire Republic in the decisions taken at the İzmir Economy Congress in terms of economic policy.

The Turkish Nation lost an important part of the trained manpower, which is one of the most important factors of economic power, in the Balkan Wars and the First World War. Despite all the negative events experienced, the War of Independence was won and the Republic of Turkey was founded. Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Parliament), initiated development attempts using scarce resources compared to its contemporaries based on the idea that full independence could be gained through economic independence.

In 1929, because of the great economic crisis affecting the world and appeared in the USA, Republic of Turkey chose Soviet Development model/plan instead of western development it took as an example in development initiatives. The First Five-Year Industrial Plan (BBYSP) included an understanding of import substitution that envisages the production of basic consumer goods domestically, and it was designed to establish about 20 publicly owned factories in the fields of textile, mining, ceramics, cellulose and chemistry. The basic philosophy of the Industrial Plans prepared before the Development Plans is the establishment of economic independence and industrialization by using national resources, thus exceeding the position of the surrounding country in the international division of labor (Soyak, 2003; Akman & Meydan, 1938).

Economic Development is implemented within the framework of a system / model. Alkin (2009) defines the economic system as the social organization in which the ways to maximize the welfare of the society are determined. He also stated that the amount of production and distribution channels is formed by the price mechanism and the markets in the capitalist system. In the socialist system, central authority decisions and central plans have replaced the price mechanism and the market (Alkin, 2009).

Although the Concept of Development is associated with the concept of economic growth, it is broader than growth and refers to the change and renewal of the social, cultural and political structures as well as the change of the economic structure of the society (Küçükoğlu, M., Taş, H. Y., & Ercan, H) In this context, the Development Plans can be defined as macro plans that deal with the whole economy, the relations between economic and social factors with a long-term integrated perspective and have an imperative feature, energy, tax and credit exemptions for the public sector, and a guiding, legal and technical features for the private sector in the medium and long term (Team, A., 2011). The concept of growth is the real increase in production capacity or real gross domestic product in a country within a year and can be measured numerically (Küçükoğlu et al., 2018).

Turkey implemented a liberal trade policy during the period 1950-1960. With the establishment of the State Planning Organization (DPT), the planned development

period started. The Turkish plan model is obligatory for the public sector and guiding for the private sector. The targets and instruments that serve as orders for the public sector are guiding for the private sector and do not contain any sanctions (Eğilmez & Kumcu, 2015).

An import substitution perspective is included in the development plans prepared until 1980. In general terms, rapid industrialization and higher foreign exchange savings were targeted with this approach (Özcan, B. & Özçelebi, O. 2013). Kuruç (1998: 77) He stated that the most successful plan in terms of achieving its goals is a Five-Year Development Plan among the development plans prepared in the period between 1960-1980. In the post-1960 period, economic growth accelerated with the “import substitution” orientation and the average annual growth rate between 1960-1980 was 6%.

Takım (2011) examined the fiscal policies in the development plans prepared for the 1960-1980 period. He stated that the targets foreseen in the first and second plans were achieved to a large extent with tight fiscal policies such as reducing public expenditures and increasing taxes. He emphasized that the reasons for not achieving the goals in the third and fourth development plans were first of all, the open financing policy implemented to meet the additional financing need caused by the deterioration of the budget discipline, the oil crisis and insufficient external resources.

The Turkish economy entered into an economic crisis during the 1970-1980 period due to the significant increase in world oil prices and the import substitution policies implemented. The 1974 Cyprus War and internal turmoil throughout the period negatively affected the country’s economy. With the effect of the devaluations in the Turkish Lira, the costs of energy imports increased and the balance of payments deteriorated. Due to the negative developments in politics, economic instability was observed. As a result of the 1980 military coup, 5th Five-Year Development Plan (1979-1983) was suspended.

There were changes in the concept of economic planning throughout the world since the 1980s. In his study, Akçay (1980, p. 40) referred to Agarwala, one of the World Bank experts, stating that the planning experiences in the process until the 1980s did not provide as much benefit to the development effort of less developed countries as they expected. He also emphasized that the administrative, technical and political problems experienced in this process negatively affected the economies of these countries. These changes are qualitative and went beyond the reduction of the nation-state’s regulatory power in the economy. Especially in developing countries, integrated development planning turned towards strategic planning, and the effect of globalization increased in development plans (Soyak, Alkan, 2003). This transformation also influenced the Turkish Economy and was effective in determining neo-liberal policies instead of statist policies in the development plans prepared since 1980.

It is seen that the Shock Doctrine was implemented by Thatcher and Reagan Governments in the UK and USA, respectively, following the unsuccessful Chile example. Through the IMF and the World Bank, it can be said that neo-liberal policies have become widespread throughout the world with shock therapy expressed as “structural adjustment” to developing countries.

The governments established after 1980 in Turkey adopted an approach that was based on opening to foreign countries and export in their development plans. It is seen that the economy in our country differed sharply from the period before 1980 due to the radical changes experienced. In this study, the structure of the Gross Domestic Product and the general balance targets of the economy, which are included in the development plans prepared in the 1980-2000 period, have been analyzed according to their realization levels.

Five-Year Development Plans 1980-2000

Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1979-1983)

Öney (1980) stated that the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan was based on a strategy that would provide the solution of the economic problems experienced in the 1970s and strengthen the economy. The Fourth Five-Year Plan includes economic and social objectives such as making progress in industry, creating modern technologies, utilizing resources efficiently, improving income distribution, and solving the problem of unemployment, especially ensuring a stable development.

In the 4th Five-Year Development Plan, the annual average growth of the Gross National Product (GNP) is 8%, agriculture 5.3%, services 8.5%, industry 9.9%. In line with these goals, it is aimed to increase the share of industry and to decrease the share of agriculture in GNP. It is aimed to grow the industrial sector through structural changes (increasing the share of intermediate and investment goods). The plan emphasizes on increasing exports and savings. With the military coup of September 12, 1980, the government that prepared the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan was dismissed, so the plan could not be implemented.

With the stabilization program, which entered into force on January 24, 1980 and known as the January 24 Decisions, it was aimed to increase the growth rate and exports, to take control inflation and reduce it, and to turn to a market economy. The January 24 decisions and stand-by agreements with the IMF were the determinants of the developments experienced during the period. The civil government, which came to power with the entry into force of the 1982 Constitution, ruled this period with annual programs.

The Turkish was devalued with the “stand-by” agreement signed with the IMF. Free

interest started to be applied with the reduction of the money supply. It was aimed to reduce public expenditures and minimize subsidies. Legal arrangements were made for foreign capital investments and the exchange rate began to be set flexible and daily. Exporters were supported for the development of foreign trade. With the transition to an export-oriented development strategy, an increase in foreign currency revenues was desired. Therefore, with the reduction of domestic demand, legal regulations for the export of surplus commodities started to be implemented. In this context, it can be stated that the basic idea of the January 24 Decisions was the incentives and legal regulations for private sector development in order to ensure financial stability and growth in the Turkish economy.

During this period (1979-1983), it is seen that the inflation rate fell after a stressful 10 years, which included the oil crisis, the Cyprus War, political and social turmoil, and the military coup with the effect of the 24 January decisions. We can say that the first steps were taken in the growth that came to a halt and tourism revenues increased.

Fifth Five-Year Development Plan Period (1985-1989)

After the 1982 Constitution came into force, the first government that was elected, implemented a “transition program” in preparation for the development plan. The Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (FFYDP) entered into force on 13th July 1984. Structural change that provided integration with the foreign countries was initiated in the FFYDP. In this context, emphasis was placed on increasing exports and domestic savings and decreasing the inflation rate. In the industrialization policy, necessity for making investments in export was emphasized. In the plan, it is expected that the GDP will reach 16,308.9 billion TL in 1989 from 12,009.4 billion TL / in 1984 with an annual average increase of 6.3 percent in market prices. The goals of the GDP structure in the development plan are included in Table 1.

Table 1. Targets for the Structure of Gross Domestic Product in the FFYDP

Sector	Average Growth Rate	Share in GNDP	
		1984	1989
Industry	%7,5	%31,9	%33,7
Services	%6,5	%50,4	%50,8
Agriculture	%3,6	%17,7	%15,5

Source: Fifth Five-Year Development Plan

When Table 1 is analyzed, it is aimed that the annual average growth rates of Industry, Services and Agriculture will be 7.5%, 6.5% and 3.6%, respectively. In addition, the shares of Industry, Services and Agriculture in GDP are expected to be 33.7%, 50.8% and 15.5%, respectively, at the end of the period.

Targets belonging to the production structure included in the development plan are

included in Table 2. When Table 2 is analyzed, there is industrial production with a growth target of 7.5%. It is seen that the highest growth rate in industrial production is Energy production with an increase of 11.2%. The annual growth rates of Investment Goods and Intermediate Goods, which are important in increasing exports, are targeted at 9.7% and 7.3%, respectively. It is seen that the highest growth target in the agriculture sector is the livestock sector with 4.7%. Construction Sector takes the first place with 8.6% growth in the Service Sector.

Table 2. Targets for the Structure of Production in the Five-Year Development Plan

Sectors	1984 Beginning of the Period		End of the Period 1989		
	Production Value	Intra-Sector %	Production Value	Intra-Sector%	Growth %
1. AGRICULTURE	3428,6	100	4092,3	100	3,6
a. Herbal Production	2008,4	58,6	2322,7	56,8	3
b. Farming	1129,2	32,9	1417,7	34,6	4,7
c. Forestry	245,3	7,2	285,5	7	3,1
d. Fisheries	45,7	1,3	66,4	1,6	7,7
2. INDUSTRY	10399,6		14901,8		7,5
a. Mining	419,4		596,2		7,3
b. Manufacturing Industry	9505	100,0	13497,2	100	7,3
i. Consumer Goods	4347,9	45,7	5937,5	44	6,4
ii. Intermediary Goods	3883,7	40,9	5532,3	41	7,3
iii. Investment Goods	1273,4	13,4	2027,4	15	9,7
c. Energy	475,2		808,4		11,2
3. SERVICES	7928,6	100	10832,6	100	6,4
a. Construction	1066	13,4	1608,3	14,9	8,6
b. Trade	22823	28,8	3187,1	29,2	6,8
c. Transportation-Communication	1846,8	23,3	2508,1	23,2	6,3
d. Financial Bodies	372,8	4,7	433,4	4	3,1
e. Housing Ownership	569,4	7,2	792,7	7,3	6,8
f. Self Employed	894,3	11,3	1185	10,9	5,8
g. Government Services	897,1	11,3	1138	10,5	4,9
Total Gross Production	21756,8		29826,7		6,5

Source: Fifth Five-Year Development Plan

General Balance Targets of the Economy

Information on the general balance targets of the economy is included in Table 3. When Table 3 is examined, there are proportional targets for increasing investments and savings and reducing the Foreign Deficit and consumption expenditures according to the shares in GNP.

Table 3. General Balance Targets of the Economy Shares in GNP at Prices in the year 1983

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
GNP	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00
Foreign Deficit	2,32	2,09	1,93	1,75	1,52	1,39
Total Sources	102,32	102,09	101,93	101,75	101,52	101,39
Total Investments	19,69	20,08	20,48	20,89	21,33	21,87
Fixed Capital Investment	18,88	19,11	19,46	19,89	20,36	20,9
Public	11,34	11,37	11,41	11,48	11,53	11,6
Private	7,53	7,74	8,04	8,41	8,83	9,3
Change in Stock	0,81	0,97	1,02	1	0,97	0,97
Public	-0,12	0,07	0,06	0,06	0,05	0,04
Private	0,93	0,9	0,96	0,95	0,92	0,93
Total Consumption	82,63	82	81,45	80,86	80,19	79,52
Kamu Har, Geliri	16,03	15,6	15,81	15,90-	18,01	16,13
Public Consumption	9,88	9,83	9,75	9,65	9,53	9,42
Public Savings	6,14	5,77	6,06	6,25	6,48	6,71
Public Investment	11,22	11,44	11,48	11,53	11,59	11,64
Public (S-I) Difference	-5,08	-5,68	-5,42	-5,29	-5,11	-4,94
Özel Har, Gelir	83,97	84,4	84,19	84,1	83,99	83,87
Private Consumption	72,75	72,17	71,7	71,21	70,66	70,1
Private Savings	11,23	12,23	12,49	12,89	13,33	13,78
Private Investment	8,47	8,64	9	9,36	9,74	10,23
Private (I-S) Difference	2,76	3,59	3,48	3,53	3,59	3,55
Total Domestic Savings	17,37	18	18,55	19,14	19,81	20,48

Source: Fifth Five-Year Development Plan

Considering the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan Period, GNP increased by 6.0 percent on an annual average. It can be said that the unemployment problem decreased to a certain extent with the rapid growth experienced during the period. The ratio of exports to imports increased from 62.0 percent in 1983 to 82.3 percent in 1988. Thus, the ratio of foreign trade deficit to GNP also tended to decrease.

Below are examples of the transformation in the Turkish Economy in the Fifth Plan period.

- The foreign exchange legislation was regulated and citizens were enabled to have

foreign currency (1984).

- Value Added Tax entered into force (1984)
- Private Finance Institutions, the first examples of Islamic Banking, were established. Al Baraka Türk A.Ş. (1985) and Faisal Finans Kurum A.Ş. etc. (1985).
- Creating funds for infrastructure investments by bringing new tools to the Capital Market (Bosphorus Bridge etc.)
- Opening of Turkish banks to foreign countries, accelerating the inflow of foreign capital by regulating foreign bank activities
- Establishing Free Zones
- Establishment of Export Credit Bank of Turkey (Turkish EXIMBANK)
- Application for full membership to the European Community on April 14, 1987,
- Under the leadership of the Central Bank; Interbank Money Market in 1986,
- The Foreign Exchange Market in 1988 and the Gold Market in 1989 were put into service.
- Establishment of Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) (1989)

During the 5th Five Year Plan period, public deficits could not be reduced to the targeted level. Consolidated Budget revenues did not increase at the expected level, despite significant changes in tax legislation. One of the factors that increase the Consolidated Budget deficit can be considered to be the increased transfer expenditures due to domestic and foreign debt interest payments. The public's loan requirement increased due to domestic and foreign debt principal payments.

Sixth Five-Year Development Plan Period (1990-1994)

In the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan, in order to eliminate the negative consequences of the previous development plan; Improving income distribution, reducing unemployment and regional and regional development inequalities in a rapid, balanced and stable development process has been determined as the general objective.

The Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (ABYKP) was approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on June 22, 1989. This plan is the second plan prepared by the same government during the development period. In the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan period, it was aimed to increase the GNP by an average of 7.0 percent per year with

fixed prices. Thus, the GNP that was 103.692.0 billion TL in 1989 reached to 145,547.2 billion TL in 1994. During the plan period, an increase of 41.855.2 billion TL in the GNP was achieved in 1988 prices. GDP, on the other hand, increased by an average of 6.8 percent annually in constant prices and was 104,545.6 billion TL in 1989 and reached to 145,317.0 billion TL in 1994. Net factor revenues from abroad were expected to become positive in the last years of the Plan period and reach 230.2 billion TL in 1994 with fixed prices. During the Plan period, GNP per capita in 1988 prices increased at an annual average rate of 4.6 percent and reached from 1.877 thousand TL in 1989 to 2.354 thousand TL in 1994. The Targets of the Structure of the Gross Domestic Product in the plan are included in Table 4.

Table 4. Targets for the Structure of Gross Domestic Product in SFYDP

Sector	<u>Average Growth Rate</u>	<u>Share in GDP %</u>	
		1989	1994
Agriculture	4,1	15,8	13,9
Industry	8,1	36,7	39
Services	6,7	47,5	47,1

Source: Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (SFYDP)

Structure of Production

When the production structure targets in the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan are analyzed, the target of the annual average production growth rate in fixed prices was 4.2% in the agricultural sector; 8.4% in the industrial sector and 6.9% in the service sector. In line with these goals, it was aimed that the share of the agricultural sector in total production decreased from 13.2 percent to 11.4 percent, the share of the industrial sector increased from 46.7 percent to 49.2 percent, and the share of the service sector decreased to 39,4 to from 40.1 percent.

Estimates regarding the intra-sector changes and growth rate of the targets of the production structure in SFYDP by sectors are given in Table 5 below. When Table 5 is analyzed, it is expected that the Total Gross Production will increase by 7.3% at the end of the period. The average growth rate in the agricultural sector is targeted to be 4.2%. When the growth rate within the agriculture sector is analyzed, the highest growth rate is expected to be Fisheries with a rate of 7.7%.

It is expected that the highest increase in Total Gross Production will be in industrial production (at 8.4%). Investment Goods (11.2%), Energy, Gas, Water (11.2%), which were included in industrial production, were prioritized. When the service sector is analyzed, we see that a growth rate of 6.9% was targeted. In the intra-sector development of the service sector, it was expected that public services would grow 4.5% and shrink within the sector.

Table 5. Targets of the Production Structure of SFYDP

Sectors	1989		1994		
	Production Value	Intra-Sector %	Production Value	Intra-Sector%	Growth %
I. AGRICULTURE	26277,4	100	32279,1	100	4,2
a. Herbal Production	14598,6	55,6	17527	54,3	3,7
b. Farming	8622,3	32,8	10950,2	33,9	4,9
c. Forestry	1787,4	6,8	1963	6,1	1,9
4.Fisheries	1269,1	4,8	1838,9	5,7	7,7
II. INDUSTRY	92597,1		133576,1		8,4
a. Mining	3653,7		4951,1		6,3
b. Manufacturing Industry	84416,1	100	125741,7	100	8,3
i. Consumer Goods	32456,2	38,4	47447	37,7	7,9
ii. Intermediate Goods	38112,1	45,2	54793,4	43,6	7,5
iii. Investment Goods	13847,8	16,4	23501,3	18,7	11,2
c. Energy, Gas, Water	4627,3		7883,3		11,2
III. SERVICES	79505,7	100	110990,8	100	6,9
a. Construction	12725	16	18735,5	16,9	8
b. Trade	25740,2	32,4	36440,3	32,8	7,2
c. Transportation, Communication	23960	30,1	33325	30	6,8
d.Financial Bodies	3301,8	4,2	4426,6	4	6
e. Household Ownership	4479	5,6	5939,9	5,4	5,8
f. Personal and Professional Services	3964,8	5	5469,2	4,9	6,6
g. Public Services	5334,9	6,7	6654,3	6	4,5
Total Gross Production	198480,2		281846		7,3

Source: 6th Five-Year Development Plan

General Balance Targets of the Economy

In spite of targeting an annual average increase of 7.0 percent in fixed prices in the Plan period; 1.911.6 billion TL in 1989, 5.847.5 billion TL in 1994. Total resources used in the economy are expected to increase by an average of 6.5 percent annually, depending on the external surplus. During the plan period, it is aimed to increase the total investments by an average of 9.2 percent per year. When Table 6 is analyzed, it was 38,905.6 billion TL in 1994, compared to TL 25,091.2 billion in 1989. The level is expected to be reached. 161,310.2 billion TL with fixed prices planned for this period. 155.388.4 billion TL of the total investment is due to fixed capital investment and the remaining 5.921.8 billion TL is due to stock increase. The ratio of external surplus to GNP, which was 1.8 percent in 1989, was projected to be 4.0 percent in 1994.

Table 6. Targets for the General Balance of the Economy

	1989(1)	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
GNP	103692,00	109592,00	116825,10	125119,70	134628,80	145547,20
Foreign Deficit	-1911,6	-2371,6	-3419,8	-4457	-5379,3	-5847,5
Total Sources	101780,4	107220,5	113405,4	120662,8	129249,5	139699,7
Total Investments	25091,2	26864,8	29058,5	31655,3	34826	38905,6
Fixed Capital Investment	24591,6	26060,7	27993,6	30452,7	33468,9	37412,5
— Public	10617,5	10983,7	11532,8	12138,3	12805,9	13535,8
— Private	13974,1	15077	16460,8	18314,4	20663,0	23876,7
Change in Stock	499,6	804,1	1064,9	1202,6	1357,1	1493,1
— Public	343,3	644,1	900,9	1035,3	1148,8	1315,6
— Private	156,3	160	164	167,3	208,3	177,5
Total Consumption	76689,2	80355,7	84346,8	89007,5	94423,5	100794,1
Public Disposable Income	17870,5	19127	20572,5	21867,5	23464,4	25206,2
Public Consumption	9095	9485,9	9903,3	10348,9	10825,0	11333,7
Public Saving	8775,5	9641,1	10669,3	11518,6	12639,4	13866,5
Public Investment	10960,8	11627,8	12433,7	131 73,6	13954,7	14851,4
Public Saving-Investment Difference	-2185,3	-1986,7	-1764,5	-1655	-1315,3	-985
Private Disposable Income	85821,5	90465,1	96252,6	103252,2	111164,4	120347
Private Consumption	67594,2	70869,8	74443,6	78658,5	83598,6	89460,3
Private Savings	18227,3	19595,3	21809	24593,7	27565,8	30886,7
Private Investment	14130,5	15237	16624,8	18481,7	20871,3	24054,2
Private Savings-Investment Difference	4096,9	4358,3	5184,2	6112	6694,5	6832,5
Private Savings Rate	21,2	21,7	22,7	23,8	24,8	25,7
Total Domestic Savings	27002,8	29236,4	32478,3	36112,3	40205,2	44753,1
Fixed Capital Investment / GDP	23,70	23,80	24,00	24,30	24,90	25,70
Domestic Savings / GDP	26	26,7	44070	28,9	29,9	30,7

Source: 6th Five-Year Development Plan

Seventh Five-Year Development Plan Period (1996-2000)

The Seventh Five-Year Development Plan focuses on institutional and legal regulations more compared to previous plans. In addition, it is aimed to bring human capital to

the fore, to ensure sustainable growth, increase the welfare of the society, increase employment and ensure justice in income distribution (Özdemir, V.,2014).

In the Plan period, it is estimated that the annual average increase in value added by main sectors will be 2.9-3.7 percent in the agricultural sector, 6.0-7.7 percent in the industrial sector and 5.1-6.8 percent in the services sector (Table 7). Thus, at the end of the Plan period, the share of the agricultural sector in GDP is expected to decrease from 15 percent to around 13 percent, on the other hand, the share of the industrial sector will increase from 25.8 percent to 27 percent, and the share of the services sector is expected to remain around 59 percent.

Table 7. Targets of the Structure of Gross Domestic Product in the 7th FYDP

Sector	Average Growth rate	Share in GDP %	
		1995	2000
I. Agriculture	2,9 - 3,7	15,0	13,5 - 13,0
Ii. Industry	6,0 - 7,7	25,8	27,0 - 27,2
Iii. Services	5,1 - 6,8	59,2	59,4 - 59,8

Source: 7th Five-Year Development Plan

Structure of Production

During the Plan period, it is expected that the increase in fixed prices in the agricultural sector will be by 2.9-3.7 percent, in the industrial sector by 6.0-7.8 percent, in the services sector by 4.9-6.8 percent and the total production increase was 5.2-6 percent (Table 8).

Table 8. Targets of the Production Structure of the 7th Five-Year Development Plan

SECTORS	1995 (1)	1995 Percentage Distribution	1995 - 2000 Annual Average Percentage Change		2000 Percentage Distribution
Agriculture	826,1	12,4	2,9	- 3,7	11,2 - 10,7
Industry	2 777,8	41,8	6,0	- 7,8	43,6 - 43,7
Services	3 039,1	45,8	4,9	- 6,8	45,2 - 45,6
TOTAL	6 643,0	100,0	5,2	- 6,9	100,0 - 100,0

Source: 7th Five-Year Development Plan

General Balance Targets of the Economy

In the 7th Five-Year Development Plan, two different scenarios based on econometric estimates were prepared differently from previous plans. Accordingly, it is estimated that the real increase in GDP will be between 5.0-6.6 percent annually.

- Annual increase in net external factor revenues of 5.5-7.1 percent
- The share of foreign resources in GNP is between 4.2 and 3.2 percent at the end of 2000

-
- An annual average increase of 6.3-7.6 percent in total demand
 - Increase of total investments at an annual average rate of 8.8-12.3 percent and its share in GNP from 22.1 percent in 1995 to 25.8-28.1 percent in 2000
 - Average 5.5-6.1 percent increase in total consumption expenditures
 - Private consumption increased by an annual average of 5.9-6.6 percent and public consumption increased by 2.7-2.6 percent
 - Due to the increase in public revenues and the decrease in interest expenditures, the share of public disposable income in GNP is expected to increase from 7.6 percent in 1995 to around 12 percent in 2000, at fixed prices.

In order to realize the foreseen growth, a fixed capital investment of 5.604.6-6.439.3 trillion TL should be made at 1994 prices during the Plan period. It is expected that 4.280.9-4.918.5 trillion TL of the total fixed capital investments will be realized by the private sector and 1.323.7-1.520.8 trillion TL by the public sector.

Evaluation of Development Plans in Terms of GDP, Production Structure and General Balance Targets of the Economy

In Turkey, economic liberalization, which was located in the center of the stabilization program implemented in 1980 and has been an integral part of economic policy since then. The theoretical core of the economic reform program is to achieve efficiency in the allocation of scarce resources and channel unproductive resources to investment and thus stimulate economic growth. (Kar, M., Peker, O., & Kaplan, M. 2008).


In the 1980-2000 period, 4 different development plans were prepared. The first two of these plans were prepared and implemented by the same government led by the prime minister. In the period of 1990-2000, development plans were prepared by different coalition governments amounting to 11.

It may be thought that political instability led by the fact that Turkey was governed by 11 different governments in the period 1990-2000 adversely affected the Turkish economy. In Table 9, information including the governments established during the period, their terms of office, negative developments and the 6th and 7th Five-Year development plans are included.

Table 9. Governments Established in 1990-2000 Period, Terms of Office, Major Events

Government	Date	Term of Office (Day)	Events	
47.Government	9 November 1989 – 23 June 1991	591	1. Gulf War	6th Five-Year development plans
48.Government	23 June 1991 – 20 November 1991	150	1994 Crisis	
49.Government	20 November 1991 – 16 May 1993	541	5 April Stability Program	
50.Government	25 June 1993 – 5 October 1995	832		
51.Government	5 October 1995 – 30 October 1995	25		
52.Government	30 October 1995 – 6 March 1996	128	Customs union agreement	7th Five-Year development plans
53.Government	6 March 1996 – 28 June 1996	114	February 28 Government Coup	
54.Government	28 June 1996 – 30 June 1997	367	1997 Asian Crisis	
55.Government	30 June 1997 – 11 January 1999	560	1998 Russian Crisis	
56.Government	11 January 1999 – 28 May 1999	137	Marmara Earthquake	

The graph of the growth rates targeted in the five-year development plans covering the period 1980-2000 and the actual growth rate are shown in Figure 2. As a result of the internal turmoil in the 1970-1980 period and the subsequent coup, the growth rate was at its lowest. It is seen that the scissors gap targeted and realized in the 5th Five-Year Development Plan was more successful than the other plans. The impact of the 94 crisis in our country affected negatively the growth targeted for 6th FYDP. The targeted growth rate of the 7th FYDP could not be reached due to the 1998 World Financial Crisis and internal dynamics.

**Figure 1.** Targeted and Actual Growth Rates for the 1998-2000 Period

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Information on the shares of sectors in GDP in the period of development plans we are examining is given in Figure 2 below. When Figure 2 is examined, it can be said that there is no significant change in the shares of the sectors in GDP.




Figure 2. Shares of sectors in GDP

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Information on the growth rates of the sectors is given in Figure 3 below. According to Figure 3, the average annual growth rate of the sectors was 1.2% in agriculture; mining and quarrying 2.5%; manufacturing industry 7.5%; energy 8%. We can say that the growth slowed down after 1995 in general.




Figure 3. Growth Rates of Sectors

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Although the goals in the development plans were diversified, economic stability could not be achieved. We can find an answer to the question of why there was no stability by looking at the Consolidated Budget expenditures. Distribution of Consolidated Budget Expenditures by Administrative / Functional Expenditures is given in Table 10.

Table 10. Breakdown of Consolidated Budget Expenditures by Administrative / Functional Expenditures
in the 1980-2000 Period

	1983	1985	1987	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
1. General Administrative Services	54,4	50,4	46,8	40,6	37,4	41,6	38,9	39,4	38	39,7	37,9	45,4	36,2	38,6	33,8
General Services	30,7	25,9	26,6	24,2	19	24,3	20,1	24	22	23,8	24,3	30,6	22,2	25,1	21,3
Defense	20,1	21	16,3	13	13,3	12,1	13,5	10,9	11,9	11,9	10,1	10,9	10,4	10,1	9,5
Justice-Safety	3,6	3,5	3,7	3,4	5,1	5,2	5,3	4,5	4,1	4	3,5	3,9	3,6	3,4	3
2.. Economic Services	22,3	22,8	20,6	15,5	16,7	17,3	17	14,8	10,8	10,1	9,3	10,2	7,9	7,6	9,1
Agriculture-Forestry-Rural Affairs	5,8	5,4	5,2	4,3	5,7	6,6	6,2	5,2	3,9	3,3	2,8	3	2,4	2,6	2,6
Water Works	5,5	7,1	7,7	5,8	5,6	5,6	5,2	4	2,8	3,1	2,8	3,2	2,4	2,3	2,3
Highways	4,7	4,9	3,9	2,9	3,1	3,2	3,1	2,9	2,3	2,2	2,1	2,4	2	1,8	1,8
Public Works	3,7	3,2	2,1	1	1,5	1,3	1,7	2	1,2	1	1,1	1	0,8	0,6	1,9
Transportation	2,2	1,8	1,3	1	0,5	0,4	0,5	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,2
Mining	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,3
3. Social Services	15,7	15,6	15,9	15,9	25,5	22,9	26,1	22,1	18,1	16,6	15,1	16,2	16,3	15,6	13,3
Education	12	11,6	11,6	12,1	18,8	17,3	19,7	16,6	13,4	12,2	11	11,9	12,4	11,8	10,1
Health	2,6	2,7	3	12,6	4,7	4	4,7	3,9	3,5	3,3	3	3,2	3	2,9	2,4
Culture-Tourism	1,1	1,3	1,3	1	0,9	0,7	0,8	0,7	0,6	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,4
Other Social Services	0	0	0	2	1,1	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,6	0,6	0,6	0,6	0,5	0,5	0,4
4. Loan interest payment	7,6	11,2	16,7	28	20,4	18,2	17,9	23,7	33,1	33,4	37,8	28,2	39,6	38,2	43,8

Source: Konukman, A. (s:53, 2003).

When Table 10 is analyzed, it is seen that the biggest increase in expenditure items in the consolidated budget was in debt and interest payments. When we look at what was done during the period, not what the development plans state, we can see the unsustainable increase in borrowing and interest expenses. Thus, it can be said that the goals in the prepared development plans could not be achieved.

Conclusion

Turkey opted for an outward-oriented economy model instead of the import substitution policy in economic policy in the post-1980 period. Thus, new financial and economic regulations were implemented, and particularly, Turkey was integrated into the outside world with the enactment of practices which encourage foreign trade. There are a number of special cases of the 1980-2000 period that form the basis of the study. The analysis to be made on the aforementioned process will be incomplete and insufficient, ignoring the conditions of the current period. Therefore, the relationship between development plans and some macroeconomic indicators cannot be handled within the framework of these two parameters alone.

We can list the developments and factors affecting these two factors in the said period in general terms as follows;

- 1-The years of the 1980s were a period in which liberal political movements and practices were based on privatization, not policies based on planning.
- 2-Turkey became one of the 3 pioneering countries in the world (US, United Kingdom and Turkey) in liberal economic approaches that appeared. While

the governments of Turgut Özal introduced the country to the world economy with their privatization practices and open policies in the said period, they also pioneered liberalist practices.

3-Intense political problems, internal political and financial instabilities and regional-global negative developments that necessiated an evaluation separating the period 1990-2000 from 1980s.

These three realities, whose general framework we determined, had a strong content that would affect the correlation between the aforementioned two parameters. It was observed that the economic and social contributions of development plans were felt before the society. An interesting success of the development plans realized on the liberal ground was observed.

In 4 different planned periods, the most successful periods are the periods when the 4th and 5th development plans were implemented, in which intense liberal policies were implemented. Is this situation, which seems like a contradiction, that liberal thought positively affected the success of planning practices that seem like an alternative to liberalism? This is the subject of discussion for a separate study. The planned development results that could be considered successful could not be obtained from the economic and political greenhouse of the 90s, which was full of adversities. It was concluded that development plans cannot positively affect macroeconomic indicators under unsuitable ground conditions.

This study revealed interesting details in terms of content. As a result, it is another finding of this study that development plans may be successful or unsuccessful under the influence of their conditions.

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